DMB, Like I said, the fact that Weed says " that Rorty has taken the empiricism out of James's theory of truth and replaced it with mere conversation." doesn't make it true (by any use of the term true).
Yet who (here, Matt or Steve say) is arguing for the for "the deflationary view" you describe in your concluding para ? "The deflationary view is so empty and trivial that it's almost funny. It's true that "snow is white" if and only if snow is white. This is a neat little trick if one is trying to untangle the liars paradox but otherwise it is just an epistemologically and ontologically neutral version of the correspondence theory. It doesn't dare to be so bold as the make any actual claims about the color of snow or even the existence of snow. It vaguely tells you that a proposition is true if it corresponds to a state of affairs but it doesn't tell you anything about that state or the truth of the proposition. By design, it is purely formal and conceptually empty. It could be written as an algebra equation. And so the imagery is perfect. Snow is cold and white is blank and analytic truth is also cold and blank." Is there anyone since (say) Wittgenstein who would disagree ? You seem to be disagreeing with straw-men, or tilting at windmills. Ian PS I agree with you - clearly experience IS excluded from conversation (unless we dramatically expand our understanding of conversation to include participatory experience as well as the reporting and imagining of it.) I doubt that's what Steve actually meant. On Mon, Jan 3, 2011 at 5:42 PM, david buchanan <[email protected]> wrote: > > > Steve said to dmb: > Of course conversation is not excluded from experience, but what you fail to > get is that nothing is excluded from conversation. > > dmb says: > It's not that I fail to understand that nothing is excluded from conversation. Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
