On 8/3/11 2:59 PM, "Steven Peterson" <[email protected]> wrote:
>> Dave >> I was referring to this: >> -------------- >> Lila -Pg 57... > > Steve: > Yes, I knew exactly what you were referring to, but remember that this > discussion is about free will. We are trying to explore the > interpretation of Pirsig's claim that the extent to which one follows > Dynamic Quality one's behavior is free. dmb contends that that freedom > is another way of understanding free will. I say that that doesn't > make any sense since as you quoted "Dynamic Quality comes as a sort of > surprise." It isn't even willed let alone _freely_ willed (whatever > that means. It is therefore not the conscious free choice upon which > to hang the notion of moral responsibility for human behavior. I agree > that "It was free, without static forms," but "without static forms" > is incompatible with any standard usage of "free will" which is > generally taken to be freedom as the basis for self-conscious > deliberation. > Dave replies: Oh, I have watched your discussion with dmb o' these long months. In part it has led me to the conclusion that the problem(s) lies primarily in the main source material you both are using. I, in general, agree with your argument but probably not for reasons you will agree with. It reminds me of a book I read some time ago by Cornell West. West is not one of my favorite people or authors but in "The American Evasion of Philosophy: A Genealogy of Pragmatism" he make some points that I think shed some light on Pirsig's purported reconstruction of pragmatism. First contrary to what RMP claims he does not "solve" all these dualistic platypuses of SOM like free-will/determinism, he evades them. By claiming that quality is prior to, more foundational than subjects and objects he can and does effectively sweep them under the rug. If you accept his most basic premise all those dualistic splits argued over for years are passé, kaput, meaningless. But as your months of dialogue with dmb indicates (together with other threads equally and long an contentious) he creates as many, or more platypussies, as he screws. That being said this review of West's book makes interesting point I think applicable to RMP. http://www.jstor.org/pss/25670019 ------------- The present situation in philosophy is one in which we arc witnessing a number of "reconstructions of the problematic," to use Dewey's terminology. This work is a new and important addition to that body of literature. For West, a renaissance of pragmatism is occurring, due to disenchantment with traditional philosophy, an interest in the relationship between knowledge and power, and a revitalization of interest in humanistic studies (pp. 3- 4). He sees himself as adding, critically, to this literature, by tracing the genealogy of pragmatism, ie., its beginning, development, decline , and resurgence . West does not purport to be comprehensive, but rather highly selective, offering a social history of ideas, wherein American pragmatism achieves maturity with the work of John Dewey, "The fundamental argument of this book is that the evasion of epistemology-centered philosophy- from Emerson to Rorty, results in a conception of philosophy as a form of cultural criticism in which the meaning of America is put forward by intellectuals in response to distinct social and cultural crises" ------------ In Pirsig's case his may have been more of an "individual crisis" coupled with his perceptions of "distinct social and cultural crises", but the resulting work fits this last quote to a "T." But that doesn't necessarily make his criticisms "right" nor his proposed solutions "good" Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
