Hi Matt, All I like this distinction between knowledge-that and knowledge-how and not just because it has to do with beavers. Do you think that knowledge-that versus knowledge-how can be used to distinquish between intellectual patterns and other types of patterns? Is knowledge-how ever intellectual or always biological or social? Is knowledge-that ever other than intellectual?
Best, Steve On Thu, May 6, 2010 at 9:18 PM, Matt Kundert <[email protected]> wrote: > > For fuckheads who like Rorty and beavers and think that Rorty has a bias > towards language over non-linguistic experience, I present this passage > talking about the distinction between propositional knowing-that and > nonlinguistic know-how (with beavers): > > "If I understand [Barry] Allen's project, he thinks that we shall only > understand 'the value of knowledge, its ecological singularity, the > inextricability of its and our flourishing' better than the Greeks did if we > set conversation in the context of the production of artifacts and skills. > Such understanding will, Allen believes, be blocked as long as we say, as I > did, that 'conversation is the ultimate context in which knowledge should be > understood.' I should be happy to change 'knowledge' to 'knowledge-that' in > that over-ambitious remark, but this would not eliminate my differences with > Allen. For I do not see that there is anything about the value of knowledge > and its ecological singularity that we do not already sufficiently understand. > > "In particular, I do not see why we need to draw any line between the knowing > animals and the non-knowing animals other than the line between the > sentence-wielding knowers-that and the non-sentence-wielders who only know > how. > > "Allen seems to want the former sort of line, for he says that plants...do > not know how to photosynthesize. Presumably he would also deny that beavers > know how to build dams, for he suggests that 'knowledge is as uniquely human > as our neurology.' Admiring the beavers as I do, I cannot see anything > especially human about knowing how to get things done. Attributing > knowledge-that, on the other hand, seems useful only when explaining > ourselves, and perhaps our computers. We attribute knowledge-how wherever > telic description seems appropriate, but knowledge-that only when intentional > description does." Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
