Ian said to dmb:
.., all you were really doing was holding up panpsychism as valid, whatever 
Birch's other defects.


dmb says:

Right. I'd never heard of the guy until Platt posted his name and the validity 
of panpsychism certainly does hinge on Birch. It doesn't hinge on Chalmers 
either. Obviously, I'd be far more interested in the panpsychism of Pierce, 
James, Dewey and Pirsig before anyone else's. This is MOQ discuss, after all. 


Ian said:
I think somewhere at root here you are trying to make a point about some kind 
of physical reductionism - and you see "emergence" as a word signalling that 
error - greedy reductionism as Dennett would say. The kind of reductionism that 
points out the physical explanations of material processes as the source of 
emergence, as if that explains all the bio-socio-intellectual patterns and 
processes too. (I take it as a given the MoQ tells us to look at patterns of 
value in all levels up to the situation in question.)


dmb says:
Yes and no. Yes, reductionism is the problem with Krimel's view and I've been 
saying that for a very long time. I don't have a problem with emergence, 
however, and I don't think it signals reductionism. Birch's point was that it's 
hard to see how mind can emerge from no-mind but if emergence is understood 
within a panpsychic view, then it's just a matter of complexity emerging out of 
simplicity. If mind and matter are two aspects of everything from the bottom 
up, then full blown reflective self-consciousness has not emerged from no-mind. 
It just means that mind has been evolving from the very beginning and it was 
never not there. So emergence and panpsychism can go quite nicely together.
But yes, it is reductionism that is the problem. Chalmers is convinced that 
some kind of non-reductionistic answer to the hard problem of consciousness and 
that it will never, in principle, be explainable in physical terms.  His 
critique of physicalism is an attack on reductionism. 

I don't know what the difference is between reductionism and greedy 
reductionism, but my hunch is that Dennett is defending his own reductionism 
with that distinction. Care to explain?



                                          
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