Mary Replied to the quotes dmb posted:EXACTLY. But if you believe this, DMB,
then what is your objection to understanding SOM (not SOL as Bo might say) as
the Intellectual Level?
dmb says:
These quotes tell us that James is breaking down "the traditional distinctions
between 'experience' and 'reality'", that the dichotomy between mind and matter
"is completely specious", and they tell us that "subjects and objects are
mistakenly presumed to be the cause of Quality!". In all these cases, we have
an intellectual rejection of SOM. I really don't understand what is unclear
about this. If intellect is equal to SOM, then these quotes would have to be a
SOM rejection of SOM. They would be rejecting the distinction on the basis of
the distinction they're rejecting. This is logically impossible. That would be
like rejecting faith on the basis of faith, rejecting empiricism for empirical
reasons.
> > "A casual reader may think James is careless in the way in which he
> > shifts from 'experience' to 'reality' but this is NOT a sign of loose
> > terminology or confusion. It reflects James's doctrine of 'pure
> > experience' where the traditional distinctions between 'experience' and
> > 'reality' are broken down." (Burkhardt's emphasis, p. xxvi)
> >
> > "The story of modern epistemology, which can be written in terms of a
> > refinement of questions concerning what is 'in' the mind and what is
> > 'outside', is the story of implausible answers to a poorly formulated
> > query. The dichotomy which is taken as so obvious between consciousness
> > or mind and what is 'outside' of our minds is completely specious.
> > There is only a continuous reality or experience which we TAKE in
> > different ways." (Burkhardt's emphasis, xxvii)
> >
> > "The very existence of subject and object themselves is deduced from
> > the Quality event. The Quality event is the cause of subjects and
> > objects, which are then mistakenly presumed to be the cause of
> > Quality!" (ZAMM 239)
> >
> > "Now it comes! Because Quality is the GENERATOR of the mythos. That's
> > it. That's what he meant when he said, 'Quality is the continuing
> > stimulus which causes us to create the world in which we live. All of
> > it. Every last bit of it'. Religion isn't invented by man. Men are
> > invented by religion. Men invent RESPONSES to Quality, and among these
> > are responses is an understanding of what they themselves are."
Mary said:
DMB, I don't agree that it's ok to continue to use terms like "it", "we", and
"I" without entailing any ontological commitments. How would that work? Would
everyone agree to preface their remarks with some sort of disclaimer to
distinguish statements intended to be using these terms facetiously from those
using them literally? Wouldn't it just be easier to say that the Intellectual
Level is based in SOM and be done with it?
dmb says:
Well, you're at odds with Pirsig on this point too. As he puts it, there is no
need to make a metaphysical disclaimer at the end of every sentence and there
really is no need to anyway. It just means that you have to read these
statements with the anti-SOM claims in mind. Right there, for example. If you
know that the Cartesian subject is being rejected, then you simply don't take
"mind" to mean the Cartesian subject. If I want to refer to the subject of SOM,
then I will call it that.
Philosophers have tried to avoid certain words for this reason, like Heidegger
for example. But that only had the effect of giving him a reputation for being
impossible to read. I have a book titled "How to Read Heidegger" and it is
designed to help students hack their way through Heidegger's weirdness. Same
with Hegel. I was traumatized trying to read him. Believe me, reinventing the
language is no way to solve this problem. I think it's much, much easier to
think and read in paragraphs, meaning you don't make an issue of the use of
pronouns or other trivialities. You look at the whole concept along with its
context and qualifications. Otherwise, you can keep yourself busy trying to
write sentences that don't have subjects or predicates. And I can keep myself
busy trying to figure what this new language is supposed to mean.
dmb said:
... Instead of having a knower and a thing to be known, the central distinction
is between two kinds of knowing, between two kinds of experience, namely
dynamic and static. There is the stream of experience and then there are the
conceptual buckets we TAKE from it. Subjects and objects are in the buckets. ...
Mary Replied:
We do not "know" Dynamic Quality. Once it is "known" it is Static Quality -
Subjects and Objects - which we can only understand in terms of a
subject-object-logic framework. This is true since that is the way the brain
of living entities on this planet have evolved to function. We are not capable
of "understanding" Dynamic Quality. That is sort of Pirsig's point, isn't it?
Until this concept is absorbed, all is lip service to the MoQ and does it a
disservice.
dmb says:
Again, there are TWO KINDS OF KNOWING. We "know" Dynamic Quality
non-conceptually. Subjects and objects are CONCEPTUALLY known. And if you want
to put it in terms of evolved brains, the left hemisphere is good at words and
concepts while the right hemisphere takes in the whole undifferentiated,
unconceptualized experience. Jill Bolte Taylor had a stroke, lost her ability
to make conceptual distinctions and experienced Nirvana, experienced pure
Dynamic Quality. And since she also happens to be a Harvard brain scientist,
she understood how her way of knowing shifted from the conceptually dominated
ordinary consciousness to the other kind. This difference is showing up in all
kinds of ways and in fact a guy by the name of Eugene Taylor (No relation, as
far as I know) who thinks psychology is on the brink of a new era because of
the latest findings in neurological studies and he thinks that we are finally
ripe to fully appreciate James's radical empiricism. See, James wrote a 120
0 page book on psychology and that science raised a lot of questions that
could only be addressed philosophically. This is what happened to Pirsig as
well. Science raised questions and he turned to philosophy for answers to them.
Interesting that they also landed on the same conclusions.
dmb said:
Well, the idea [behind the rejection of SOM] is that we "knowers" are not
ontologically distinct from what can be "known". What's known is experience.
How can "we" be ontologically distinct from our own experience? Again, for the
radical empiricist reality is not the cause of our experience, it IS our
experience. The distinction between pure experience and conceptual experience
is the distinction between Dynamic Quality and static quality. That defines the
limits of reality. The idea of an external physical environment is just that,
an idea. Yes, it's a very good idea most of the time. It has great pragmatic
value and that's why SOM can be counted as one of the paintings in our
pluralistic gallery of truth. It agrees with experience and it works, but there
is a downside and when you think it is the very structure of reality rather
than just a good idea and you want to develop a theory of truth with that as
your basic assumption, then you've got serious problems.
Mary Replied:
I totally agree with these statements, DMB. The question is, do you have a
problem agreeing with me when I take them to their logical conclusion and state
that the Intellectual Level is SOM?
dmb says:
If you think the logical conclusion to draw from my statements is that the
intellectual level is SOM, then you do not understand my statements. And yes,
as you know perfectly well, I have a big problem with that conclusion. The
whole point of the art gallery analogy is to insist that there can be more than
one intellectual construction of reality and that SOM is only one of them.
Mary said:
You are not getting anywhere useful with this exercise in comparing and
contrasting Pirsig with other philosophers because they all take SOM as an
unspoken assumption.
dmb says:
Oh, for Pete's sake! It is Pirsig who compares the MOQ to James's radical
empiricism and he does so precisely because James does NOT take subjects and
objects as an unspoken assumption. He takes is at an artificial conception that
has plagued the history of philosophy. James is aligned with Pirsig because he
attacks that assumption. If i seem frustrated, it's because I've posted the
quote at the end of chapter 29 about 50 times and yet you, Bo and Marsha treat
James's ideas like its just something I made up. Again, it is Pirsig who
identified James as an ally. I'm just elaborating on that fact. It would only
take a few minutes to read chapter 29 of Lila. If you had an hour for lunch,
you could read it twice and still have time to think about it. If you do that
and you still think such comparisons are pointless, please let me know.
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