On Wed, May 4, 2011 at 2:20 PM, <[email protected]> wrote: > [Steve] >> what matters here is HOW someone decides what >> to believe. Is that belief compelled or is it freely chosen? > > We sometimes say "The evidence compelled him to believe his daughter > committed the crime". But we also say "The evidence didn't compel > him to believe his daughter committed the crime, but he believed it > anyway".
Steve: Your point? > > [Steve] >> If you can't believe just whatever you want but rather only that which >> appeals to your sensibilities based on the available evidence as >> probably true, and since you didn't choose these sensibilities or the >> evidence, then what sort of freedom is this? > Craig: > But prior choices do affect our sensibilities and how we weigh the > evidence. Steve: Of course they do. That's my point. What I doubt is that there is something extra we need to take into account besides our histories to explain our choices that supposedly goes by the name of free will. > [Steve] >> How is this different from the "freedom" to fall when pushed >> out of an airplane? > Craig: > The biggest difference is when we are able to choose, our choice often > results. There are no known cases of someone being pushed out of an > airplane & not falling. Steve: If we choose to fall when pushed from an airplane, our choice routinely obtains. > >> [Craig, previously] >> 1) There's something on a high shelf that I want, so I raise my arm >> to reach it. > > [Steve] >> The difference between 1) and the "freedom" to fall out of an airplane >> when pushed is a matter of your ability to imagine a plausible reality >> where you did not fall but rather just hung there in the sky in much the >> same way as bricks don't. Craig: > I don't think so. But if you want to test your theory, I suggest starting > at a lower height. You want to live to see its refutation. Steve: I have no theory which says I can will myself not to fall or will myself to believe the absurd. I'm not the one endorsing free will here. that would be you. > [Steve] >> The question with regard to free will in 1) is what compels the arm to >> be raised? > > To avoid begging the question, this needs to be phrased: > what, if anything, compels the arm to be raised? Steve: Whatever. You still didn't answer even your rephrased question. > [Steve] >> Occam's Razor should lead >> you to believe that the the extra-added ingredient is unnecessary to >> explain what happened and provides no additional explanatory value for >> why you raised your arm. Craig: > Q: Why did the mass murderer open fire on the crowd? > A1: He chose to. > A2: He was compelled to. > Which has better explanatory value? > Occam's razor cuts both ways. Steve: A1 is no answer. We know he chose to open fire on the crowd. The question was WHY did he choose to. Craig: > What is this compulsion we have when we don't feel compelled? > Perhaps the cases of free will are just the cases where there is no > compulsion. Steve: Rather the feeling that you are sometimes in control of your intentions--that you are the source of your thoughts rather than a being comprised of these thoughts among other patterns, that there is an I that is not your body, your brain, your mind, your thoughts, that can direct your thoughts to tell yourself to do something is an illusion. As Harris out it, the illusion of free will is itself an illusion. Any one who meditates has a sense of this. Thoughts simply arise. What else could they do? What else of the self could their be once you subtract your body, brain, mind, beliefs, etc? Once we've dispensed with the big God, some still need lose the notion of the small one, the soul. Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
