On 12/03/09, 3:16 PM, Joseph Maurer wrote:
Hi Ham,
Following Aquinas-Aristotle¹s theory of knowledge in SOM
there are two ways of looking at existence. There is a "real" existence
--how a thing exists in itself, and an ³intentional² existence--how a
thing
exists in a mind after the abstraction of the essence by the intellect
which then creates an "intentional" existence and the abstraction has
existence only in a mind.
This "realist"-"idealist" characterization of existence is based in the
metaphysical theory for the dual existence in knowledge SOM.
I don't know what source you used for this analysis, but you seem to be
aiming for a synthesis of Aristotelianism, Essentialism, and Pirsigianism
which confuses all three. Also, I'm never sure what "intentional" is
supposed to mean with respect to existence and creation. Is existence
"intentional" when posited as a product of intellection? Or, should this
term only be applied to existence posited as the creation of an "intelligent
designer"?
Aquinas accepted Aristotle's primacy of the "Act" (i.e., being, matter) but
was still dealing with Plato's "Forms", so in that sense he was an idealist.
He believed that objective knowledge was acquired through two cognitive
faculties working in tandem--"sense" and "intellect". In the process of
cognition the form of the "universal" is impressed upon the sensibility of
"matter" to actualize the individuated object. According to Maurice de Wulf
who compiled the radicalacademy.com essay on Aquinas, "The object of
sensitive knowledge is the particular thing, while the object of the
intellect is the 'intelligible,' which is arrived at from the particular by
abstraction."
My own epistemology reverses this functionality. The Aquinas-Aristotle
"sense" is Ham's Sensibility (to/of essential Value). Experience
differentiates Value into the existential objects, while intellection makes
it knowledgeable as universal truth relative to the individual. I do not
subscribe to the concept of "primary matter" or "universal form".
Pirsig¹s theory of knowledge sees existence in two ways:
"Dynamic-undefined" and "Static-defined" Evolution becomes
meaningful in the undefined pragmatic/value setting of existence.
Imho Pirsig¹s division of existence, static/dynamic, is more precise
pragmatically than the Thomistic duality of idealist/realist and
avoids a mind/matter dichotomy. Applying Pirsig¹s paradigm to
SOM, the "idealist" proposes an indefinable reality, and the "realist"
proposes a definable reality.
Since experiential existence is a process, I view it as "dynamic". I don't
see the logic of attributing "dynamic" to an Absolute Source, nor do I
understand why the "static/dynamic" metaphor is "pragmatically more
precise".
Following Bo¹s description of intellect SOL I would place DQ,
undefined, in L for Language. No matter what we say there is
something undefined, open to further discussion. Mathematics
avoids that by a provision that 1 must be defined before 2 becomes
logical. This limits the scope of mathematics to the defined by
eliminating analogies and metaphors as practical in knowing
what is true. Mathematics depends on the narrowly focused
definition of 1 in the search for truth.
This is my understanding of SOM and it seems our vocabularies
have a difference. On a MOQ mailing list I will be using Pirsig¹s
formulation for a dynamic/static existence.
Imho there is nothing wrong with being "idealistic". It¹s simply
indefinable and requires further explication through the use of
metaphorical and analogical examples for understanding. The
"objectivist" acknowledges a static defined logic for mathematics
as long as 1 is defined. The "logician" appeals to (undefined)
metaphors and analogies to create an atmosphere for a definition
of 1 for his conclusion. The mathematician acknowledges an
existence of a defined 1. Mathematics is based on static logic,
never dynamic logic. There are no analogues in defined mathematics
and its use is more limited in a dialog about what is real.
Unless the prime integer '1' connotes primary difference, mathematical
equations are meaningless in metaphysical propositions. As you say, this
limits the usefulness of mathematics in philosophical explications, forcing
us to use analogy and metaphor. It's my opinion that the "defined world" is
the reality of existentialists and scientific empiricists, whereas
metaphysics presents concepts that resist definition. A philosopher should
be consistent in the usage of 'coined' or special terms, and I feel obliged
to point out fundamental differences between Essentialism and the MoQ in
this forum. Admittedly, however, I'm not comfortable trying to communicate
my concepts in another author's language and generally find
"philosophilogical" comparisons more confusing than enlightening, which is
why I rarely label my philosophy according to some classical school of
thought.
I don't know whether we've resolved anything here, Joe, other than
acknowledging our respective differences. I still owe you a response to
your questions about the meaning and teleological implications of
Essentialism, which I'll get to shortly.
Thanks for your epistemological analysis which leads me to believe I have
little in common with either Aquinas or Pirsig.
Essentially yours,
Ham
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