Hi dmb, On Wed, Jul 20, 2011 at 3:42 PM, david buchanan <[email protected]> wrote: > > dmb said: > Steve keeps saying Lila just is her values and there is no added metaphysical > entity beyond that. This is true enough as far as it goes, but this doesn't > mean that selves have no existence at all. Steve and I and everyone else > exist DEPENDENTLY within this larger evolutionary framework. > > Steve replied: > To assert that the self "exists DEPENDENTLY" is to deny the free will horn of > the traditional free will versus determinism dilemma since the whole big deal > there was always about whether or not an INDEPENDENT self can assert itself, > i.e. exercise it's free will. Obviously a value-based metaphysics also denies > the determinism horn of the traditional SOM dilemma as well. ... > > > dmb says: > Yes, Steve, the existence of the DEPENDENT self denies the the notion of an > INDEPENDENT self. It is a rejection of the self as an independent entity. > Pirsig's description of Lila (and everyone else) as persons engaged in a > struggle with the patterns of their own life e is an alternative to the > notion of an independent self. I'm talking about the discussion of freedom > and constraint in terms of Lila's battle, in terms of Pirsig's evolutionary > morality. That's WHY the traditional dilemma doesn't come up. The MOQ sets > the issues of freedom and control into a completely different context AND > thereby re-conceiving the self so that we are NOT EVEN TALKING about the > freedom and constraint OF an independent self anymore. Instead, we are > talking about the freedom and constraint of the MOQ's dependent self. That is > the "one" who is controlled to some extent. That is the "one" who is free to > some extent. > > So what are YOU talking about, Steve, if not that "one"? Have we not already > agreed that there is no independent self? Have we not already established the > fact that the MOQ rejects that notion of the self? Have we not already > established the topic here as Pirsig's reformulation of the issue without the > Cartesian self figuring into it? Yes. Yes, we have. And so your reply is a > non-sequetor. Questions about the status of this independent self simply > isn't relevant because it does not exist in Pirsig's reformulation. You're > not only talking about a straw man that nobody is defending, you're changing > the subject.
Steve: Maybe you can answer this as our master of logic. How can you still think it is an interesting question to wonder about whether a DEPENDENT self has INDEPENDENT (free) will? You accuse me of changing the subject, but my point all along has been that the free will determinism debate is an SOM problem which as Pirsig says, doesn't come up in the MOQ. Everything you said above supports what I have been saying all along, so I can only think that if I am arguing against a straw man it is only because you have finally come around. If there is no independent (free) self, then in the SOM sense of the term (and "free will" is an SOM term) the MOQ denies the "free will" horn of the ancient dilemma. If reality is Quality, the MOQ denies the determinism horn of the dilemma as well. What we have here is not some middle ground that says we have a little free will and are also a little bit determined by forces external to the will (since the MOQ doesn't play that internal/external subject-object game). Instead the MOQ denies the SOM premise (the independent self in a world of objects) upon which it could possibly make sense to ask the free will/determinism question. That doesn't mean we can't talk about freedom, but in the MOQ we aren't talking about "free will" since there is no independent self who could possess this faculty. Best, Steve Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
