Interesting Arlo, I think my first ever thread on here was this
distinction between
Why ? being answered with a "How" explanation ... of mechanisms,
processes, tendencies, content, context, etc ,
(... which can be as broad or detailed - reductionist - as you like.
And as you say, science has a very good handle on that. )
and ...
Why ? seeking a "What for" purposeful / teleological answer.
Science is also very good at explaining why that purposeful (agent
with an intent) answer is very useful and efficient and a naturally
evolved human way to think. Not many people buy Dennett's "intentional
stance" as anything other than a way of thinking - psychology - but
then that's all he intended anyway (pun intended, intended, intended
... etc). The problem with this purposeful view is when moving between
levels of fine detail (proximate causes) and broader (first or
ultimate) causes, you end up with gods and invisible hands at work,
where as you say the "mu" answer is as good as any ... but then the
"how" answer is as you also say, better. (Science's blind spot - not
blind faith as we clarified earlier - is simply to not even notice or
give credence to this issue existing.)
My main interest in teleological thinking ("as-if" causality I call it
- afer Paul Turner) is in fcat that I believe some version of the
Anthropic Principles will push the boundaries beyond some current
errors in understanding fundamental physics and cosmology - but the
telelology will come out unscathed as a "way of thinking" I'll bet.
Arlo had asked Mary.
> Finally, consider amoebas in a petri dish with a drop of acid placed nearby.
> Science observe the amoeba move, and can describe the mechanisms and context
> this movement occurs. Do you really think "science" has no handle whatsoever
> on "why" the amoeba moved?
Regards
Ian
Moq_Discuss mailing list
Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc.
http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org
Archives:
http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/
http://moq.org.uk/pipermail/moq_discuss_archive/
