I think if we follow the Turner letter definition of intellectual patterns as manipulation of symbols, then that's pretty much coextensive with propositional knowing-that. And that, I think, would mean that bio and social are know-how--you can't articulate what you are doing, but you get things done successfully nevertheless. The trouble, as always, in the schematic is how to describe DQ's place.
I remember reading a transcript of a lecture Pirsig gave once where (if memory serves) he used Bertrand Russell's distinction between knowledge by appearance and knowledge by description to catch hold of the same thing. To illustrate the existence of the former he described knowing our grandmother's face before consciously knowing it was our grandmother. There's a TV show with Tim Roth out right now (instant on Netflix!) called Lie to Me that's all about the turning of a know-how--the detection of deception and emotions in the face and body--into a propositional knowing-that (well, it's not at all _about_ that, but is what the premise of the show embodies). While there's nothing in Sellarsian pragmatism that has to deny any of this (Rorty's and Sellars' students have in fact become better and better at capturing it), it also isn't clear to me how the distinction between know-how and knowing-that gets what some people seem to want out of the notion of "pre-intellectual cutting edge of reality." For example, Russell absolutely did _not_ mean the distinction between know-how and knowing-that. He meant more like "direct experience of reality," and once we have an awareness of know-how and knowing-that it either A) takes away all the analogies with know-how in explicating what "language doesn't capture" or B) makes it even more unclear how language (knowing-that) gets in the way of "direct experience" (know-how)--because on the analysis being offered, knowing-that is just one kind of know-how. Matt > Date: Fri, 7 May 2010 08:07:37 -0400 > From: [email protected] > To: [email protected] > Subject: [MD] Know-how > > Hi Matt, All > > I like this distinction between knowledge-that and knowledge-how and > not just because it has to do with beavers. Do you think that > knowledge-that versus knowledge-how can be used to distinquish between > intellectual patterns and other types of patterns? Is knowledge-how > ever intellectual or always biological or social? Is knowledge-that > ever other than intellectual? > > Best, > Steve _________________________________________________________________ Hotmail is redefining busy with tools for the New Busy. Get more from your inbox. http://www.windowslive.com/campaign/thenewbusy?ocid=PID28326::T:WLMTAGL:ON:WL:en-US:WM_HMP:042010_2 Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
