Hi Matt, Matt said: I have one wrinkle to Steve's thoughts that people attracted to Alexander Bain's definition of belief as a habit of action should bear in mind. The reconstrual of evidence is great--
> > Steve said: > A bald belief in God (just like a simple lack of belief in God) > does not necessarily cash out as a pattern of action that > frustrates anyone else's pursuit of happiness, so we don't > have the right to demand that theists supply evidence in > support of their beliefs until such beliefs are made public > as specific actions or the intention to act in such a way as > to interfere with other people's desires. > > Matt: > What I would add is that we need to remember that > physical articulation of beliefs--thoughts made public in > the form of spoken or written words (hell, even > semi-linguistic forms as gestures and looks)--are part of > the "made public as specific actions." > Steve: I agree with your expansion of the idea of action to include articulation of beliefs. My point is that all such actions that could be categorized as religious do not necessarily have the potential to interfere with anyone else's pursuits, and if they don't then they don't need to be justified to anyone else. It is only when the religious person wants to enlist someone else in her own pursuits based on a religious belieff such as participating in the public project of science or history or politics hat she faces justified demands for evidence that she has a duty to respond to. Her duty to provide evidence lies only in the extent to which her belief is in service to a desire that includes the cooperation of others. In regard to your 5 cases (especially 4 and 5), if someone intends to be participating in the public projects of history or science (the project of achieving consensus on a coherent picture of reality that best enables us to predict and control) in claiming that the earth was created in 7 days, then that person's beliefs must submit to demands for justification. But if the person intends this belief as aimed at satisfying some different desires that do not include implicit demands for the copperation of others, then the vey same assertion does not need to submit to demands for evidence. Best, Steve Five different cases: 1) someone says on an internet forum: "I believe in God." 2) someone says on an internet forum: "I believe in God, and that means America is great." 3) someone says on an internet forum: "I believe in God, and that means the world was created in 7 days." 4) a science teacher says on Sunday to his parish: "I believe in God, and that means the world was created in 7 days." 5) a science teacher says on Monday to his physics class: "I believe in God, and that means the world was created in 7 days." I think all five cases deserve different treatment. (1) is Steve's "bald belief in God." As stated, it isn't very interesting for the average outsider (even if you are a believer) as the person has motivated it, so what is there to object to? Asking for evidence would likely provoke responses on this model: "Because I feel His presence." And then what would the atheist say? If you say, "Well, I don't," the response might be, "I didn't ask you to," and now you just look silly. If the atheist says, "that's not relevant," and the response is, "it's as relevant as feeling love," now you look really silly. If the atheist says, "Believing in God is the flouting of scientific evidence for evolution," and the response comes, "But I do believe in evolution," now you look stupid for having imputed beliefs to a person willy-nilly. Bald belief in God? Say, "Good for you," and move on. The trouble with (1) is that nothing in particular necessarily follows from it. To feel the need to engage in a conversation, I would think you'd need more evidence of something pernicious. (2) is similar, though weirder. The trouble with (2) is that the conjunction seems like a non sequitor. And you might ask why the person thinks there's a connection there. But nothing, again, necessarily follows from either belief. However, American exceptionalism is a well-known motivator of occasionally bad actions (particularly in those who provide a conjunction between it and their bald belief in God), so extra probing might be in order, to find just what the person thinks is entailed. (3) is an interesting case because it isn't clear whether all secularists should feel compelled to argue with someone who believes the world was created in seven days, particularly if it's only articulated on an internet forum. I say we shouldn't all feel compelled, though people who do can have at it. Only bear in mind that if that belief doesn't, say, motivate them to say hateful things about gay people or make their children scientifically illiterate, it isn't clear what purpose one would have in mind in so engaging. At a certain point, however, with some people (and for clarity sake, I will admit that people in internet forums are probably not these "some people," but meek introverts you meet in regular life might be), one might wonder whether the secularist is being the inconsiderate one by hammering away at a belief the believer doesn't even motivate to do anything with. (4) seems cut and dried to me: nothing wrong, nothing to complain about. Dude shows up to his private club and says private, insidery things to other insiders. (5) also seems fairly cut and dried: dude should be fired. He should be fired, not because he expressed either belief, but because he expressed the second belief while wearing his physics hat, he was expressing his belief in the creation of the world in seven days _as a promoter of physics_ to a crowd who was _trying to learn physics_. Like a lawyer being disbarred for breaking professional rules, the science teacher began teaching religion _as science_. I don't care if teachers want to tell their students whether they believe in God, Allah, Yahweh or Vishnu--it doesn't seem relevant, but I'm not so naive as to think that all sorts of personal beliefs don't seep into educational environs all the time. Nor do I think it is, most of the time, pernicious. But (5) is. But to say again: words are actions. First Amendment case-law only seems on the surface to contradict that statement, but even American law understands that anything that has a physical effect counts as an action that might have a further reaction. Can't yell "fire" in a theatre, after all. (Though apparently you can yell for somebody to call 911, even though there is _not_ a fire burning on the dance floor. I know; I checked.) Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org.uk/pipermail/moq_discuss_archive/
