Hi DMB. On Fri, Dec 31, 2010 at 7:03 PM, david buchanan <[email protected]> wrote: > > Steve said to Matt: > We've been through this with DMB many times over the past five years or so. I > can't see why he'd want to drop the distinction between a true belief and a > justified belief. I can't imagine that Pirsig meant to drop this distinction > in embracing the pragmatic theory of truth. I tend to think that Pirsig would > find the notion that we could be justified in believing something at one time > that turns out not to be true and that someone could believe something that > turns out to be true without any justification or even right for the wrong > reason. > > dmb says: > Well, I'm all for a good thought experiment if it helps but the card games > and the case of the stolen money seems to suggest that the distinction > between truth and justification is only good for describing trivial errors > and ordinary mistakes.
Steve: What makes you think that I had some higher aim than "describing trivial errors and ordinary mistakes"? Why is that not a valid consideration in philosphical talk about the use of the word "true"? DMB: > The notion that our truths can later become untrue does not mean that truth > and justification are two different things. It just means that new truths > emerge and old truths die. If they weren't well justified, we wouldn't have > called them true. As I tried to explain in the last post, the pragmatist > thinks that a well funded, well justified belief is all we can ever mean by > the word "true". Steve: Obviously, true CAN mean something other than that because a well-justified belief may not be true. Best, Steve Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
