Kreug]
And therefore all philosophical reflection, as an intellectual movement away from a more concrete analysis into abstract conceptual analysis, invariably must return "...back once again to the *same practical common-sense* of our starting point, the pre-philosophic attitude with which we originally confront the visible world" if it is to remain faithful to our lived experience.3<http://williamjamesstudies.press.illinois.edu/1.1/krueger.html#_ftn3> John] But...but...but... what if our "common sense starting point" is as abstract as concrete? What I mean is, what if this latching onto the one "concrete" thing you can grasp is just as much an intellectual abstraction taken on faith as the most soaring idealistic conceptions? Then preferring the concrete to the abstract is just a preference for minutiae. Kreuger] It is in concrete experience that the world as given, within the "aboriginal flow of feeling" that is the "much-at-onceness" of pre-conceptual phenomenal experience, that we discern the deeper features of reality—such as cause, continuity, self, substance, activity, time, novelty, and freedom.4<http://williamjamesstudies.press.illinois.edu/1.1/krueger.html#_ftn4>This "pre-philosophic" attitude through which we initially face the world is captured in James's development of the concept of "pure experience" as the foundation of his radical empiricism. John] So the deeper features of reality are discerned in the pre-phenomenal experience. Cause is pre-phenomenal. Self is pre-phenomenal. Substance, activity, time, novelty and freedom are all "out there", waiting to be discovered and used. It's just asinine. Pirsig describes it that way exactly. Every time "something" happen in my experience, my brain fires off some kind of electrochemical response. It might be as noticeable as a hot stove or as subtle as a butterfly's kiss. I get some kind of response in my organistic being from the outside world. When this happens, I often get a formal pattern that falls into my category of "known concept". Sometimes it's not recognizable but I still call it a concept - content of consciousness. I might not have a word for it, which means I'll probably have a hard time remembering it or sorting it or intellectualizing about it, but something happens, some definite pattern falls under the purview of my mind. You can spend your time analyzing how this happens, what sort of patterns emerge and give them all kinds of labels... but the one label that does not fit, that does not make any sense whatsoever is "pre-conceptual experience". Such a self-deluded idea as the basis for a metaphysics is ludicrous. He must be using "concept" differently than "brain wave pattern" the way I do. Which I think is a shame, because you can really get hung up on words if you don't differentiate between word-concepts (known intellectual patterns) and thought-concepts. (content of consciousness) Krueger] *5* James's brand of radical empiricism therefore looks to ground his empirical philosophy on the raw material of experience as given. Of this methodological principle he writes: "The postulate is that the only things that shall be debatable among philosophers shall be things definable in terms drawn from experience."5<http://williamjamesstudies.press.illinois.edu/1.1/krueger.html#_ftn5> John] To a philosopher, it's all debatable - the definable and the indefinable alike. What's not experience? Just because it occurs only in my mind, is that not an "experience"? Perhaps the only "pure" experience we can realize is that purely in our minds. Thus "terms drawn from experience" can be shortened to "terms". True, albeit tautologically. Kreuger] James was suspicious of the idea that conceptual or propositional thought functions as the primitive—and thus irreducible—interface between self and world. On this conceptualist or "intellectualist" line, as James refers to it, all thinking and experience involves concepts. No concepts, no experience. John] I guess I must be an "intellectualist" because that's the way I define "concept" - any thought or experience or brainwave pattern. Kreuger] James instead argues that the phenomenal content of embodied experience *as experienced* outstrips our capacity to conceptually or linguistically articulate it. John] He's saying the we experience a lot that we don't consciously experience? Ok, I got no problem with that. Just don't call it a concrete foundation is all. Kreuger] In other words, James insists that many of our basic experiences harbor *non-conceptual content*. That is, many of our experiences have a rich phenomenal content that is too fine-grained and sensuously detailed to lend itself to an exhaustive conceptual analysis.7<http://williamjamesstudies.press.illinois.edu/1.1/krueger.html#_ftn7> John] Exhaustive conceptual analysis can be exhausting, like trying to count how many hypothesis can dance on the pins of your head - an infinity of them, is the answer. So? Like trying to quantify the ten thousand things. Don't go there. "Non-conceptual content" is a concept that has no content. I can see that this is going to have to be continued. Where did you guys get this guy? Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org.uk/pipermail/moq_discuss_archive/
