Hello John Wilkes Booth born in 1966, [you said] > But I claim that the specification for Truth specifies the empty set. > > IN FACT IT MUST!
OUTSTANDING! Mary - The most important thing you will ever make is a realization. > -----Original Message----- > From: [email protected] [mailto:moq_discuss- > [email protected]] On Behalf Of Frank Booth > Sent: Thursday, May 20, 2010 2:36 PM > To: [email protected] > Subject: Re: [MD] Ron, Rorty and Truth > > [Marsha] > Call me stupid if it makes you feel good, but it seems to me > the best that can be done is to start shifting the world-view from > truth as about subjects and objects, or ideal forms, to truth > as ever-changing, interdependent, impermanent, relative > patterns. > > [Frank] > Hi stupid. > > Didn't work. Still feel like shit. > > There are two things: > > There is a specification of Truth. > > And there are things which satisfy the parameters of the specification > of Truth. > > Obviously two very different things. > > The classical specification for Truth is a synonym for STATIC. > > You want the specification to be a synonym for DYNAMIC. > > But the classical specification of Truth is a high quality Intellectual > pattern, possibly the highest. It seems to get us somewhere. > > And what distinguishes the Intellect from the Social is greater > freedom, i.e. DYNAMISM, EVOLUTION. > > An interesting contradiction. > > But I claim that the specification for Truth specifies the empty set. > > IN FACT IT MUST! > > Otherwise we would have some "thing" that would serve as the > fundamental axiom and we would be able to build from it the ultimate > metaphysics that would explain everything we want to know. > > End of story. > > ( cascade of cheers and applause, the sound of cash registers > overheating and slot machines exploding, wild horses stampeding ) > > We need that empty set. Can't do without it. > > > > > ________________________________ > From: MarshaV <[email protected]> > To: [email protected] > Sent: Thu, May 20, 2010 8:09:33 AM > Subject: Re: [MD] Ron, Rorty and Truth > > > Steve, > > Call me stupid if it makes you feel good, but it seems to me > the best that can be done is to start shifting the world-view from > truth as about subjects and objects, or ideal forms, to truth > as ever-changing, interdependent, impermanent, relative > patterns. > > > Marsha > > > > > > > > On May 20, 2010, at 10:40 AM, MarshaV wrote: > > > > > Hi Steve, > > > > see below... > > > > > > On May 20, 2010, at 9:05 AM, Steven Peterson wrote: > > > >> Hi Ron, > >> > >> Ron said: > >>> Dave has provided several quotes over the course of this arguement. > Which stated that Rorty felt that any epistomologial theory of truth is > meaningless, Dave points out that this is true if one is speaking to > the context of objective truth in an ontological way. Objective truth > is culturally derrived. Pirsig and James remark how truth is a species > of the good. Connecting truth and experience, that is why everyone can > agree to "the good" but disagree over the truth. > >> > >> Steve: > >> I don't think that Pirsig thinks that people agree about "the good" > >> any more than they do about the truth. > >> > >> Rorty agrees with Pirsig about the notion that truth is a sort of > >> good. What he doubts (I think along with Pirsig) is the possibility > of > >> coming up with a theory about what MAKES all true statements good-- > the > >> essence of Truth. He thinks it is pointless to ask, what is that > >> common feature that all true sentences share other than goodness? No > >> answers to that question have ever helped us say more true things or > >> distinguish true beliefs from false ones. Pirsig points to common > ways > >> that we verify beliefs (logical consistency, coherence with other > >> beliefs we take to be true, economy of explanation, agreement with > >> experience), but like Rorty, he doesn't think that truth has an > >> essence we can get at with a theory. That is what Rorty means by > >> saying that he sees the pragmatist theory of truth as a deflationary > >> theory says that truth is not the sort of thing one should expect to > >> have a philosophically interesting theory about. In Pirsig's terms, > to > >> say that a sentence is true is to say no more and no less than that > it > >> is a high quality intellectual pattern of value. In Rorty's terms, > to > >> say that a belief is true is to say that, as far as we know, no > other > >> habit of action is a better habit of action. > >> > >> > >> Rorty in his Introduction to Consequences of Pragmatism: > >> "The essays in this book are attempts to draw consequences > pragmatist > >> theory about truth. This theory says that truth is not the sort of > >> thing one should expect to have a philosophically interesting theory > >> about. from a For pragmatists, “truth” is just the name of a > property > >> which all true statements share. It is what is common to “Bacon did > >> not write Shakespeare,” “It rained yesterday,” “E = mc2” “Love is > >> better than hate,” “The Allegory of Painting was Vermeer’s best > work,” > >> “2 plus 2 is 4,” and “There are nondenumerable infinities.” > >> Pragmatists doubt that there is much to be said about this common > >> feature. They doubt this for the same reason they doubt that there > is > >> much to be said about the common feature shared by such morally > >> praiseworthy actions as Susan leaving her husband, America joining > the > >> war against the Nazis, America pulling out of Vietnam, Socrates not > >> escaping from jail, Roger picking up litter from the trail, and the > >> suicide of the Jews at Masada. They see certain acts as good ones to > >> perform, under the circumstances, but doubt that there is anything > >> general and useful to say about what makes them all good. The > >> assertion of a given sentence – or the adoption of a disposition to > >> assert the sentence, the conscious acquisition of a belief – is a > >> justifiable, praiseworthy act in certain circumstances. But, a > >> fortiori, it is not likely that there is something general and > useful > >> to be said about what makes All such actions good-about the common > >> feature of all the sentences which one should acquire a disposition > to > >> assert. > >> > >> Pragmatists think that the history of attempts to isolate the True > or > >> the Good, or to define the word “true” or “good,” supports their > >> suspicion that there is no interesting work to be done in this area. > >> It might, of course, have turned out otherwise. People have, oddly > >> enough, found something interesting to say about the essence of > Force > >> and the definition of “number.” They might have found something > >> interesting to say about the essence of Truth. But in fact they > >> haven’t. The history of attempts to do so, and of criticisms of such > >> attempts, is roughly coextensive with the history of that literary > >> genre we call “philosophy” – a genre founded by Plato. So > pragmatists > >> see the Platonic tradition as having outlived its usefulness. This > >> does not mean that they have a new, non-Platonic set of answers to > >> Platonic questions to offer, but rather that they do not think we > >> should ask those questions any more. When they suggest that we not > ask > >> questions about the nature of Truth and Goodness, they do not invoke > a > >> theory about the nature of reality or knowledge or man which says > that > >> “there is no such thing” as Truth or Goodness. Nor do they have a > >> “relativistic” or “subjectivist” theory of Truth or Goodness. They > >> would simply like to change the subject. They are in a position > >> analogous to that of secularists who urge that research concerning > the > >> Nature, or the Will, of God does not get us anywhere. Such > secularists > >> are not saying that God does not exist, exactly; they feel unclear > >> about what it would mean to affirm His existence, and thus about the > >> point of denying it. Nor do they have some special, funny, heretical > >> view about God. They just doubt that the vocabulary of theology is > one > >> we ought to be using. Similarly, pragmatists keep trying to find > ways > >> of making anti-philosophical points in non-philosophical language. > For > >> they face a dilemma if their language is too unphilosophical, too > >> “literary,” they will be accused of changing the subject; if it is > too > >> philosophical it will embody Platonic assumptions which will make it > >> impossible for the pragmatist to state the conclusion he wants to > >> reach. > >> > >> All this is complicated by the fact that “philosophy,” like “truth” > >> and “goodness,” is ambiguous. Uncapitalised, “truth” and “goodness” > >> name properties of sentences, or of actions and situations. > >> Capitalised, they are the proper names of objects – goals or > standards > >> which can be loved with all one’s heart and soul and mind, objects > of > >> ultimate concern. Similarly, “Philosophy” can mean simply what > Sellars > >> calls “an attempt to see how things, in the broadest possible sense > of > >> the term, hang together, in the broadest possible sense of the > term.” > >> Pericles, for example, was using this sense of the term when he > >> praised the Athenians for “philosophising without unmanliness” > >> (philosophein aneu malakias). In this sense, Blake is as much a > >> philosopher as Fichte, Henry Adams more of a philosopher than Frege. > >> No one would be dubious about philosophy, taken in this sense. But > the > >> word can also denote something more specialised, and very dubious > >> indeed. In this second sense, it can mean following Plato’s and > Kant’s > >> lead, asking questions about the nature of certain normative notions > >> (e.g., “truth,” “rationality,” “goodness”) in the hope of better > >> obeying such norms. The idea is to believe more truths or do more > good > >> or be more rational by knowing more about Truth or Goodness or > >> Rationality. I shall capitalise the term “philosophy” when used in > >> this second sense, in order to help make the point that Philosophy, > >> Truth, Goodness, and Rationality are interlocked Platonic notions. > >> Pragmatists are saying that the best hope for philosophy is not to > >> practise Philosophy. They think it will not help to say something > true > >> to think about Truth, nor will it help to act well to think about > >> Goodness, nor will it help to be rational to think about > Rationality." > >> > >> Best, > >> Steve > >> > > > > > > And??? Shall I sing: > > > > Is that all there is, is that all there is > > > > If that's all there is my friends, then let's keep dancing > > > > Let's break out the booze and have a ball > > > > If that's all there is > > > > > > > > ___ > > > > > > Moq_Discuss mailing list > > Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. > > http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org > > Archives: > > http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ > > http://moq.org/md/archives.html > > > > ___ > > > Moq_Discuss mailing list > Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. > http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org > Archives: > http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ > http://moq.org/md/archives.html > > > > > Moq_Discuss mailing list > Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. > http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org > Archives: > http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ > http://moq.org/md/archives.html Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
