DMB, you wrote to John... "In the sentences you're responding to here, please notice that Kreuger is doing what I do so often, which is to use a variety of terms to refer to the same basic notion. In this case, "pure experience" is also called "concrete experience", the "aboriginal flow of feeling", "much-at-onceness" and "preconceptual phenomenal experience". Each of these terms are just different ways to refer to the same thing."
I agree with that approach, feel exactly the same way ... what do we do with people (mentioning no names) who still expect "definitional" use of words like "pure", "immediate", "pre-conceptual", "radical" ? Regards Ian On Thu, Jul 30, 2009 at 1:34 AM, david buchanan<[email protected]> wrote: > > Joel Kreuger wrote: > It is in concrete experience that the world as given, within the "aboriginal > flow of feeling" that is the "much-at-onceness" of pre-conceptual phenomenal > experience, that we discern the deeper features of reality—such as cause, > continuity, self, substance, activity, time, novelty, and freedom. This > "pre-philosophic" attitude through which we initially face the world is > captured in James's development of the concept of "pure experience" as the > foundation of his radical empiricism. > > John responded to Joel: > So the deeper features of reality are discerned in the pre-phenomenal > experience. Cause is pre-phenomenal. Self is pre-phenomenal. Substance, > activity, time, novelty and freedom are all "out there", waiting to be > discovered and used. It's just asinine. Pirsig describes it that way > exactly. > > dmb says: > Firstly, I should say that main point in providing the link to Kreuger's > article was to show that the concept of "pure experience" works in James's > pragmatism as well as in Zen Buddhism. The idea was to show Marsha that James > is quite compatible with Eastern philosophies. Now that she has found a book > on the Dalai Lama that uses quotes from James, that assertion seems a lot > less strange and a lot more believable to her. I think Kreuger's article > serves that purpose pretty well. Since the purpose now is to get at the basic > ideas in James's radical empiricism, I'm not so sure his article is the best > we could do. But, especially since you've already done so much work on it, > it's good enough. > > In the sentences you're responding to here, please notice that Kreuger is > doing what I do so often, which is to use a variety of terms to refer to the > same basic notion. In this case, "pure experience" is also called "concrete > experience", the "aboriginal flow of feeling", "much-at-onceness" and > "preconceptual phenomenal experience". Each of these terms are just different > ways to refer to the same thing. Kreuger is saying that "the deeper features > of reality" are discerned from this pure experience, but I would prefer to > say they are derived from this preconceptual experience. In terms of the MOQ, > Kreuger would be saying that static patterns of quality are derived from > Dynamic Quality. The static patterns are things like causation, self, > substance and time. To put it in ordinary language, this is just a way of > saying that these are concepts drawn from concrete experience. > > One good way to think about this would be the contrast between the terms > "phenomena" and "noumena", which mean "things that appear" and "things that > are thought". This is very much like the contrast between perception and > conception. These terms are generally used within SOM so one can find people > like Kant (idealism) and Hume (empiricism) using them but they work pretty > well anyway. Sorry for getting so basic on you here, but I couldn't help but > notice that you converted Kreuger's "preconceptual phenomenal experience" > into "pre-phenomenal experience". See, Kreuger is being a little redundant > there because phenomenal experience is already contrasted with conceptual > experience simply by virtue of the meaning of those terms. And since > phenomenal experience is the first and most basic kind of experience, there > is no such thing as a "pre-phenomenal experience". That phrase basically > would mean "pre-experiential experience" and so the phrase is nonsense in the > same way that the phrase "preconceptual concepts" would make no sense. Not > that you said any such thing. > > John said: > He (Kreuger) must be using "concept" differently than "brain wave pattern" > the way I do. Which I think is a shame, because you can really get hung up > on words if you don't differentiate between word-concepts (known intellectual > patterns) and thought-concepts. (content of consciousness) > > dmb says: > > Yea, I think that this whole thing will be a lot less confusing if you just > agree to use the standard meaning of the word "concept". As I understand it, > James, Pirsig, Kreuger and myself use the term in the ordinary way. It just > means "idea" and ideas are so intimately tied in with language that one can > hardly separate the two. (If semiotics has it right, words and concepts are > two of the three aspects in the total system of meaning.) Think of the way > concepts have meaning and value only insofar as they can be defined, for > example. Definitions and concepts are very nearly the same thing. As far as > our present purposes go, the distinction between word-concepts and > thought-concepts would be irrelevant. Then again, I'm not really even sure > what you mean by that. > Krueger said: > James's brand of radical empiricism therefore looks to ground his empirical > philosophy on the raw material of experience as given. Of this methodological > principle he writes: "The postulate is that the only things that shall be > debatable among philosophers shall be things definable in terms drawn from > experience." > > John replied: > To a philosopher, it's all debatable - the definable and the indefinable > alike. What's not experience? Just because it occurs only in my mind, is > that not an "experience"? Perhaps the only "pure" experience we can > realize is that purely in our minds. Thus "terms drawn from experience" can > be shortened to "terms". True, albeit tautologically. > > dmb says: > Krueger's sentence means the same thing as James's and "experience" is the > operative word in both of them. The empiricists says that all knowledge must > be grounded in experience and the radical empiricists says the same thing, > only he says it louder and more emphatically. James is simply saying that > philosophers have no business talking about things that can't be known in > experience. James goes on to say that philosophers can't ignore ANY kind of > experience, that they have to talk about whatever is known in experience. The > radical empiricists literally goes so far as to say that experience and > reality are the same thing. Or to put is as neatly as possible; experience IS > reality. And yes, so-called subjective experience definitely counts as > experience, as reality. > > Krueger wrote: > James was suspicious of the idea that conceptual or propositional thought > functions as the primitive—and thus irreducible—interface between self and > world. On this conceptualist or "intellectualist" line, as James refers to > it, all thinking and experience involves concepts. No concepts, no experience. > > John replied: > guess I must be an "intellectualist" because that's the way I define > "concept" - any thought or experience or brainwave pattern. > > dmb says: > > This is where the inadequacy of Krueger's article really starts to show. Not > that there's anything wrong with what he's saying but a different writer > might have highlighted the implied attack on SOM here. I mean, James isn't > just disputing the idea that conceptual thought functions as the "interface > between self and world", as we see in the quotes from chapter 29 in Lila, > he's also saying that "self" and "world" are concepts. > > Krueger said: > James instead argues that the phenomenal content of embodied experience *as > experienced* outstrips our capacity to conceptually or linguistically > articulate it. > > John replied: > He's saying the we experience a lot that we don't consciously experience? Ok, > I got no problem with that. Just don't call it a concrete foundation is all. > > dmb says: > Yea, sort of. The idea here is simply that reality is too rich for words. > Experience is so much bigger than our thoughts. When Krueger goes on to say > "our experiences have a rich phenomenal content that is too fine-grained and > sensuously detailed to lend itself to an exhaustive conceptual analysis", > he's basically just repeating himself. But don't get me wrong. When one is > trying to explain an unusual idea, repeating oneself in various ways with > various terms is a very good thing. In ZAMM Pirsig expresses this same idea > by way of sand. He says the world as we know it is just a handful of sand > drawn from an endless beach. In Lila, he says there is always a discrepancy > between concepts and reality. It all means the same thing. If just one of > them works for you, the other ways of saying it will suddenly make a lot more > sense. > > Later,dmb > > > _________________________________________________________________ > NEW mobile Hotmail. Optimized for YOUR phone. 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