John, Must you apply a static pattern of value to an experience? Marsha
-----Original Message----- From: [email protected] [mailto:[email protected]] On Behalf Of John Carl Sent: Saturday, July 25, 2009 7:25 PM To: [email protected] Subject: Re: [MD] John Carl's Critique of Pure Experience. Inst02 Not if you define concepts by experience... how could there be? On Sat, Jul 25, 2009 at 2:04 PM, MarshaV <[email protected]> wrote: > > John, > > Are you saying that you to not believe there is experience that is > non-conceptual? > > > Marsha > > > > > > -----Original Message----- > From: [email protected] > [mailto:[email protected]] On Behalf Of John Carl > Sent: Saturday, July 25, 2009 4:31 PM > To: [email protected] > Subject: [MD] John Carl's Critique of Pure Experience. Inst02 > > Kreug] > > > And therefore all philosophical reflection, as an intellectual movement > away > from a more concrete analysis into abstract conceptual analysis, invariably > must return "...back once again to the *same practical common-sense* of our > starting point, the pre-philosophic attitude with which we originally > confront the visible world" if it is to remain faithful to our lived > experience.3< > http://williamjamesstudies.press.illinois.edu/1.1/krueger.html# > _ftn3> > > > > John] > > > But...but...but... what if our "common sense starting point" is as abstract > as concrete? What I mean is, what if this latching onto the one > "concrete" > thing you can grasp is just as much an intellectual abstraction taken on > faith as the most soaring idealistic conceptions? Then preferring the > concrete to the abstract is just a preference for minutiae. > > > Kreuger] > > > > It is in concrete experience that the world as given, within the > "aboriginal > flow of feeling" that is the "much-at-onceness" of pre-conceptual > phenomenal > experience, that we discern the deeper features of reality-such as cause, > continuity, self, substance, activity, time, novelty, and > freedom.4< > http://williamjamesstudies.press.illinois.edu/1.1/krueger.html#_ft > n4>This > "pre-philosophic" attitude through which we initially face the world > is > captured in James's development of the concept of "pure experience" as the > foundation of his radical empiricism. > > > John] > > > So the deeper features of reality are discerned in the pre-phenomenal > experience. Cause is pre-phenomenal. Self is pre-phenomenal. Substance, > activity, time, novelty and freedom are all "out there", waiting to be > discovered and used. It's just asinine. Pirsig describes it that way > exactly. > > > Every time "something" happen in my experience, my brain fires off some > kind > of electrochemical response. It might be as noticeable as a hot stove or > as > subtle as a butterfly's kiss. I get some kind of response in my organistic > being from the outside world. When this happens, I often get a formal > pattern that falls into my category of "known concept". Sometimes it's not > recognizable but I still call it a concept - content of consciousness. > I > might not have a word for it, which means I'll probably have a hard time > remembering it or sorting it or intellectualizing about it, but something > happens, some definite pattern falls under the purview of my mind. You can > spend your time analyzing how this happens, what sort of patterns emerge > and > give them all kinds of labels... but the one label that does not fit, that > does not make any sense whatsoever is "pre-conceptual experience". Such a > self-deluded idea as the basis for a metaphysics is ludicrous. > > > He must be using "concept" differently than "brain wave pattern" the way I > do. Which I think is a shame, because you can really get hung up on words > if you don't differentiate between word-concepts (known intellectual > patterns) and thought-concepts. (content of consciousness) > > > Krueger] > > *5* > > James's brand of radical empiricism therefore looks to ground his > empirical philosophy on the raw material of experience as given. Of this > methodological principle he writes: "The postulate is that the only things > that shall be debatable among philosophers shall be things definable in > terms drawn from > experience."5< > http://williamjamesstudies.press.illinois.edu/1.1/krueger.html > #_ftn5> > > > > > John] > > > To a philosopher, it's all debatable - the definable and the indefinable > alike. What's not experience? Just because it occurs only in my mind, is > that not an "experience"? Perhaps the only "pure" experience we can > realize is that purely in our minds. Thus "terms drawn from experience" > can > be shortened to "terms". True, albeit tautologically. > > > > Kreuger] > > > James was suspicious of the idea that conceptual or propositional thought > functions as the primitive-and thus irreducible-interface between self and > world. On this conceptualist or "intellectualist" line, as James refers > to > it, all thinking and experience involves concepts. No concepts, no > experience. > > > John] > > > I guess I must be an "intellectualist" because that's the way I define > "concept" - any thought or experience or brainwave pattern. > > > Kreuger] > > > James instead argues that the phenomenal content of embodied experience *as > experienced* outstrips our capacity to conceptually or linguistically > articulate it. > > > John] > > He's saying the we experience a lot that we don't consciously experience? > Ok, I got no problem with that. Just don't call it a concrete foundation > is all. > > > Kreuger] > > > In other words, James insists that many of our basic experiences > harbor *non-conceptual > content*. That is, many of our experiences have a rich phenomenal content > that is too fine-grained and sensuously detailed to lend itself to an > exhaustive conceptual > analysis.7< > http://williamjamesstudies.press.illinois.edu/1.1/krueger.html#_f > tn7> > > > > John] > > > Exhaustive conceptual analysis can be exhausting, like trying to count how > many hypothesis can dance on the pins of your head - an infinity of them, > is the answer. So? Like trying to quantify the ten thousand things. > Don't > go there. > > > "Non-conceptual content" is a concept that has no content. I can see that > this is going to have to be continued. Where did you guys get this guy? > Moq_Discuss mailing list > Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. > http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org > Archives: > http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ > http://moq.org.uk/pipermail/moq_discuss_archive/ > > Moq_Discuss mailing list > Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. > http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org > Archives: > http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ > http://moq.org.uk/pipermail/moq_discuss_archive/ > Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org.uk/pipermail/moq_discuss_archive/ Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org.uk/pipermail/moq_discuss_archive/
