Steve said to dmb:
Abandoning truth means abandoning theories of truth? You say it's the third
time, but that is a new twist to me. It seems to me that you were unable to
make your claim stick that Rorty is missing something by not talking about
experience, then you moved onto "abandoning truth," but since Rorty obviously
does talk about truth you've now tried to shift the argument once again to
truth theories. But I've always said that Rorty does not claim to have a theory
of truth and thinks we ought to give up the project of seeking a theory of
truth, and I've spent a lot of time explaining why that is.
dmb says:
Yes, I'm talking about abandoning epistemology and truth theories. I'm talking
about why Rorty does that and why I think it's a mistake. The argument has not
"shifted" from truth theories to the claim that Rorty is missing something by
not talking about experience. Both complaints are part of the same argument.
For James and Pirsig, the pragmatic theory of truth and radical empiricism both
heavily rely on experience. This is what distinguishes Rorty from Pirsig and
James. The explanations I offered about the differences between radical
empiricism and traditional empiricism are also part of the same argument. The
debate we just had about the question of truth not being a loaded question is
part of this same argument. I'm asking you to think in paragraphs here, Steve.
And yes, yes, yes again. We are talking philosophy. We're talking about
epistemology and theories of truth. And we're talking about Rorty's refusal to
talk about them as compared with the willingness of James and Pirsig to assert
them both.
Steve said:
I already quoted Rorty explaining why he doesn't think truth is the sort of
notion we ought to try to have a theory about:
"...The question is precisely whether “the true” is more than what William
James defined it as: “the name of whatever proves itself to be good in the way
of belief, and good, too, for definite, assignable reasons.” On James’s view,
“true” resembles “good” or “rational” in being a normative notion, a compliment
paid to sentences that seem to be paying their way and that fit in with other
sentences which are doing so. the pragmatist does not think that, whatever
else philosophy of language may do, it is going to come up with a definition of
“true” which gets beyond James. He happily grants that it can do a lot of other
things. For example, it can, following Tarski, show what it would be like to
define a truth-predicate for a given language. The pragmatist can agree with
Davidson that to define such a predicate – to develop a truth-theory for the
sentences of English, e.g, – would be a good way, perhaps the only way, to
exhibit a natural language as a learnable, recursive structure, and thus to
give a systematic theory of meaning for the language."
dmb says:
I'm trying to explain that this is NOT how James defined "the true". Rorty is
leaving out experience, which is central to James's theory of truth. I've
dished up many James quotes to show you that. As you can see from the redacted
Rorty quote, he puts all the emphasis on sentences and language and says true
is just a normative notion, a compliment paid to sentences. Rorty has
linguisticized James in such a way that it no longer has that central empirical
dimension.
Steve continued:
We've been through all this already. This is when you criticized Rorty for
leaving out experience, which is when I asked you to explain what he is
missing, which is when you dropped that line of criticism, and now we've come
full circle. ... Now you add that he also has refused to do epistemology and
quote this... [from Stanford's article on Rorty] "Rorty suggests, that "we see
knowledge as a matter of conversation and of social practice, rather than as an
attempt to mirror nature." (PMN 171) Rorty provides this view with a label:
"Explaining rationality and epistemic authority by reference to what society
lets us say, rather than the latter by the former, is the essence of what I
shall call ‘epistemological behaviorism,’ an attitude common to Dewey and
Wittgenstein." (PMN 174) ... Indeed, many who share Rorty's historicist
scepticism toward the transcending ambitions of epistemology—friendly critics
like Hilary Putnam, John McDowell and Daniel Dennett—balk at the idea that
there are no constraints on knowledge save conversational ones. Yet this is a
central part of Rorty's position, repeated and elaborated as recently as in TP
and PCP." I find it pretty strange that you object to Rorty dropping
epistemology while quoting a passage describing what Rorty calls his
"epistemological behaviorism."
dmb says:
C'mon Steve. Look at the substance and the meaning of the quote. It is a very
succinct explanation of what Rorty is missing. It seems the answer to the
question only prompts you to ask the question. "Epistemological behaviorism",
despite the name, refers to Rorty's anti-empirical stance. It refers to the
view that knowledge is "a matter of conversation and of social practice, rather
than as an attempt to mirror nature". That's the whole thing in a nutshell.
That is Rorty giving up on epistemology because, for him, epistemology is
defined as the attempt to mirror nature. This is where I point out that his
criticism of attempts to mirror nature cannot be applied to radical empiricism
simply because it is equally critical of that same attempt. Because Rorty
defines the question in terms of that failed answer, he thinks we should give
up on the question altogether. I'm saying that is not a valid conclusion. I'm
saying that pragmatism and radical empiricism can and do reject the
correspondence theory of truth (the mirror of nature) and yet they still has
epistemological thought. They're still empirically based so that the true and
the real are NOT just a matter of "what society let's us say". As the article
notes, you don't have to be a realist to find Rorty's conclusions
objectionable. Like I said, "we might agree that there are certain questions
that should be dropped, questions about thee objective truth or the essence of
truth for example but Rorty thinks that dropping those particular questions
means dropping epistemology in general. James and Pirsig don't take that
approach. Instead of rejecting empiricism, they improve and expand it. In a
very real sense, they go in the exact opposite direction from Rorty".
Steve said:
What is it that you think Pirsig and James say about knowledge that Rorty
doesn't agree with?
dmb says:
That it is grounded in experience, that experience is the test of truth and
defines our range of knowledge. They don't call it radical empiricism for
nothing. It is an explicitly epistemological position. Rorty's refusal to have
such a position means he doesn't agree. That's pretty obvious, isn't it?
Steve said:
Of course I don't deny Rorty's position on theories of truth. We've debated
that issue numerous times, so it is strange that you would think that I would
deny Rorty's position. He doesn't think that philosophical inquiry into truth
will help us determine what is true beyond simply saying with James that true
beliefs lead to successful action, and if a theory of truth doesn't get us past
James (as no offered theory ever has), well then it just isn't worth having.
dmb says:
Well, as I see it, that's just one of the nonchalant ways to abandon
epistemology and truth theories. To say it's not worth having or it's not
interesting enough to do is just the kind of dismissive, subject-changing
approach Rorty recommends. And if the correspondence theory were the only truth
theory I'd probably agree. My point is that it is not the only theory, not the
only question. My point is that Rorty has distorted the pragmatic theory of
truth and dismissed radical empiricism altogether and that these moves make him
very, very different from Pirsig and James. In Pirsig's case, for example,
dismissing radical empiricism means taking DQ out of the MOQ. In James's case,
dismissing radical empiricism means overlooking the attack on SOM, overlooking
the direct attack on the metaphysical assumptions underlying the correspondence
theory and traditional empiricism. These are James's ideas but they certainly
get us past Rorty's idea of James.
Steve said:
Just in case you may want to choose to answer any of the questions I asked
previously, I'll re-post the following from my last post to you where I
complained that you still hadn't answered my questions from the previous post...
dmb says:
To be honest, I saw your questions as evidence of confusion because you asked
them in response to answers already supplied. Or sometimes they seemed to
answer themselves. This one, for example: "How does your talk about empirical
reality add anything to saying that true beliefs lead to successful action?" I
don't understand this question because "action" IS "empirical reality". And
then there are the questions that I've been answering the whole time in lots of
different ways, like this one: "What tools do you have for justifying beliefs
to others that Rorty could not use?" Seriously, isn't it completely obvious by
now? James and Pirsig have an empiricism and a theory of truth. That's what he
does not have for justifying beliefs. For him, the only constraint is
conversation within what society allows us to say.
Honestly, now. You don't see that?
Steve said:
I understand completely that you think that Rorty has left something important
out by not talking about empirical reality. I'm still wondering what that
something is. What is the practical difference between James saying that true
beliefs lead to successful action and saying that true beliefs lead to
successful action IN EXPERIENCE? Does that last bit add some explanatory power?
Does it keep us from getting fooled or keep us from being able to fool others?
dmb says:
Well, "action" counts as experience but it doesn't make for a theory of truth
all by itself. That's makes a practical difference. Rorty is refusing to do
epistemology while Pirsig and James have an epistemology based on experience
and a theory of truth based on agreement with experience. For Rorty, truth is
verbal, is a matter of a sentence's ability to fit in with other sentences.
This is where the concerns about relativism come into the argument because that
has practical consequences. For a pragmatist, talking about empirical reality
makes a practical difference because empirical reality IS practical reality.
Truth is what happens to an idea in the course of experience. It is made true
by events, not by mirroring objective reality or revealing the essence of
truth, whatever that is. This is what it means for truth to lead to successful
action. If we can ride an idea into the future then it proves itself true. If
"action" means conversation or intersubjective agreement, well then you're
talking about something very much more narrow than James or Pirsig. We can't
persuade a motorcycle to fix itself by using the right vocabularies or the
right rhetorical strategies. Your ideas about the machine are going to lead you
through the process of repairing it or they are not. Trying to fix it with the
wrong ideas in mind is probably going to teach you something about what's true
and what isn't. I think Pirsig chose a practical, hands-on analogy to explain
the scientific process AND Zen meditation for a reason. Think about that. Think
about how non-verbal that second one is and how empirical they both are. That's
what Rorty ain't got.
_________________________________________________________________
Hotmail is redefining busy with tools for the New Busy. Get more from your
inbox.
http://www.windowslive.com/campaign/thenewbusy?ocid=PID27925::T:WLMTAGL:ON:WL:en-US:WM_HMP:032010_2
Moq_Discuss mailing list
Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc.
http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org
Archives:
http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/
http://moq.org/md/archives.html
