Hi Horse,
Thanks for the always spot on analysis.  More below.

Mark

On Aug 3, 2011, at 6:14 AM, Horse <[email protected]> wrote:

> 
> Hi Folks
> 
> A couple of things that need to be cleared up in relation to free will as I 
> see it:
> 
> 1) In a reality in which everything is a moral activity (MoQ) any act is a 
> moral act - so we can't help but act morally according to the MoQ. The 
> argument which requires free will in order to act morally would appear to be 
> irrelevant - we can't help but act morally regardless of the existence of 
> free will.
> 
> "The Metaphysics of Quality says that if moral judgements are essentially 
> assertions of value and if value is the fundamental ground-stuff of the 
> world, then moral judgements are the fundamental ground-stuff of the 
> world......
> .....So what Phædrus was saying was that not just life, but everything, is an 
> ethical activity. It is nothing else. When inorganic patterns of reality 
> create life the Metaphysics of Quality postulates that they’ve done so 
> because it’s “better” and that this definition of “betterness”—this beginning 
> response to Dynamic Quality—is an elementary unit of ethics upon which all 
> right and wrong can be based."
> 
> How does throwing free will into the mix make any difference to inherent 
> moral behaviour as a pre-requisite of existence? Or is the MoQ wrong when it 
> states that existence is a moral order?

DQ is Will, free or otherwise.  Determined will is only sq.  The moral order 
sets the stage for Will.  Will is an expression of such order.  Existence is an 
expression of Will.
> 
> 2) There seems to have been a tendency recently to equate free will with DQ. 
> Equating (or more accurately conflating) the two in this way is a mistake - 
> in my opinion - as it tends to intellectualise/compartmentalise DQ. Which is 
> always a mistake.
> 
> 3) The degree to which we are free to act - i.e. have the greatest choice - 
> increases as we move up the static value hierarchy but still doesn't appear 
> to be completely free. Statically, we can only choose between those patterns 
> that already exist - i.e. we can have a PRE-ference for a PRE-existing static 
> pattern. If we choose not to prefer an existing pattern and instead opt for a 
> new pattern of our own creation then we are following DQ. Opting for 
> another's creation is certainly not following DQ.
> I think this ties in with what Pirsig says re:SQ/DQ and behaviour:

Actually, free will decreases as we move up the hierarchy.  The inorganic has 
the highest propensity for freedom.  As Pirsig states, all is imbued with free 
will.
> 
> "In the Metaphysics of Quality this dilemma doesn’t come up. To the extent 
> that one’s behavior is controlled by static patterns of quality it is without 
> choice. But to the extent that one follows Dynamic Quality, which is 
> undefinable, one’s behavior is free."
> 
> I think we need to come up with a better way of expressing the idea of free 
> will cos at the moment it just doesn't seem to be getting too far.
> 
I agree.  We should first start with the MoQ axiom that All has free will.  
This is explicitly stated in Lila.

Mark
> Horse
> 
> -- 
> 
> "Without music to decorate it, time is just a bunch of boring production 
> deadlines or dates by which bills must be paid."
> — Frank Zappa
> 
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