Steve, Call me stupid if it makes you feel good, but it seems to me the best that can be done is to start shifting the world-view from truth as about subjects and objects, or ideal forms, to truth as ever-changing, interdependent, impermanent, relative patterns.
Marsha On May 20, 2010, at 10:40 AM, MarshaV wrote: > > Hi Steve, > > see below... > > > On May 20, 2010, at 9:05 AM, Steven Peterson wrote: > >> Hi Ron, >> >> Ron said: >>> Dave has provided several quotes over the course of this arguement. Which >>> stated that Rorty felt that any epistomologial theory of truth is >>> meaningless, Dave points out that this is true if one is speaking to the >>> context of objective truth in an ontological way. Objective truth is >>> culturally derrived. Pirsig and James remark how truth is a species of the >>> good. Connecting truth and experience, that is why everyone can agree to >>> "the good" but disagree over the truth. >> >> Steve: >> I don't think that Pirsig thinks that people agree about "the good" >> any more than they do about the truth. >> >> Rorty agrees with Pirsig about the notion that truth is a sort of >> good. What he doubts (I think along with Pirsig) is the possibility of >> coming up with a theory about what MAKES all true statements good--the >> essence of Truth. He thinks it is pointless to ask, what is that >> common feature that all true sentences share other than goodness? No >> answers to that question have ever helped us say more true things or >> distinguish true beliefs from false ones. Pirsig points to common ways >> that we verify beliefs (logical consistency, coherence with other >> beliefs we take to be true, economy of explanation, agreement with >> experience), but like Rorty, he doesn't think that truth has an >> essence we can get at with a theory. That is what Rorty means by >> saying that he sees the pragmatist theory of truth as a deflationary >> theory says that truth is not the sort of thing one should expect to >> have a philosophically interesting theory about. In Pirsig's terms, to >> say that a sentence is true is to say no more and no less than that it >> is a high quality intellectual pattern of value. In Rorty's terms, to >> say that a belief is true is to say that, as far as we know, no other >> habit of action is a better habit of action. >> >> >> Rorty in his Introduction to Consequences of Pragmatism: >> "The essays in this book are attempts to draw consequences pragmatist >> theory about truth. This theory says that truth is not the sort of >> thing one should expect to have a philosophically interesting theory >> about. from a For pragmatists, “truth” is just the name of a property >> which all true statements share. It is what is common to “Bacon did >> not write Shakespeare,” “It rained yesterday,” “E = mc2” “Love is >> better than hate,” “The Allegory of Painting was Vermeer’s best work,” >> “2 plus 2 is 4,” and “There are nondenumerable infinities.” >> Pragmatists doubt that there is much to be said about this common >> feature. They doubt this for the same reason they doubt that there is >> much to be said about the common feature shared by such morally >> praiseworthy actions as Susan leaving her husband, America joining the >> war against the Nazis, America pulling out of Vietnam, Socrates not >> escaping from jail, Roger picking up litter from the trail, and the >> suicide of the Jews at Masada. They see certain acts as good ones to >> perform, under the circumstances, but doubt that there is anything >> general and useful to say about what makes them all good. The >> assertion of a given sentence – or the adoption of a disposition to >> assert the sentence, the conscious acquisition of a belief – is a >> justifiable, praiseworthy act in certain circumstances. But, a >> fortiori, it is not likely that there is something general and useful >> to be said about what makes All such actions good-about the common >> feature of all the sentences which one should acquire a disposition to >> assert. >> >> Pragmatists think that the history of attempts to isolate the True or >> the Good, or to define the word “true” or “good,” supports their >> suspicion that there is no interesting work to be done in this area. >> It might, of course, have turned out otherwise. People have, oddly >> enough, found something interesting to say about the essence of Force >> and the definition of “number.” They might have found something >> interesting to say about the essence of Truth. But in fact they >> haven’t. The history of attempts to do so, and of criticisms of such >> attempts, is roughly coextensive with the history of that literary >> genre we call “philosophy” – a genre founded by Plato. So pragmatists >> see the Platonic tradition as having outlived its usefulness. This >> does not mean that they have a new, non-Platonic set of answers to >> Platonic questions to offer, but rather that they do not think we >> should ask those questions any more. When they suggest that we not ask >> questions about the nature of Truth and Goodness, they do not invoke a >> theory about the nature of reality or knowledge or man which says that >> “there is no such thing” as Truth or Goodness. Nor do they have a >> “relativistic” or “subjectivist” theory of Truth or Goodness. They >> would simply like to change the subject. They are in a position >> analogous to that of secularists who urge that research concerning the >> Nature, or the Will, of God does not get us anywhere. Such secularists >> are not saying that God does not exist, exactly; they feel unclear >> about what it would mean to affirm His existence, and thus about the >> point of denying it. Nor do they have some special, funny, heretical >> view about God. They just doubt that the vocabulary of theology is one >> we ought to be using. Similarly, pragmatists keep trying to find ways >> of making anti-philosophical points in non-philosophical language. For >> they face a dilemma if their language is too unphilosophical, too >> “literary,” they will be accused of changing the subject; if it is too >> philosophical it will embody Platonic assumptions which will make it >> impossible for the pragmatist to state the conclusion he wants to >> reach. >> >> All this is complicated by the fact that “philosophy,” like “truth” >> and “goodness,” is ambiguous. Uncapitalised, “truth” and “goodness” >> name properties of sentences, or of actions and situations. >> Capitalised, they are the proper names of objects – goals or standards >> which can be loved with all one’s heart and soul and mind, objects of >> ultimate concern. Similarly, “Philosophy” can mean simply what Sellars >> calls “an attempt to see how things, in the broadest possible sense of >> the term, hang together, in the broadest possible sense of the term.” >> Pericles, for example, was using this sense of the term when he >> praised the Athenians for “philosophising without unmanliness” >> (philosophein aneu malakias). In this sense, Blake is as much a >> philosopher as Fichte, Henry Adams more of a philosopher than Frege. >> No one would be dubious about philosophy, taken in this sense. But the >> word can also denote something more specialised, and very dubious >> indeed. In this second sense, it can mean following Plato’s and Kant’s >> lead, asking questions about the nature of certain normative notions >> (e.g., “truth,” “rationality,” “goodness”) in the hope of better >> obeying such norms. The idea is to believe more truths or do more good >> or be more rational by knowing more about Truth or Goodness or >> Rationality. I shall capitalise the term “philosophy” when used in >> this second sense, in order to help make the point that Philosophy, >> Truth, Goodness, and Rationality are interlocked Platonic notions. >> Pragmatists are saying that the best hope for philosophy is not to >> practise Philosophy. They think it will not help to say something true >> to think about Truth, nor will it help to act well to think about >> Goodness, nor will it help to be rational to think about Rationality." >> >> Best, >> Steve >> > > > And??? Shall I sing: > > Is that all there is, is that all there is > > If that's all there is my friends, then let's keep dancing > > Let's break out the booze and have a ball > > If that's all there is > > > > ___ > > > Moq_Discuss mailing list > Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. > http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org > Archives: > http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ > http://moq.org/md/archives.html ___ Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
