Krimel said: Regardless of the alleged advantages of radical empiricism, it builds on sensory empiricism. We can not experience relations between our sense impressions if we have no sense impressions. ...James is not overturning sensory empiricism in the slightest. He is adding the connectedness of our senses; our ability to match faces and voices. It is the appreciation of figure ground relationships, innate rules for constructing faces and seeing how things relate. He is expanding empiricism to include both sensation and perception. But he says time and again that concepts or ideas or rationalism are derived from experience or perception.
Later, Krimel quoted William James as support: "Empiricism is known as the opposite of rationalism. Rationalism tends to emphasize universals and to make wholes prior to parts in the order of logic as well as in that of being. Empiricism, on the contrary, lays the explanatory stress upon the part, the element, the individual, and treats the whole as a collection and the universal as an abstraction. My description of things, accordingly, starts with the parts and makes of the whole a being of the second order. It is essentially a mosaic philosophy, a philosophy of plural facts, like that of Hume and his descendants, who refer these facts neither to Substances in which they inhere nor to an Absolute Mind that creates them as its objects." dmb says: To answer your question, no, he doesn't sound "a bit like a reductionist". And it shouldn't come as surprise that James "doesn't sound all that pissed off at Hume" because they are both empiricists. The difference is important but they both emphasize experience as the test of truth. The difference between rationalism and empiricism is like the difference between Hegel and Hume, Plato and Aristotle or even the romantic/classic split in ZAMM. The phrase "Absolute Mind", for example, comes from Hegel's philosophy. As James saw it, these were the two main categories throughout philosophy and he thought one's preference for one or the other was largely a matter of temperament. It's one of his grand themes. [Krimel] Call me names all you want but this is insulting. The various incarnations of the mind body debate echoing across the history of philosophy? Who knew? This epic debate gets reduced to the SOM strawman in Lila. I know the tale. I think James is consistently advocating empiricism over the kind of rehashed and regurgitated idealism/romantic/rationalism you keep peddling under guise of 'radical empiricism'. By the way I was responding to your comment, "If a guy were interested in distinguishing traditional sensory empiricism from radical empiricism, he would read what James had to say about Hume." I quote what James says about Hume and you act surprised and then try claim his obviously bottom up view is somehow not reductionist. How are we to take this seriously, Dave? [dmb] Anyway, you're apparently oblivious to this and so, as we see in your comments above, you're taking "rationalism" to mean "concepts or ideas". This misunderstanding, in turn, leads you to read believe James is "expanding empiricism to include both sensation and perception". [Krimel] I am not the least oblivious to this. Rationalism claims that knowledge comes through the exercise of reason. Empiricism says that knowledge arises from the senses. As the quote I offered shows James was firmly on the side of empiricism. James understood full well that perception includes sensation and is derived from it in the same way the concepts are derived from percepts. I have merely trying to get you to acknowledge this fact. [dmb] You're right about one thing. Radical empiricism IS an expansion of traditional empiricism. The quote from Pirsig was supposed to show you HOW it expands upon traditional empiricism. As I see it, you're misreading James in such a way that his expansion would be pretty trivial. It wouldn't really merit a separate name. And [Krimel] I don't see the expansion as trivial in the least. It includes a wide variety of autonomic processes that operate outside of awareness and are certainly worthy of attention. Processes that make the world right side up, even though it is presented to us upside down. These processes open us to immediate communication with our peers in the form of emotional displays. They give us an instant evaluation of the Quality of our surrounding moment to moment and alert us to any change. They are highly evolved and complex reactions to a dynamic environment. But let me add a quote you conveniently failed to address from my previous point. This is what James says specifically about his beef with Hume and how he overcomes it: "...Hume's statement that whatever things we distinguish are as 'loose and separate' as if they had 'no manner of connection.' James Mill's denial that similars have anything 'really' in common, the resolution of the causal tie into habitual sequence, John Mill's account of both physical things and selves as composed of discontinuous possibilities, and the general pulverization of all Experience by association and the mind-dust theory, are examples of what I mean." All he is saying is what he always says. Experience is not made of unconnected discrete elements it is a continuous stream. It is not a set of fixed static events, it is a dynamic every changing stream. Rather like James says later in "Some Problems of Philosophy" perception is dynamic and continuous but ideas, concepts, mental representations are discrete. You are claiming much more for Pirsig than I think James would allow. I know the Apologist in you wants this but I don't think it is so. [dmb] will you puh-leeze stop pretending that gav or I or anyone else is a making a case that we can think without brains or see without eyes. That would be beyond goofy and that's not what it means to expand on sensory empiricism. The quote was suppose to offer a concise statement about the nature of this expanded empiricism.... [Krimel] When you stop hissing "SOM... reduction bad... every time the issue comes up. Make a point Dave. What is specifically is "bad" in some specific meaningful way. Offer some alternate view and show how it better accounts for the data you think is so precious. dmb quoted Pirsig on the MOQ's empiricism: "The MOQ subscribes to what is called empiricism. It claims that all legitimate human knowledge arises from the senses or by thinking about what the senses provide. Most empiricists deny the validity of any knowledge gained through imagination, authority, tradition, or purely theoretical reasoning. They regard fields such as art, morality, religion, and metaphysics as unverifiable. The MOQ varies from this by saying that the values of art and morality and even religious mysticism are verifiable, and that in the past they have been excluded for metaphysical reasons, not empirical reasons. They have been excluded because of the metaphysical assumption that all the universe is compose of subjects and objects and anything that can't be classifieds as a subject or an object isn't real. There is no empirical evidence for this assumption at all. It is just an assumption." Krimel replied: I see nothing in this statement to contradict my original statement above. Apparently, Dave doesn't either. dmb says: Well, here I've just spelled it out and repeated the quote again. You say the expansion is about including sensation and perception and I think anyone should be able to see that the expansion is about including all experience regardless of whether or not it involves the senses. Obviously, that is a much more dramatic move than the one you suggest. I'm not picking nits here, dude. Your misunderstanding of these issue is really quite epic. For (another) example... [Krimel] You are the one claiming James is Pirsig's sock puppet. I think it is clear that sensation was never off the table except in your head. Perception is the addition. I would even grant that James' expansion includes all of the "unconscious" and emotional processes that occupy us for about 90% of our lives, all of the automatic things, from the breathing, to driving a car. But please tell us all, what experience does not involve either sensation or perception or both. Take your pick, mix and match. What kind of experience would that be? What are we to actually consider in your expanded view. Krimel said to dmb: Back to the bitching about reductionism, huh Dave. You have a lot of balls to bring it up after refusing to address the issue previously. But since Pirsig is trying to reduce everything to Value here it seems an especially silly point to try to sneak in. dmb says: I'm a bitch with a lot of balls to sneak in a silly point about reductionism? Are you seriously that oblivious? Dude, reductionism is the name of the thread. Reductionism is the name of my complaint... yamana, yamana, yamana. [Krimel] I named the thread, Dude. I started it as a complaint against your blanket charges of something as bad that you couldn't even identify. I made two extensive posts on the subject that you where unable to deal with. It is seriously disingenuous to act all holy now. And let me add that the quote you tried to sneak reduction into was not about reduction at all. I invite you once again to check out Pirsig's explicit statements in this regard. [dmb] Maybe you're even sincere and don't see these explanations and supporting quotes as a real argument but rather just an attempt to characterize your "position with broad generic meaningless labels", as you put it, "without showing how or why" and offering "nothing at all explicit". [Krimel] Jesus, that is exactly what I have said over and over and here you are offering the same blanketed horse crap. No I sincerely don't think you have address a single point I have made in this thread. It is unbelievable to me that you think this weak nonsense you are offering is anything like an "explanation". [dmb] It's possible that this is not just face-saving bullshit and that you honestly don't think I'm saying anything worth listening to or anything that makes sense. That is possible. [Krimel] Are you just playing here? You are the one whose face ought to be red. Don't you have any pride at all? You apparently don't know what the various forms of reductionism are or which ones you are applying. You say reduction is bad and yet Pirsig doesn't. He says it is a form of generalization that allows theorizing to occur. Pirsig in essence reduces everything to Quality. You use language which reduces concepts to words. You have addressed none of this. But if you think you have answered a single charge or refuted a single statement I have made in several rather lengthy post you are simply delusional. [dmb] But I just don't see why. It doesn't take a rocket surgeon to grasp this stuff. I don't think anybody in my class flunked out over it. But me thinks thou does protest way too much. Me thinks you cannot be serious. [Krimel] Blah, Blah ...more pretentious pandering to your peanut gallery. Your failure here is pretty obvious but I admire your nerve in trying to act smug about it. Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org.uk/pipermail/moq_discuss_archive/
