[John] And I mean that in a good way Krimel. Rarely have I encountered a post where every single point made seems exactly right to me.
[Krimel] Thanks, John. On Mon, Jan 4, 2010 at 10:17 AM, Krimel <[email protected]> wrote: > > [Krimel] > > Right, everything you can think of and everything anyone has ever > > thought of are potentially part of the intellectual level. To actually > > be part of the intellectual level as such, it must be a pattern. That is > > it must persist or have extension in the temporal dimension. > > [Mati:] > I think of the early primitive art in which animals were drawn > on the cave wall, from my perspective they certainly were thinking > about the animals and were conveying them in a temporal interpretation > of the animals themselves. Based on what you suggest they must have > been intellectual. I would suggest they were displaying behavior that > had an intelligence, but they were not intellectual. Intellect > requires a metaphysical basis. That basis did not exist in a capacity > to sustain itself as a level until Aristotle's S/O divide. I think > there is a common agreement that intelligence existed long before > intellect. > > [Krimel] > I think the intellectual level was around way before cave art, which dates > to about 40,000 years ago. But cave art and burial of the dead are among > the > first bits of evidence we have of an intellectual "level". They suggest not > just that thoughts occurred but that they persisted in time and were shared > within a community. > > Intellect does not require metaphysics. You have this backassward. > Metaphysics is a product of intellect. As for the intellectual level its > very existence as a level is supported entirely by the processes of > encoding > and decoding. Language is the first layer of the intellectual level that > provides the extension in time needed for ideas to be transmitted and to > persist in time. Amongst tribal people this meant that the intellectual > level was at first confined to those who shared the language, values and > traditions of small communities. As one group or another becomes more > wide-ranging or families of common languages grew large so to did the > intellectual level in the form of stories told around camp fires and the > transmission of lore and skills to the young. Writing was the next step in > the development of the intellectual level as it allows symbolically encoded > concepts to extend for centuries. Next came the printing press, then film > of > various sorts and now the digital revolution. All are phases in the > explosion of the intellectual level in the modern world. > > Aristotle and the Greeks just happen to coincide with a period during which > writing had allowed for the accumulation of ideas to the point of critical > mass. It was a marvelous time but it is not the beginning; it is merely a > particular phase where in recognizably modern forms of thinking begin to > appear. > > > [Krimel] > > I don't think it is possible for intellect to precede society but if that > > were the case it would indeed be a problem for the MoQ. However, we see > > that the social level is primary in almost all primates and most mammals. > > Intellect on the other hand only begins to show up in the great apes. > > Mati: > I will respectfully suggest that your premise that thinking is > intellect then indeed MoQ has a problem. That has been the Achilles > heal that Bo has been pointing out so persistently for so long. > > [Krimel] > A proton is inorganic but it is not the inorganic level. CO2 is an organic > molecule but it is not the organic level. A thought or even a method of > thinking like logic may be intellectual but not the intellectual level. A > level is the accumulation of all such patterns in one level or another. The > inorganic level consists of static pattern in the subatomic realm. The > biological level is static patterns of carbon molecules and the > intellectual > level is symbolic encoding. > > > [Mati] > > The point is when we discuss something that can defined metaphysically > has > > always come home to the S/O reality. > > > > [Krimel] > > That does seem to be Bo's oft stated notion. It is so clearly wrong that > > it is a wonder that anyone buys, much less repeats it. > > Mati: > It is not clearly wrong from my humble perspective, based on > what you believe is the metaphysical value of intellect. It seems that > some other might have come to the same conclusion as Bo has suggested. > The problem is SOM has created a messy web which tangles our notion > of who we are. Bo's notions rids the tangles and puts intellect in > it's proper place and allows MoQ to be the next possible level. > Otherwise MoQ seems fail to gather any meaning with any legitimacy. > > [Krimel] > As I said metaphysics is a form of intellectual activity. Metaphysics of > any > stripe is a part of the intellectual level. We can argue about the relative > merits of one metaphysics or another but this is hardly the basic for > constructing a new level. > > [Mati:] > I understand the need to suggest that MoQ is an intellectual > pattern. And I agree that SOM and MOQ are two distinctive different > patterns. But if MoQ is a pattern of intellect of sorts it is > completely separate entity from SOM(intellect). I have privately > discussed this issue at length with Bo. They function similarly in the > same metaphysical discussion but MoQ is radically different from SOM > in that provide a far more clearer understanding of all values that > are defined. Pirsig suggests, and I think correctly, that accounts > for the meaning of all values, that was the shortcoming of SOM. I > know Bo will cringe at my suggestion that MoQ might be considered a > Neo-Intellect, but that is an entirely different discussion. > > [Krimel] > These are all fine reasons for preferring MoQ over SOM. But nothing in what > you say suggests that they are sufficiently different to constitute a > different level. Giraffes are very different from elephant but both are > vertebrates, both are mammals. Even the platypus however difficult it was > to > classify finds its way into a comfortable niche in the tree of life. > > {Mati:} > Truth is based on the prospective that is based on. Walk into > any church and ask were truth resides, they won't give you an answer > that is neccessarily intellectually based. > > [Krimel] > I might argue with the quality of the intellectual effort they put into > their account of truth just as I am with you and Bo but that does not make > their account any less intellectual. Their arguments are expressed > symbolically and refer to patterns of thought and action. After all cancer > is a biological pattern just as much as a bad idea is an intellectual > pattern. > > > [Mati] > > The metaphysical path of "encoding of experience into concepts" is a > > dead end that gets nowhere metaphysically speaking in the same manner > > as SOM. Bo's simply points that out. > > > > [Krimel] > > Saying it is a dead end does not make it so. This issue of encoding and > > decoding experience into concepts is fundamental to perception and > > discourse. It is what we are biologically and socially equipped to do and > > without it we have nothing to say no capacity to say it. > > Mati: > Encoding and Decoding of experience is done at the biological, > social and intellectual level. > > [Krimel] > Such patterns as exist at the inorganic, biological and social levels can > be > encoded and decoded conceptually but nothing in those patterns is > conceptual; they merely happen in response to the existing conditions. When > we detect such patterns and render them symbolic then they are at the > intellectual level. > > [Mati:] > The conceptualization is experience is done at both the social and > intellectual level, and some might suggest it even happens at the > biological level. Again encoding and decoding of experience of > concepts seems to be part of the capacity having intelligence not > intellect, though it should be suggested that one needs a capacity > of intelligence to allow intellect to function. > > [Krimel] > A concept is a pattern of thinking that has extension in time. When we > think > about anything, we are operating at the intellectual level. But thinking > and > conceptualization are not required at either the social or the biological > level. The Pecking Order is a social pattern that runs up and down the > animal kingdom. Animals in a group organize their social behavior according > to each individual's rank in such hierarchies. They do not analytically > describe their group dynamics, they just act. Primates are among the most > social of animals and human patterns of social interaction do not differ > significantly from what we see in other primate groups. Our species > characteristically over thinks everything and we intellectualize and > formalize certain forms and expressions of social behavior. But talking or > understanding social behavior in intellectual terms does not make such > talking and analysis any less a part of the intellectual rather than the > social level. > > > [Krimel] > > BTW, metaphysics, like physics, is mainly a matter of finding the > smallest > > set of concepts to account for the largest amount of experience. Static > > and dynamic are two such concepts that account for a wider range of > > phenomena than do subjects and objects or mind and matter. > > Mati: > I find it interesting that of all the metaphysical phenomena > that you had to chose from to contrast MOQ, you chose SOM to make your > point. Pirsig did the same thing. That is why, in part, I believe SOM > defaults to Intellect. There isn't any other metaphysical construct > to default to in the same capacity, or any capacity for that matter, > as the static value of intellect. > > [Krimel] > Odd that you should say this because it has been my experience that when > someone here throws out the "you talking SOM" line, it merely mean they > either don't get what you have said or they don't like it. There is nothing > inherently SOM about physics. I suspect if you took a random sample of > metaphysical leanings of a group of particle physicists you would get a > pretty broad spectrum of opinions. After all Pirsig draws heavily on Bohr > in > his SPOV paper and it is exceedingly difficult to read Bohr as an advocate > of SOM. > > That said, neither you nor Bo has ever presented, to my knowledge, anything > to suggest that the MoQ is not an intellectual pattern. Sadly the SOL > (which > I firmly believe is an apt nom de plume, since in my neck of the woods it > means Shit Outta Luck) is little more than a lame attempt to elevate SOM to > the privileged position from which the MoQ seeks to dethrone it. > > > Moq_Discuss mailing list > Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. > http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org > Archives: > http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ > http://moq.org.uk/pipermail/moq_discuss_archive/ > Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org.uk/pipermail/moq_discuss_archive/ Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org.uk/pipermail/moq_discuss_archive/
