Hi John, Most of the disagreements in this forum might have at their basis a conflict of definition. For now I'm looking forward to reading your Part-03.
Marsha -----Original Message----- From: [email protected] [mailto:[email protected]] On Behalf Of John Carl Sent: Sunday, July 26, 2009 2:19 PM To: [email protected] Subject: Re: [MD] John Carl's Critique of Pure Experience. Inst02 I don't know about intelligent reasons. I define concept as "patterned brain stimulation" - which just about includes everything. Other people define "concept" as "words". Thus I do believe in their non-conceptual experience, I just don't believe in mine. Hey! Cool bumper sticker/t-shirt idea. On Sun, Jul 26, 2009 at 11:08 AM, MarshaV <[email protected]> wrote: > > John, > > You do not need to answer. I will assume that you do not deny the > possibility of non-conceptual experience, but have an intelligent reason > for > not accepting it. > > > Marsha > > > > > -----Original Message----- > From: [email protected] > [mailto:[email protected]] On Behalf Of MarshaV > Sent: Sunday, July 26, 2009 1:48 PM > To: [email protected] > Subject: Re: [MD] John Carl's Critique of Pure Experience. Inst02 > > > But you wanna disagree with the state of non-conceptualized experience? > > > -----Original Message----- > From: [email protected] > [mailto:[email protected]] On Behalf Of John Carl > Sent: Sunday, July 26, 2009 1:16 PM > To: [email protected] > Subject: Re: [MD] John Carl's Critique of Pure Experience. Inst02 > > Nah... I don't wanna. > > > > > On Sat, Jul 25, 2009 at 8:09 PM, MarshaV <[email protected]> wrote: > > > > > John, > > > > The MoQ states that experience comes before conceptualizing self and > > object, > > do you disagree with this? > > > > > > Marsha > > > > > > > > > > -----Original Message----- > > From: [email protected] > > [mailto:[email protected]] On Behalf Of John Carl > > Sent: Saturday, July 25, 2009 7:25 PM > > To: [email protected] > > Subject: Re: [MD] John Carl's Critique of Pure Experience. Inst02 > > > > Not if you define concepts by experience... how could there be? > > > > On Sat, Jul 25, 2009 at 2:04 PM, MarshaV <[email protected]> wrote: > > > > > > > > John, > > > > > > Are you saying that you to not believe there is experience that is > > > non-conceptual? > > > > > > > > > Marsha > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > -----Original Message----- > > > From: [email protected] > > > [mailto:[email protected]] On Behalf Of John Carl > > > Sent: Saturday, July 25, 2009 4:31 PM > > > To: [email protected] > > > Subject: [MD] John Carl's Critique of Pure Experience. Inst02 > > > > > > Kreug] > > > > > > > > > And therefore all philosophical reflection, as an intellectual movement > > > away > > > from a more concrete analysis into abstract conceptual analysis, > > invariably > > > must return "...back once again to the *same practical common-sense* of > > our > > > starting point, the pre-philosophic attitude with which we originally > > > confront the visible world" if it is to remain faithful to our lived > > > experience.3< > > > http://williamjamesstudies.press.illinois.edu/1.1/krueger.html# > > > _ftn3> > > > > > > > > > > > > John] > > > > > > > > > But...but...but... what if our "common sense starting point" is as > > abstract > > > as concrete? What I mean is, what if this latching onto the one > > > "concrete" > > > thing you can grasp is just as much an intellectual abstraction taken > on > > > faith as the most soaring idealistic conceptions? Then preferring the > > > concrete to the abstract is just a preference for minutiae. > > > > > > > > > Kreuger] > > > > > > > > > > > > It is in concrete experience that the world as given, within the > > > "aboriginal > > > flow of feeling" that is the "much-at-onceness" of pre-conceptual > > > phenomenal > > > experience, that we discern the deeper features of reality-such as > cause, > > > continuity, self, substance, activity, time, novelty, and > > > freedom.4< > > > http://williamjamesstudies.press.illinois.edu/1.1/krueger.html#_ft > > > n4>This > > > "pre-philosophic" attitude through which we initially face the world > > > is > > > captured in James's development of the concept of "pure experience" as > > the > > > foundation of his radical empiricism. > > > > > > > > > John] > > > > > > > > > So the deeper features of reality are discerned in the pre-phenomenal > > > experience. Cause is pre-phenomenal. Self is pre-phenomenal. > > Substance, > > > activity, time, novelty and freedom are all "out there", waiting to be > > > discovered and used. It's just asinine. Pirsig describes it that way > > > exactly. > > > > > > > > > Every time "something" happen in my experience, my brain fires off some > > > kind > > > of electrochemical response. It might be as noticeable as a hot stove > or > > > as > > > subtle as a butterfly's kiss. I get some kind of response in my > > organistic > > > being from the outside world. When this happens, I often get a formal > > > pattern that falls into my category of "known concept". Sometimes it's > > not > > > recognizable but I still call it a concept - content of > consciousness. > > > I > > > might not have a word for it, which means I'll probably have a hard > time > > > remembering it or sorting it or intellectualizing about it, but > something > > > happens, some definite pattern falls under the purview of my mind. You > > can > > > spend your time analyzing how this happens, what sort of patterns > emerge > > > and > > > give them all kinds of labels... but the one label that does not fit, > > that > > > does not make any sense whatsoever is "pre-conceptual experience". > Such > > a > > > self-deluded idea as the basis for a metaphysics is ludicrous. > > > > > > > > > He must be using "concept" differently than "brain wave pattern" the > way > > I > > > do. Which I think is a shame, because you can really get hung up on > > words > > > if you don't differentiate between word-concepts (known intellectual > > > patterns) and thought-concepts. (content of consciousness) > > > > > > > > > Krueger] > > > > > > *5* > > > > > > James's brand of radical empiricism therefore looks to ground his > > > empirical philosophy on the raw material of experience as given. Of > this > > > methodological principle he writes: "The postulate is that the only > > things > > > that shall be debatable among philosophers shall be things definable in > > > terms drawn from > > > experience."5< > > > http://williamjamesstudies.press.illinois.edu/1.1/krueger.html > > > #_ftn5> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > John] > > > > > > > > > To a philosopher, it's all debatable - the definable and the > indefinable > > > alike. What's not experience? Just because it occurs only in my > mind, > > is > > > that not an "experience"? Perhaps the only "pure" experience we can > > > realize is that purely in our minds. Thus "terms drawn from > experience" > > > can > > > be shortened to "terms". True, albeit tautologically. > > > > > > > > > > > > Kreuger] > > > > > > > > > James was suspicious of the idea that conceptual or propositional > thought > > > functions as the primitive-and thus irreducible-interface between self > > and > > > world. On this conceptualist or "intellectualist" line, as James > refers > > > to > > > it, all thinking and experience involves concepts. No concepts, no > > > experience. > > > > > > > > > John] > > > > > > > > > I guess I must be an "intellectualist" because that's the way I define > > > "concept" - any thought or experience or brainwave pattern. > > > > > > > > > Kreuger] > > > > > > > > > James instead argues that the phenomenal content of embodied experience > > *as > > > experienced* outstrips our capacity to conceptually or linguistically > > > articulate it. > > > > > > > > > John] > > > > > > He's saying the we experience a lot that we don't consciously > experience? > > > Ok, I got no problem with that. Just don't call it a concrete > > foundation > > > is all. > > > > > > > > > Kreuger] > > > > > > > > > In other words, James insists that many of our basic experiences > > > harbor *non-conceptual > > > content*. That is, many of our experiences have a rich phenomenal > content > > > that is too fine-grained and sensuously detailed to lend itself to an > > > exhaustive conceptual > > > analysis.7< > > > http://williamjamesstudies.press.illinois.edu/1.1/krueger.html#_f > > > tn7> > > > > > > > > > > > > John] > > > > > > > > > Exhaustive conceptual analysis can be exhausting, like trying to count > > how > > > many hypothesis can dance on the pins of your head - an infinity of > > them, > > > is the answer. So? Like trying to quantify the ten thousand things. > > > Don't > > > go there. > > > > > > > > > "Non-conceptual content" is a concept that has no content. I can see > > that > > > this is going to have to be continued. Where did you guys get this > guy? > > > Moq_Discuss mailing list > > > Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. > > > http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org > > > Archives: > > > http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ > > > http://moq.org.uk/pipermail/moq_discuss_archive/ > > > > > > Moq_Discuss mailing list > > > Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. > > > http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org > > > Archives: > > > http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ > > > http://moq.org.uk/pipermail/moq_discuss_archive/ > > > > > Moq_Discuss mailing list > > Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. > > http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org > > Archives: > > http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ > > http://moq.org.uk/pipermail/moq_discuss_archive/ > > > > Moq_Discuss mailing list > > Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. > > http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org > > Archives: > > http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ > > http://moq.org.uk/pipermail/moq_discuss_archive/ > > > > Moq_Discuss mailing list > > Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. > > http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org > > Archives: > > http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ > > http://moq.org.uk/pipermail/moq_discuss_archive/ > > > Moq_Discuss mailing list > Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. > http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org > Archives: > http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ > http://moq.org.uk/pipermail/moq_discuss_archive/ > > Moq_Discuss mailing list > Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. > http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org > Archives: > http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ > http://moq.org.uk/pipermail/moq_discuss_archive/ > > Moq_Discuss mailing list > Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. > http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org > Archives: > http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ > http://moq.org.uk/pipermail/moq_discuss_archive/ > Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org.uk/pipermail/moq_discuss_archive/ Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org.uk/pipermail/moq_discuss_archive/
