Hi Craig, Thank you for the insight. My only addition would be that, while there may not be distinction, language only represents a very small part of thought. I tend to agree with Carl Jung's theories on symbolism. So, as I have said before, language is the expressive (communicative) part of thought, which forms the cultural (or social) connections between thought beings. It is a very simplified part of collective thought (or consciousness). To limit such consciousness to language is indeed doing it a disservice.
The analogy which comes to mind would be my attempting to explain to you over the phone what a painting looks like to me. Language is certainly not enough. I do not believe that thought can be minimized to language as Wittgenstein tried to do. In fact, he changed his mind in the second half of his life. Again, I am no expert on semiotics, only on what I think goes on in my head. Cheers, Mark On Mon, Oct 4, 2010 at 12:23 PM, david buchanan <[email protected]>wrote: > > Gents: > > There is a difference "between the written (or spoken) word and its > representation" in one's head but both of these are considered to part of > language. In semiotics, the former is called a "sign" and the latter is the > "signified". Often there is also a "referent", which is the actual "thing" > being referred to - as opposed to the word or the concept that refers to it. > Language includes all three parts and so the difference between words and > concepts is a distinction within the language process, within the overall > system. So I don't think there is any meaningful distinction between thought > and language. > > Also, I'm pretty sure the MOQ is at odds with the brain-mind identity > theory. This is not to say that we can think without brains. Reductionism is > the problem and we can avoid it by noticing that we inherit a whole system > of thought and language from the culture and this system has evolved as a > collective effort. It's not a product of the brain so much as a product of > accumulated experience. In terms of the MOQ's levels of static quality, we'd > say that thought and language are social and intellectual rather than > biological or physical. > > Lil' Wiki on the topic, under the heading "some important semioticians": > "Charles Sanders Peirce (1839–1914), the founder of the philosophical > doctrine known as pragmatism (which he later renamed "pragmaticism" to > distinguish it from the pragmatism developed by others like William James), > preferred the terms "semiotic" and "semeiotic." He defined semiosis as > "...action, or influence, which is, or involves, a cooperation of three > subjects, such as a sign, its object, and its interpretant, this > tri-relative influence not being in any way resolvable into actions between > pairs." ("Pragmatism", Essential Peirce 2: 411; written 1907). His notion of > semiosis evolved throughout his career, beginning with the triadic relation > just described, and ending with a system consisting of 59,049 (= 310, or 3 > to the 10th power) possible elements and relations. One reason for this high > number is that he allowed each interpretant to act as a sign, thereby > creating a new signifying relation. Peirce was also a notable logician, and > he considered semiotics and logic as facets of a wider theory. For a summary > of Peirce's contributions to semiotics, see Liszka (1996).Ferdinand de > Saussure (1857–1913), the "father" of modern linguistics, proposed a > dualistic notion of signs, relating the signifier as the form of the word or > phrase uttered, to the signified as the mental concept. It is important to > note that, according to Saussure, the sign is completely arbitrary, i.e. > there was no necessary connection between the sign and its meaning. This > sets him apart from previous philosophers such as Plato or the Scholastics, > who thought that there must be some connection between a signifier and the > object it signifies. In his Course in General Linguistics, Saussure himself > credits the American linguist William Dwight Whitney (1827–1894) with > insisting on the arbitrary nature of the sign. Saussure's insistence on the > arbitrariness of the sign has also influenced later philosophers and > theorists such as Jacques Derrida, Roland Barthes, and Jean Baudrillard. > Ferdinand de Saussure coined the term semiologie while teaching his landmark > "Course on General Linguistics" at the University of Geneva from 1906–11. > Saussure posited that no word is inherently meaningful. Rather a word is > only a "signifier," i.e. the representation of something, and it must be > combined in the brain with the "signified," or the thing itself, in order to > form a meaning-imbued "sign." Saussure believed that dismantling signs was a > real science, for in doing so we come to an empirical understanding of how > humans synthesize physical stimuli into words and other abstract concepts." > > > > > > Date: Mon, 4 Oct 2010 11:05:26 -0700 > > From: [email protected] > > To: [email protected] > > Subject: Re: [MD] The MOQ difference > > > > Fair enough Craig, we have different delimitations of the words being > used. > > But, I think I get what you mean. Concepts as a inner function of the > > brain which is more than just for communication. The word dog may be > > composed of 12-13 interconnected neurons in my brain which fire in such a > > way as to make dog appear in my mind's eye. (of course I am just making > > that neuron stuff up, just an analogy). > > > > I was differentiating between the written word and its representation in > my > > head. In this way I see language as a trigger. But as you say, concept > > could be used to represent that inner sense. If this is what you mean, > then > > certainly concepts do result in language, and our living in a culture > could > > arise as concepts. It may be more of a two way street however. Do > levels > > interact in a dynamic way? If so, how can we measure such interaction > and > > allow prediction? (Serious question from the uninitiated). > > > > Mark > > > > > > On Mon, Oct 4, 2010 at 9:07 AM, <[email protected]> wrote: > > > > > [Craig, previously] > > > > > > > > > > "concepts are provided by our language" & > > > > "language is provided by our culture" > > > > > > > > > . > > > [Mark] > > > > If a concept is a string of words that has meaning, > > > > where does that meaning come from? > > > > > > . > > > I would say "a string of words that has meaning" is a sentence, > > > not a concept. > > > . > > > [Mark] > > > > Certainly the words are neutral, just sounds. > > > > > > . > > > Not certain. Words are not just sounds, but have meaning. > > > > > > > > > . > > > [Mark] > > > > In my opinion, a concept must trigger an > > > > inner reaction that is independent of the words. > > > > > > . > > > The inner reaction triggered by a concept (for instance, "dog") > > > is NOT independent of the inner reaction tiggered by the word "dog", > > > but is IDENTICAL. > > > Craig > > > Moq_Discuss mailing list > > > Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. > > > http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org > > > Archives: > > > http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ > > > http://moq.org/md/archives.html > > > > > Moq_Discuss mailing list > > Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. > > http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org > > Archives: > > http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ > > http://moq.org/md/archives.html > > Moq_Discuss mailing list > Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. > http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org > Archives: > http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ > http://moq.org/md/archives.html > Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
