http://discovermagazine.com/2009/feb/13-is-quantum-mechanics-controlling-your-thoughts good article to read
2010/8/20 David Thomas <[email protected]> > The idea for this thread started with my question here: > > > [Dave in Theocracy, Secularism, and Democracy] > >DMB, > > > As sarcastic and mean-spirited as we both can be, I have a real question > for > > you? And don't take this the wrong way. Since you are one of keepers of > the > > semi-official party line translation of Pirsig's work, "What about > > consciousness?" I'm just starting David Chalmers, "The Conscious Mind". > > A brief word search of both of RMP's works seems to indicate that he > takes > > it a given and with his resolution of the mind/body problem he solves > "the > > problem of consciousness" Even though I'm only 4 pages into the book I > can > > tell that Chalmers would disagree, immediately and vigorously, that RMP's > > approach just sweeps it under the rug. > > > > Think on it and later on maybe we can try to discuss it semi-civically in > a > > separate thread. > > > > Dave > > And then in what has to be some weird yet undiagnosed Freudian suppression > of past sexual abuses David Buchanan is unable to now talk directly to me > but channels Steve: > > > Steve said to dmb: > > ... I have a real question for you? "What about consciousness?" ... > "the > > problem of consciousness" ... RMP's approach just sweeps it under the > rug. > > > > > > dmb says: > > Not sure you've asked an actual question here. What is the problem of > > consciousness, exactly? What's being swept under the rug by RMP's > approach? > > > > But let me remind you that James' Essays in Radical Empiricism basically > > consists of two central essays and all the rest are expansions and > > qualifications of those two main essays. One of them is titled "Does > > Consciousness Exist?" and in it James answers "no", not if you mean a > thing, > > an entity that has the thoughts. There is no Cartesian self, no mental > > substance. And then you see how subjects and objects are demoted from > primary > > ontological categories to secondary concepts at the end of chapter 29 in > Lila. > > As you're reading Chalmers ask yourself if he's operating with the > > subject-object metaphysical assumptions. Do you think you could spot such > a > > thing? It'll probably mean reading between the lines just because > assumptions > > are like that. They tend to go without saying. If anyone is likely to be > > explicit about such a thing, it'll be a philosopher. But still. > > > > By the time James was all pumped up about radical empiricism in 1904 and > 1905, > > a period of explosive creativity for James, he was also very excited > about a > > philosophical wild man named Gustav Fechner. (Krimel is gonna love this.) > An > > idea of his that James found very appealing was "the view that the entire > > material universe, instead of being dead, is inwardly alive and > consciously > > animated ..in diverse spans and wavelengths, inclusions and > envelopments". > > This isn't too far from the MOQish notion that the laws of physics are > better > > conceived as patterns of preference. Even the physical is inwardly alive > and > > consciously animated to some extent. The "its" count as one of the spans > and > > wavelengths in this living universe. As James himself put it, "..it is > easy to > > believe that consciousness or inner experience never originated, or > developed, > > out of the unconscious, but that it and the physical universe are > co-eternal > > aspects of one self-same reality, much as concave and convex are > > aspects of one curve." > > > > You see what these guys are saying? > > > > If you're a scientific materialist and you hear James explain that > > consciousness as an entity, as a Cartesian self, does not exists, you're > > likely to take James as being somewhere in the brain-mind identity camp. > You'd > > think there is no such thing as consciousness per se because the mind is > just > > what the brain does, more or less. Most people in this camp will back off > just > > a bit and make some qualification, but that's the basic idea. But when > you > > read this Fechner-inspired stuff you realize that James had a whole > different > > deal in mind. Instead of thinking that the mental is a product of the > > physiological, which is a product of the physical, you see that it's more > like > > the physical and the mental have grown up and evolved together as two > aspects > > of the One. In fact, James's biographer, Robert Richardson, says the > quote > > above is the best statement about the many and the One that James ever > > produced (page 447). > > > > Now think about that pithy little radically empirical slogan. Experience > and > > reality amount to the same thing. > > > > Hmmmm. Consciousness. Maybe I'll give it some thought. > > > > What was the question? Can you state it very specifically? > > Which then jumps to this: > > > [Krimel] > > Thanks for this grab bag of illustrations. > > > > ---------------------------------------------------------- > > Illustration #1: The one size fits all explanation... > > ---------------------------------------------------------- > > > > [Steve asks dmb a question > > ... I have a real question for you? "What about consciousness?" ... > "the > > problem of consciousness" ... RMP's approach just sweeps it under the > rug. > > > > [dmb responds:] > > Not sure you've asked an actual question here. What is the problem of > > consciousness, exactly? What's being swept under the rug by RMP's > approach? > > > > But let me remind you that James' Essays in Radical Empiricism... > > > > [Krimel] > > There it is. The answer to every question. The wielding of the only tool > in > > Dave's tool box. > > > > ---------------------------------------------------------- > > Illustration #2: The steel trap mind slamming shut... > > ---------------------------------------------------------- > > > > [dmb] > > As you're reading Chalmers ask yourself if he's operating with the > > subject-object metaphysical assumptions. Do you think you could spot such > a > > thing? It'll probably mean reading between the lines just because > > assumptions are like that. They tend to go without saying. If anyone is > > likely to be explicit about such a thing, it'll be a philosopher. But > still. > > > > > > [Krimel] > > It is hard to see how anyone interested in the idea of consciousness > could > > ignore or dismiss Chalmers but for dmb it's not a problem. Rather than > > engage the issues raise he slaps on the label: SOM and "Presto" no need > to > > read, no need to engage the issue, time to just sit back and feel self > > righteous. > > > > ---------------------------------------------------------- > > Illustration #3: Appeal to authorities then embarrass them... > > ---------------------------------------------------------- > > > > [dmb] > > By the time James was all pumped up about radical empiricism in 1904 and > > 1905, a period of explosive creativity for James, he was also very > excited > > about a philosophical wild man named Gustav Fechner. > > > > [Krimel] > > Here we see dmb's sense of history mangled. James talks extensively about > > Fechner in his Principles of Psychology because Fechner was among the > first > > and best at trying to quantify the senses. James got "all pumped up" to > > write and introduction to Fechner's pamphlet "The Little Book of Life > After > > Death" originally published in 1836 under a pseudonym. I think it would > be > > difficult to find thinkers from the 19th century able to divorce > themselves > > from animistic, spiritualist thinking. Surely at a century and a half's > > remove we ought to be able to forgive them. But dmb instead prefers to > cite > > them as justification for a continuing adherence to these quaint > > misconceptions. > > > > Holding Fechner and James up as giving authority to animism and > spiritualism > > does them both a disservice. It assumes that those positions are > unaffected > > by a century of research and discourse. More knowledge of the physiology, > > cause and effects, and abstract metaphysical thinking on and about the > brain > > and consciousness have take place in the past 25 years that in the whole > > span of history leading up to Fechner and James' time. It insults them > both > > to think that their idea are unaffected by this progress. > > > > ---------------------------------------------------------- > > Illustration #4: Letting the bathwater leak in through the backdoor... > > ---------------------------------------------------------- > > > > [dmb] > > This isn't too far from the MOQish notion that the laws of physics are > > better conceived as patterns of preference. Even the physical is inwardly > > alive and consciously animated to some extent. The "its" count as one of > the > > spans and wavelengths in this living universe. > > > > [Krimel] > > Rather than altering our notions of "preference" to include a > probabilistic > > view of causality; dmb sees Pirsig retreating into this kind of spiritual > > animism. > > > > It has is an ongoing mystery how one can make a claim for a universe that > is > > "...inwardly alive and consciously animated" and yet deny that one's > > position is not supernatural, even theistic. I'm not even sure that stuff > > qualities as bathwater. After you stuff a towel under the back drop why > > don't you try shaking the handle? > > > > ---------------------------------------------------------- > > Illustration #5: The bumper sticker grab bag... > > ---------------------------------------------------------- > > > > [dmb] > > You see what these guys are saying? > > > > If you're a scientific materialist and you hear James explain that > > consciousness as an entity, as a Cartesian self, does not exists, you're > > likely to take James as being somewhere in the brain-mind identity camp. > > > > [Krimel] > > No need to engage a different point of view when you can cover your lack > of > > breadth and depth with slogans and strawmen. Since dmb engagement with > > intellectual activity is stunted in the 19th century, the materialist > > strawman is a Newtonian projection. Although it went up in flames at > least > > by the middle of the 20th century it lives for dmb as a kind of fantasy > > whipping boy. > > > > Note also the second example of the bumper sticker approach: "brain-mind > > identity camp" as though in this label we find a clearly defined group of > > the slack jawed, oblivious to dmb's keen and exhaustive insights. > > > > ---------------------------------------------------------- > > Illustation #6: Spinning to blur distinctions... > > ---------------------------------------------------------- > > > > [dmb] > > You'd think there is no such thing as consciousness per se because the > mind > > is just what the brain does, more or less. Most people in this camp will > > back off just a bit and make some qualification, but that's the basic > idea. > > But when you read this Fechner-inspired stuff you realize that James had > a > > whole different deal in mind. Instead of thinking that the mental is a > > product of the physiological, which is a product of the physical, you see > > that it's more like the physical and the mental have grown up and evolved > > together as two aspects of the One. In fact, James's biographer, Robert > > Richardson, says the quote above is the best statement about the many and > > the One that James ever produced (page 447). > > > > [Krimel] > > Here again we see the strawmen but some are willing to "back off" if > "just a > > bit" no doubt intimidated by the imagined power of dmb's keen > observations. > > Unfortunately dmb offers no actual attack on this position just a > > perfunctory dismissal and retreat into the 19th century. After all, if > one > > were to venture into the 21st century it would be really hard to muster > > enough strawmen on this subject to matter. > > > > "The mind is what the brain does..." of course it is and mostly"more" > rather > > than "less". The "mind," whatever that is supposed to be, is the outcome > of > > the process of the nervous system's engagement with the environment. It > > takes the sensory input Fechner so painstaking detailed and converts it > into > > thought and action. If "consciousness" is a process then the brain is the > > processor. It is the dismissal of this notion that demands some kind of > > sustained defense in the 21st century. > > > > ---------------------------------------------------------- > > Illustration # 1 redeux: The short form... > > ---------------------------------------------------------- > > > > [dmb] > > Now think about that pithy little radically empirical slogan. Experience > and > > reality amount to the same thing. > > > > [Krimel] > > Bullshit lite: Less tedium but still impossible to swallow. > > > > It might actually be meaningful to say "Experience and one's conception > of > > reality amount to the same thing." > > > > ---------------------------------------------------------- > > Illustration #7: The clever signoff or "The Illusion of Cool..." > > ---------------------------------------------------------- > > > > [dmb] > > Hmmmm. Consciousness. Maybe I'll give it some thought. > > > > What was the question? Can you state it very specifically? > > > > [Krimel] > > I picture him saying this while polishing his Foster Grant wraparounds > > simultaneously grinding a Marlboro filter beneath his Chuck Taylors; > > Bohemian ironic affections trapping him in the amber of the 50s. Refusing > > the new millennium and feeling really good about it after all color TV is > > just a fad. > > > > Thanks Dave, a truly enlightening post. > > > I hope you're not thanking me. I just here in the middle wondering what the > hell just happened. > > I just asked a very simple question of DMB, "What about consciousness?" > > Which of course is an insult to "philosophers" who like everything spelled > out in precise sentences so that they can avoid the question by attacking > its lack of logical coherence, syntax, grammar, misspelling, anything but > address the issue. Or maybe the author I mentioned was on his university's > banned books list and he didn't want to be burned at the stake, I don't > know. > > In his two fictional biographies, "Zen and the Art of Motorcycle > Maintenance" and "Lila" author Robert M Pirsig tries to develop a > metaphysical system based on Quality. This attempt takes its final form in > Lila and where Pirsig calls it " The Metaphysics of Quality." > > Based on what Pirsig calls "MoQ", What commentary, analysis, or conclusions > does he make about "consciousness" or "conscious experience"? Is he right? > How do you know? > > I specialize in unconsciousness and have no idea what the other might be so > have at it. > > Dave > > > > > > > Moq_Discuss mailing list > Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. > http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org > Archives: > http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ > http://moq.org/md/archives.html > -- parser Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
