Hi Steve, see below...
On May 20, 2010, at 9:05 AM, Steven Peterson wrote: > Hi Ron, > > Ron said: >> Dave has provided several quotes over the course of this arguement. Which >> stated that Rorty felt that any epistomologial theory of truth is >> meaningless, Dave points out that this is true if one is speaking to the >> context of objective truth in an ontological way. Objective truth is >> culturally derrived. Pirsig and James remark how truth is a species of the >> good. Connecting truth and experience, that is why everyone can agree to >> "the good" but disagree over the truth. > > Steve: > I don't think that Pirsig thinks that people agree about "the good" > any more than they do about the truth. > > Rorty agrees with Pirsig about the notion that truth is a sort of > good. What he doubts (I think along with Pirsig) is the possibility of > coming up with a theory about what MAKES all true statements good--the > essence of Truth. He thinks it is pointless to ask, what is that > common feature that all true sentences share other than goodness? No > answers to that question have ever helped us say more true things or > distinguish true beliefs from false ones. Pirsig points to common ways > that we verify beliefs (logical consistency, coherence with other > beliefs we take to be true, economy of explanation, agreement with > experience), but like Rorty, he doesn't think that truth has an > essence we can get at with a theory. That is what Rorty means by > saying that he sees the pragmatist theory of truth as a deflationary > theory says that truth is not the sort of thing one should expect to > have a philosophically interesting theory about. In Pirsig's terms, to > say that a sentence is true is to say no more and no less than that it > is a high quality intellectual pattern of value. In Rorty's terms, to > say that a belief is true is to say that, as far as we know, no other > habit of action is a better habit of action. > > > Rorty in his Introduction to Consequences of Pragmatism: > "The essays in this book are attempts to draw consequences pragmatist > theory about truth. This theory says that truth is not the sort of > thing one should expect to have a philosophically interesting theory > about. from a For pragmatists, “truth” is just the name of a property > which all true statements share. It is what is common to “Bacon did > not write Shakespeare,” “It rained yesterday,” “E = mc2” “Love is > better than hate,” “The Allegory of Painting was Vermeer’s best work,” > “2 plus 2 is 4,” and “There are nondenumerable infinities.” > Pragmatists doubt that there is much to be said about this common > feature. They doubt this for the same reason they doubt that there is > much to be said about the common feature shared by such morally > praiseworthy actions as Susan leaving her husband, America joining the > war against the Nazis, America pulling out of Vietnam, Socrates not > escaping from jail, Roger picking up litter from the trail, and the > suicide of the Jews at Masada. They see certain acts as good ones to > perform, under the circumstances, but doubt that there is anything > general and useful to say about what makes them all good. The > assertion of a given sentence – or the adoption of a disposition to > assert the sentence, the conscious acquisition of a belief – is a > justifiable, praiseworthy act in certain circumstances. But, a > fortiori, it is not likely that there is something general and useful > to be said about what makes All such actions good-about the common > feature of all the sentences which one should acquire a disposition to > assert. > > Pragmatists think that the history of attempts to isolate the True or > the Good, or to define the word “true” or “good,” supports their > suspicion that there is no interesting work to be done in this area. > It might, of course, have turned out otherwise. People have, oddly > enough, found something interesting to say about the essence of Force > and the definition of “number.” They might have found something > interesting to say about the essence of Truth. But in fact they > haven’t. The history of attempts to do so, and of criticisms of such > attempts, is roughly coextensive with the history of that literary > genre we call “philosophy” – a genre founded by Plato. So pragmatists > see the Platonic tradition as having outlived its usefulness. This > does not mean that they have a new, non-Platonic set of answers to > Platonic questions to offer, but rather that they do not think we > should ask those questions any more. When they suggest that we not ask > questions about the nature of Truth and Goodness, they do not invoke a > theory about the nature of reality or knowledge or man which says that > “there is no such thing” as Truth or Goodness. Nor do they have a > “relativistic” or “subjectivist” theory of Truth or Goodness. They > would simply like to change the subject. They are in a position > analogous to that of secularists who urge that research concerning the > Nature, or the Will, of God does not get us anywhere. Such secularists > are not saying that God does not exist, exactly; they feel unclear > about what it would mean to affirm His existence, and thus about the > point of denying it. Nor do they have some special, funny, heretical > view about God. They just doubt that the vocabulary of theology is one > we ought to be using. Similarly, pragmatists keep trying to find ways > of making anti-philosophical points in non-philosophical language. For > they face a dilemma if their language is too unphilosophical, too > “literary,” they will be accused of changing the subject; if it is too > philosophical it will embody Platonic assumptions which will make it > impossible for the pragmatist to state the conclusion he wants to > reach. > > All this is complicated by the fact that “philosophy,” like “truth” > and “goodness,” is ambiguous. Uncapitalised, “truth” and “goodness” > name properties of sentences, or of actions and situations. > Capitalised, they are the proper names of objects – goals or standards > which can be loved with all one’s heart and soul and mind, objects of > ultimate concern. Similarly, “Philosophy” can mean simply what Sellars > calls “an attempt to see how things, in the broadest possible sense of > the term, hang together, in the broadest possible sense of the term.” > Pericles, for example, was using this sense of the term when he > praised the Athenians for “philosophising without unmanliness” > (philosophein aneu malakias). In this sense, Blake is as much a > philosopher as Fichte, Henry Adams more of a philosopher than Frege. > No one would be dubious about philosophy, taken in this sense. But the > word can also denote something more specialised, and very dubious > indeed. In this second sense, it can mean following Plato’s and Kant’s > lead, asking questions about the nature of certain normative notions > (e.g., “truth,” “rationality,” “goodness”) in the hope of better > obeying such norms. The idea is to believe more truths or do more good > or be more rational by knowing more about Truth or Goodness or > Rationality. I shall capitalise the term “philosophy” when used in > this second sense, in order to help make the point that Philosophy, > Truth, Goodness, and Rationality are interlocked Platonic notions. > Pragmatists are saying that the best hope for philosophy is not to > practise Philosophy. They think it will not help to say something true > to think about Truth, nor will it help to act well to think about > Goodness, nor will it help to be rational to think about Rationality." > > Best, > Steve > And??? Shall I sing: Is that all there is, is that all there is If that's all there is my friends, then let's keep dancing Let's break out the booze and have a ball If that's all there is ___ Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
