[Steve]
> you can demonstrate your agency with
> whatever example you want so long as it demonstrates that you can will
> yourself to believe something that you don't think is true.

Of all the arguments against free will, this is the weakest.
Your self-contradictory criterion of free will is to "will yourself
to believe something that you don't think is true". Since no one
else thinks this is what's meant by 'free will', it is irrelevant
to that issue.
All that is required for free will is a case of deciding what to believe.

[Steve]
> You have no choice but to believe what you deem to be better justified

Exactly. But "deeming to be better justified" can itself be making
a choice & so is an example of free will without any infinite regress.


[Craig, previously]
>You could simply ask me to raise either my right or left arm &
> I would choose which to raise.

[Steve]
> Or would you be compelled in some way? How could we ever tell the
> difference? How could that count as a demonstration that is relevant
> here?

Now you're back on track.
We need to look at a range of cases:
1) There's something on a high shelf that I want, so I raise my arm 
to reach it.
2) I see something coming toward me out of the corner of my eye &
raise my arm in protection.
3) An electric charge is sent into my brain & my arm kicks up.
4) Someone holds a knife at my throat, orders me to raise my arm &
I do so.
5) A hypnotist plants a suggestion that I raise my arm when I
hear the word 'chicken'; I hear the word 'chicken' & I raise my arm.
I would characterize them thus:
1) free will
2) reflex (no free will) 
3) compulsion (no free will)
4) free will & coercion
5) compulsion (no free will)
In 1) I don't see any reason to think I'm "compelled in some way".
What way would that be? We can tell the difference between 1) vs.
3) or 5).
Craig
Moq_Discuss mailing list
Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc.
http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org
Archives:
http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/
http://moq.org/md/archives.html

Reply via email to