only 2 Little remarks , Dave. 1) Julian huxley, mentioned in your summary, was the brother of..Aldous huxley, and he was the main engine behind the launching of the Neo-Darwinism as accepted widely these days. I think he was also related to Ch Darwin,but i'm not sure. 2) switching to overkill-modus? was it raining outside?------what a fucking quality-explosion.
2010/8/29 david buchanan <[email protected]> > > Krimel said to dmb: > In bed with a metaphysical SOMer you now seek a three way with a Christian > bio-theologian IDer, who says, "In so far as any line is drawn it is > completely arbitrary. The logical alternative is to propose that there is no > line of demarcation any more than there is a line between living and non > living in evolution." That squares with Pirsig's discrete and feuding > inorganic and biological levels how? BTW, does he know who you're are > sleeping with these days? > > > > dmb says: > > As shocking as it may seem, I actually agree with Platt about at least one > thing; you are using personal insults to dismiss the messenger INSTEAD of > dealing with the message. Everyone knows that ad hominem attacks are not a > valid. Even non-philosophers know this. This is especially bogus in the case > with panpsychism. This view has been a respectable and valid philosophical > option since the very beginning. It stretches from Heraclitus to Chalmers. > It's simply ignorant to dismiss the idea as flakey new-age nonsense. One > certainly doesn't have to be an advocate of Christianity or intelligent > design either. If you dismiss every thinker who ever thought panpsychism was > plausible, you'd have to dismiss about half of the philosophers who ever > lived. And you don't have to take my word for it. Look it up and see for > yourself. Here is an excerpt from a peer-reviewed encyclopedia article. This > part just covers the last century or so but it goes all the way back to the > pre-Socratic philo > sophers.This section stretches from William James to David Chalmers and > you'll see that panpsychism, "offers a naturalistic escape from Cartesian > dualism and Christian theology". > Twentieth Century to the PresentWilliam James first addressed the subject > of panpsychism in his Principles of Psychology. He devoted a full chapter to > Clifford’s mind-stuff theory, and displayed notable sympathy to the view. > James’ first personal endorsement of panpsychism came in his Harvard lecture > notes of 1902-3, in which he noted, “pragmatism would be [my] method and > ‘pluralistic panpsychism’ [my] doctrine” (Perry, 1935: 373). In his 1905-6 > lecture notes he observed: “Our only intelligible notion of an object in > itself is that it should be an object for itself, and this lands us in > panpsychism and a belief that our physical perceptions are effects on us of > ‘psychical’ realities…” (ibid: 446). > James arrived at a clear and unambiguous position in his 1909 book, A > Pluralistic Universe. He explained that his theory of radical empiricism is > a form of pluralist monism in which all things are both pure experience and > “for themselves,” that is, are objects with their own independent psychical > perspectives. In the end he endorsed “a general view of the world almost > identical with Fechner’s” (ibid: 309-10). He saw in this new worldview “a > great empirical movement towards a pluralistic panpsychic view of the > universe” (ibid: 313). > In the early part of the twentieth century, panpsychist philosophy > continued to develop rapidly in England and the USA. The dominant > philosophical system, the one most connected with panpsychism, was Process > Philosophy. Its earliest advocates were Bergson and Whitehead. > Bergson wrote Creative Evolution in 1907. His thesis—that matter is “the > lowest degree of mind”—echoes Peirce. He added, following Schopenhauer, that > “pure willing [is the] current that runs through matter, communicating life > to it” (1907/1911: 206). But Bergson’s clearest elaboration came in Duration > and Simultaneity (1922). Here he achieved a true process philosophy wherein > all physical events contain a memory of the past. Given his earlier > insistence that memory is essential to mind, one can see the conclusion that > mind, or consciousness, is in all things: > What we wish to establish is that we cannot speak of a reality that endures > without inserting consciousness into it. … [I]t is impossible to imagine or > conceive a connecting link between the before and after without an element > of memory and, consequently, of consciousness. … We may perhaps feel averse > to the use of the word “consciousness” if an anthropomorphic sense is > attached to it. [But] there is no need to take one’s own memory and > transport it, even attenuated, into the interior of the thing. … It is the > opposite course we must follow. … [D]uration is essentially a continuation > of what no longer exists into what does exist. This is real time, perceived > and lived. … Duration therefore implies consciousness; and we place > consciousness at the heart of things for the very reason that we credit them > with a time that endures (1922/1965: 48-49).Whitehead’s panpsychism is > relatively well known. It is based in his view of an “occasion of > experience” as the ultimate pa > rticle of reality, and as possessing both a physical pole and a mental > pole. If things are nothing but occasions, and occasions are in part mental, > then all things have a mental dimension. In Modes of Thought (1938), in the > chapter titled “Nature Alive,” he observed, “this [traditional] sharp > division between mentality and nature has no ground in our fundamental > observation. [...] I conclude that we should conceive mental operations as > among the factors which make up the constitution of nature” (p. 156). > Bertrand Russell ultimately came to a neutral monist view in which events > were the primary reality, and mind and matter were both constructed from > them. After some early, suggestive comments, he became increasingly > supportive of panpsychism in the late 1920′s. Russell’s book An Outline of > Philosophy(1927) directly addressed this. He wrote: “My own feeling is that > there is not a sharp line, but a difference of degree [between mind and > matter]; an oyster is less mental than a man, but not wholly un-mental” (p. > 209). Part of the reason why we cannot draw a line, he says, is that an > essential aspect of mind is memory, and a memory of sorts is displayed even > by inanimate objects: “we cannot, on this ground [of memory], erect an > absolute barrier between mind and matter. … [I]nanimate matter, to some > slight extent, shows analogous behavior” (p. 306). In the summary he adds, > The events that happen in our minds are part of the course of nature, and > we do not know that the events which happen elsewhere are of a totally > different kind. The physical world…is perhaps less rigidly determined by > causal laws than it was thought to be; one might, more or less fancifully, > attribute even to the atom a kind of limited free will (p. 311).Perhaps > Russell’s clearest statement came in his Portraits from Memory (1956). > Memory is “the most essential characteristic of mind, … using this word > [memory] in its broadest sense to include every influence of past experience > on present reactions” (pp. 153-4). As before, memory applies to all physical > objects and systems: > This [memory] also can be illustrated in a lesser degree by the behavior of > inorganic matter. A watercourse which at most times is dry gradually wears a > channel down a gully at the times when it flows, and subsequent rains follow > [a similar] course… You may say, if you like, that the river bed ‘remembers’ > previous occasions when it experienced cooling streams. … You would say > [this] was a flight of fancy because you are of the opinion that rivers and > river beds do not ‘think’. But if thinking consists of certain modifications > of behavior owing to former occurrences, then we shall have to say that the > river bed thinks, though its thinking is somewhat rudimentary (p. 155).In > contrast to Whitehead, Charles Hartshorne articulated a clear and explicit > form of process panpsychism. Beginning with his Beyond Humanism (1937), he > laid out the unambiguous position that all true individuals possess a kind > of psyche: “Molecules, atoms, and electrons all show more analogy of behavio > r to animals than do sticks and stones. The constitutions of inorganic > masses may then after all belong on the scale of organic being…” (pp. > 111-112). Elaborating on this notion over four decades, through such > articles as “Panpsychism” (1950), “Physics and Psychics” (1977), and “The > Rights of the Subhuman World” (1979), his panpsychism (or, “psychicalism”) > is a clear and consistent theme. He combined the insights of Leibniz with > Whitehead’s process view into a system which, he claimed, resolved many > long-standing philosophical problems: most notably that it serves as a third > way between dualism and materialism. Ultimately, panpsychism/psychicalism > is, he says, the most viable ontology available to us—certainly preferable > to an utterly unintelligible materialism: “the concept of ‘mere dead > insentient matter’ is an appeal to invincible ignorance. At no time will > this expression ever constitute knowledge” (1977: 95). > Many other great thinkers of the twentieth century promoted panpsychist > ideas, including: > F. S. C. Schiller: “A stone, no doubt, does not apprehend us as spiritual > beings… But does this amount to saying that it does not apprehend us at all, > and takes no note whatever of our existence? Not at all; it is aware of us > and affected by us on the plane on which its own existence is passed… It > faithfully exercises all the physical functions, and influences us by so > doing. It gravitates and resists pressure, and obstructs…vibrations, and so > forth, and makes itself respected as such a body. And it treats us as if of > a like nature with itself, on the level of its understanding…” (1907: > 442).Samuel Alexander: “there is nothing dead, or senseless in the universe, > [even] Space-Time itself being animated”(1920: 69).John Dewey : “[T]here is > nothing which marks off the plant from the physico-chemical activity of > inanimate bodies. The latter also are subject to conditions of disturbed > inner equilibrium, which lead to activity in relation to surrounding things, > and which te > rminate after a cycle of changes…” (1925: 253).Sir Arthur Eddington: “The > stuff of the world is mind-stuff” (1928: 276).J. B. S. Haldane: “We do not > find obvious evidence of life or mind in so-called inert matter…; but if the > scientific point of view is correct, we shall ultimately find them, at least > in rudimentary form, all through the universe” (1932: 13).J. Huxley: “[M]ind > or something of the nature as mind must exist throughout the entire > universe. This is, I believe, the truth” (1942: 141).Teilhard de Chardin: > “there is necessarily a double aspect to [matter’s] structure… > [C]o-extensive with their Without, there is a Within to things.” “[W]e are > logically forced to assume the existence in rudimentary form…of some sort of > psyche in every corpuscle, even in those (the mega-molecules and below) > whose complexity is of such a low or modest order as to render it (the > psyche) imperceptible…” (1959: 56, 301).C. H. Waddington: “[S]omething must > go on in the si > mplest inanimate things which can be described in the same language as > would be used to describe our self-awareness” (1961: 121).Gregory Bateson: > “The elementary cybernetic system with its messages in circuit is, in fact, > the simplest unit of mind; … More complicated systems are perhaps more > worthy to be called mental systems, but essentially this is what we are > talking about. … We get a picture, then, of mind as synonymous with > cybernetic system… [W]e know that within Mind in the widest sense there will > be a hierarchy of subsystems, any one of which we can call an individual > mind” (1972: 459-60).Freeman Dyson: “The laws [of physics] leave a place for > mind in the description of every molecule… In other words, mind is already > inherent in every electron, and the processes of human consciousness differ > only in degree and not in kind…” (1979: 249).David Bohm: “That which we > experience as mind…will in a natural way ultimately reach the level of the > wavefunction and of > the ‘dance’ of the particles. There is no unbridgeable gap or barrier > between any of these levels. … It is implied that, in some sense, a > rudimentary consciousness is present even at the level of particle physics” > (1986: 131).Panpsychism enters the 21st century with vigor and diversity of > thought. A number of recent works have focused attention on it. If we look > back to the year 1996 we find two books that contributed to a resurrection > of sorts. First, Chalmers’ The Conscious Mind lays out a naturalistic > dualism theory of mind in which he suggests (with an apparent diffidence) > that mind can be associated with ubiquitous information states—following > Bateson and Bohm, though without citing their panpsychist views. His > relatively detailed discussion of panpsychism sparked a resurgence of > discussion on the matter, and contributed to a wider interest. Also, Abram’s > Spell of the Sensuous argued from a phenomenological basis for a return to > an animistic worldview, though hi > s work was more poetic essay than detailed philosophical inquiry. In 1998 > process philosopher David Ray Griffin published Unsnarling the World-Knot, a > major milestone in panpsychist philosophy. Griffin supplies a detailed and > scholarly assessment of the subject, though with a strong focus on the > process view, and with only a cursory historical study. > Into the present century, Christian DeQuincey’s Radical Nature (2002) > offers another process perspective, and a more satisfying review of the > historical aspect. In 2003 there were two more books dedicated to > panpsychism: David Clarke’s Panpsychism and the Religious Attitude, and > Freya Mathews’ For Love of Matter. Clarke again takes the process view, > underscoring the dominance of this philosophical perspective on the > discussion. Mathews moves into new territory; drawing inspiration from > Schopenhauer, she crafts a truly metaphysical philosophy in which humans are > sensitive participants in an animate cosmos. Gregg Rosenberg released a > nominally panpsychist approach to mind in 2004, with his book A Place for > Consciousness. In 2005, Skrbina published the first-ever comprehensive study > of the subject, Panpsychism in the West. Most recently, Galen Strawson has > presented a forceful argument for panpsychism based on the inexplicability > of emergence of mind (see Section 4). > Thus, at present we can discern at least six active lines of inquiry into > panpsychism: > the Process Philosophy view, as conceived by Bergson and Whitehead, and > developed by Hartshorne, Griffin, DeQuincey, and Clarke;the Quantum Physics > approach, as developed by Bohm, Hameroff, and others;the Information Theory > approach, arising from the work of Bateson, Wheeler (1994), Bohm, and > Chalmers;the Part-Whole Hierarchy, as envisioned by Cardano and elaborated > by Koestler (1967) and Wilber (1995);the Nonlinear Dynamics approach, as > inspired by Peirce (1892) and further articulated by Skrbina (1994, 2001); > andStrawson’s (2006) “real physicalism” (see Section 4).These areas all > offer significant opportunity for development and articulation. They hold > out the hope of resolving otherwise intractable problems of emergentism and > mechanism, especially when so many conventional approaches have reached a > dead end. As Nagel, Searle, and others have noted, the problems of mind and > consciousness are so difficult that “drastic actions” are warranted—perhaps > even as drastic as > panpsychism. > Panpsychism, with its long list of advocates and sympathizers, is a robust > and respectable approach to mind. It offers a naturalistic escape from > Cartesian dualism and Christian theology. And, by undermining the > mechanistic worldview, it promises to resolve not only long-standing > philosophical problems but persistent social and ecological problems as > well. Many great thinkers, from Empedocles and Epicurus to Campanella and > LaMettrie, Fechner and James to Gregory Bateson, have recognized the > potential for the panpsychist view to fundamentally alter, for the better, > our outlook on the world. An animated worldview is not only philosophically > rigorous, but it can have far-reaching and unanticipated effects. > > > > > Moq_Discuss mailing list > Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. > http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org > Archives: > http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ > http://moq.org/md/archives.html > -- parser Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
