Hi Marsha, that's why I like Hofstadter ... you said "He does plenty of talking about patterns, and I did get a little hopeful, but no he's a materialist. One wants to ask him why wouldn't he think the same patterns that create the self, creates objects."
I believe he does think that too. It's just not the subject of the book you are currently reading. Ian On Mon, May 31, 2010 at 5:42 PM, MarshaV <[email protected]> wrote: > > > Hi Platt, > > Yes, it does seem that way. He does plenty of talking about patterns, and > I did get a little hopeful, but no he's a materialist. One wants to ask him > why > wouldn't he think the same patterns that create the self, creates objects. > Seems > like an obvious consideration. > > Wonder what it will take? But you are correct, it is too bad. > > > Marsha > > > > > > > On May 31, 2010, at 11:58 AM, Platt Holden wrote: > >> Hi Marsha, >> >> Like most academics, Hofstadter buys into SOM hook, line and sinker. Too >> bad, really. >> >> Platt >> >> On Mon, May 31, 2010 at 6:50 AM, MarshaV <[email protected]> wrote: >> >>> >>> >>> >>> "What would make a human brain a candidate for housing a loop of >>> self-representation? Why would a fly brain or a mosquito brain not be just >>> as valid a candidate? Why, for that matter, not a bacterium, an ovum, a >>> sperm, a virus, a tomato plant, a tomato, or a pencil? The answer should be >>> clear: a human brain is a representational system that knows no bounds in >>> terms of the extensibility or flexibility of its categories. A mosquito >>> brain, by contrast, is a tiny representational system that contains >>> practically no categories at all, never mind being flexible and extensible. >>> Very small representational systems, such as those of bacteria, ova, >>> sperms, plants, thermostats, and so forth, do not enjoy the luxury of >>> self-representation. And a tomato and a pencil are not representational >>> systems at all, so for them, the story ends right there (sorry, little >>> tomato! sorry, little pencil!). >>> "So a human brain is a strong candidate for having the potential of >>> rich perceptual feedback, and thus rich self-reresentation. But what kinds >>> of perceptual cycles do we get involved in? We begin life with the most >>> elementary sorts of feedback about ourselves, which stimulate us to >>> formulate categories for our most obvious body parts, and building on this >>> basic pedestal, we soon develop a sense for our bodies as flexible physical >>> objects. In the meantime, as we receive rewards for various actions and >>> punishments for others, we begin to develop a more abstract sense of "good" >>> and "bad", as well as notions of guilt and pride, and our sense of ourselves >>> as abstract entities that have the power to decide to make things happen >>> (such as continuing to run up a steep hill even though our legs are begging >>> us to just walk) begins to take root. >>> "It is crucial to our young lives that we hone our developing >>> self-symbol as precisely as possible. We want (and need) to find out where >>> we belong in all sorts of social hierarchies and classes, and sometimes, >>> even if we don't want to know thee things, we find out anyway. For >>> instance, we are all told, early on, that we are "cute"; in some of us, >>> however, this message is reinforced far more strongly than in others. In >>> this manner, each of us comes to realize that we are "good-looking" or >>> "gullible" or "cheeky" or "shy" or "spoiled" or "funny" or "lazy" or >>> "original", or whatever. Dozens of such labels and concepts accrete to our >>> growing self-symbols. >>> "As we go through thousands of experiences large and small, our >>> representation of these experiences likewise accrete to our self-symbols. >>> Of course a memory of a visit to the Grand Canyon, say, is attached not >>> only to our self-symbol but to many other symbols in our brains, but our >>> self-symbol is enriched and rendered more complex by this attachment." >>> (Hofstadter, Douglas,'I Am A Strange Loop', pp.182-183) >>> >>> --- >>> >>> A extremely interesting explanation of self-forming, yet ALL in this >>> explanation are patterns and analogs including the concept of a "human >>> brain" (sorry little marsha). >>> >>> >>> Does the concept 'dna' as a pattern have any more substance for the >>> biologist than for the police officer? >>> >>> >>> >>> ___ >>> >>> >> Moq_Discuss mailing list >> Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. >> http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org >> Archives: >> http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ >> http://moq.org/md/archives.html > > > > ___ > > > Moq_Discuss mailing list > Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. > http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org > Archives: > http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ > http://moq.org/md/archives.html > Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
