dmb said:
I honestly don't know what the difference is between denying the slogan and
refusing to use the slogan. I have the same problem understanding what you mean
when you say "we don't want to deny radical empiricism, we just don't want to
use it." I do not see any difference.
Matt replied:
If we agree that differently composed sentences can mean the same thing (which
one can find out through a process we've been calling "translation"), then to
refuse without denying is to say "I recognize that these two sentences say the
same thing, but I prefer to use one of them over the other." The grounds of
preference, then, exist to the side (as it were) of the ground upon which the
two different sentences mean the same thing. I take that to be nothing
particularly contentious.
dmb says:
Oh, I see. When two sentences mean the same thing then the grounds of
preferring one over the other are something other than their common meaning.
But I'm still confused because this kind of preference for psychological
nominalism over radical empiricism is predicated on the assertion that they
mean the same thing. But that is the very thing in dispute. I don't see how a
theory of language (verbal behaviorism) can be parallel to an empirical theory
that centers around pre-verbal experience. And of course I've raised the issue
of a translation problem because terms like "pre-verbal" stand for very
different meanings.
Matt continued:
What I mean then by not wanting "to use" radical empiricism is just that I
don't feel the need to use the philosophical vocabulary supplied by radical
empiricism to do philosophical work that I take another vocabulary also able to
do. This is what the "parallel claim" is for: to establish that the two
vocabularies "mean the same thing" over a particular ground.
dmb says:
Okay, but that's exactly what this debate is all about. I think there is
nothing like radical empiricism in the vocabulary you prefer. I think the
grounds for preferring one over the other are not at all off to the side. As I
see, the difference is so substantial that using these linguistic theories
instead of radical empiricism amounts to an evacuation of the central concepts.
Matt said:
... the force of "it's language all the way down" is .. only pushed as a
negative thesis against the enemy of Platonism, if there is no enemy, there is
no more force on our part. We aren't trying to say that you must use the
slogan, only that you not be a Platonist. That's why actively denying the
slogan looks like actively denying anti-Platonism. But, as you point out,
that's just an appearance. Likewise, however, is the appearance that we are
posing a "false dilemma." We, like you, just don't want people to be
Platonists or SOMists anymore.
dmb says:
Right, I see the slogan as a negative thesis too. Its aim is to tell us what we
can not have. It's says we cannot have pre-linguistic awareness as a basis for
truth or knowledge. But I'm trying to say that radical empiricism centers
around something that looks and sounds like everything negated by that thesis.
Radical empiricism centers around the terms prohibited by the slogan but it
uses them to stand for very different concepts. (The title of Seigfried's book
is "William James's Radical Reconstruction of Philosophy" and Pirsig likes to
think of his thesis as a Copernican revolution in philosophy.)
Matt said:
So: the issue has been, and still is, what radical empiricism does for you that
a psychological nominalist vocabulary is unable to do .. and whether everyone
needs to do it.
dmb says:
On that point, I think there is no contest. I think we agree that your
preferred vocabulary is almost purely negative but radical empiricism is a
positive program. This difference basically means that the psychological
nominalist is not able to do anything that a radical empiricist can do. He just
doesn't have those tools at all.
Matt continued:
...For example, one uncontested thing the vocabulary of radical empiricism does
better is "talk to," as it were, Pirsig, James, and Dewey's texts. I take it
that neither Steve nor I have any wish to argue about that. The link with the
second half of the issue is whether everyone needs to "talk to" (i.e., read and
assimilate to) Pirsig, James, and Dewey's texts. My impression of how you've
responded to issues, when stated like this, is that you will say "no, people
don't need to 'talk to' their texts in that specific sense." I take that to be
an uncontested kind of claim, too, basically a "different strokes" approach.
dmb says:
Well, I'm not exactly sure what it would mean to say "everyone" needs to read
and assimilate Pirsig's texts. As you obviously already know, reading Pirsig is
the only requirement to be here and discussing those books is the purpose of
this forum. I guess that would be one of the main reasons that I feel justified
in insisting upon the use of Pirsig's central terms and in putting stress upon
their meanings. I think it would be a bit absurd to be so insistent in some
other context but also think it's a bit absurd not to in this particular
context. That's why I find "Rorty's overbearing negativity towards Platonism to
be at a certain point bad conversationally", as you said And it's not just that
Rortyists "are not much fun to talk to if you want to do anything other than
beat up Platonists", although that's probably true too. The problem is that it
seems to preclude discussion of positive programs like the pragmatic theory of
truth and radical empiricism
Ooops, gotta go. Later.
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