Hi Matt,

I like the distinction you made between 3 uses of truth. You called
the 3rd use the semantic notion of truth, but isn't this whole
analysis a semantic one?

Best,
Steve





On Wed, May 5, 2010 at 12:10 PM, Matt Kundert
<[email protected]> wrote:
>
> Steve said:
> I agree that it is indeed the same thing to assert that something is true and 
> to assert that you are justified in believing that same something--as Pierce 
> said, "we think each one of our beliefs to be true, and, indeed, it is mere 
> tautology to say so"--it is nevertheless good to recognize that at least some 
> of the things that we are justified in believing are probably not actually 
> true.
>
> Matt:
> Rorty, for these purposes, liked to distinguish--in good, commonsensical 
> dictionary fashion--different uses of the word "true."  Because, on the one 
> hand, justification is our only route to truth, so when you feel justified in 
> believing something, you feel it is true.  That was the "endorsing use of 
> truth" (occasionally called the "complimentary" use which got Rorty into a 
> lot of trouble).  Because, if justification is our only route to truth, then 
> it does seem an add-on to then say it is justified _and_ true.  Call the 
> endorsing use "the use of truth from the first-person standpoint."
>
> Another use of true, which is what Steve wants to emphasize is different and 
> needed--we shouldn't assimilate all uses of truth to the endorsing use (like 
> in our theories of truth)--is the "cautionary use of truth."  This is the 
> impetus of somebody, having heard you slide from justification to a 
> complimentary extra endorsement of "and it's true, too" to say, "well, you 
> might be justified, but it still might not be true."  Call the cautionary use 
> "the use of truth from the third-person standpoint."
>
> Distinct from this again is the "disquotational use of truth," which is the 
> semantic notion, the very boring explanation of the only kind of 
> correspondence pragmatists think we are going to find between sentences and 
> states of affairs: "'X' is true iff X."  (For example: The sentence "Snow is 
> white" is true if and only if snow is white.)  Explains nothing much, but 
> that's the point.  Call the disquotational use "the use of truth from the 
> God-person standpoint."  If you find God's point of view useful, maybe you 
> can get more out of correspondence than pragmatists can.
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