Hi Steve, To reiterate, my posting was concerned with the rhetorical value of the term free, as applied to will and that what might be seen as a redundant term in SOMish vernacular, actually is meaningful when viewed through the lens of MoQ levels.
> > > Steve: > To summarize my conclusions from all the talk since the spring about > the relationship between free will and the MOQ, I would say that we > ought to distinguish between a (I) metaphysical and a (II) > conventional use of the term "free will." > John: I think we are in basic agreement about the two differing ways of talking about free will. However in a purely metaphysical sense, I see free will as fundamental and I don't think your explication gives that view much credence. To my recollection, last spring, when as you say, all this discussion started, I was concerned with a comment of Pirsig's in the Coppleston Annotations which I thought denigrated free will and my point was to equate free will with Quality. But historical perspectives aside... Steve: > > I. The traditional dilemma between free will and determinism where the > debate is framed around the self as a metaphysical entity is replaced > in the MOQ with Pirsig's notion of DQ as a sort of freedom (as > expressed in Pirsig's "the extent to which one's behavior > follows..."). In this sense, both of the following seem like > reasonable conclusions to me... > a.) The MOQ denies both horns of the traditional philosophical dilemma > since it rejects the premise upon which that dilemma rests. > b.) Alternatively, one could take Pirsig as accepting the free will > horn while redefining what is meant by free will to the extent that it > is no longer what what originally asked about in the traditional > dilemma. In this new Pirsigian usage of the term as the capacity to > respond to DQ, even rocks and trees and atoms can be said to have free > will as Pirsig said in LC. Further, this capacity is not a matter of > will as a deliberate choice since DQ is said to be primary while > concepts are secondary. (See Pirsig's "hot stove" talk.) > John: Well as you should know by now, I have troubles with the hot stove analogy. It takes as its basic assumption that we all react the same to hot stoves, but I disagree vehemently to that assumption. Each of us carries a unique historical context to our experience, and no two reactions to ANY phenomenon are exactly alike. But leaving that aside for the moment, I would say that it's important when applying the idea of free will to rocks, trees and atoms, to notice the distinct differences in degree of freedom of choice available to the differing levels. In fact, I think this is the key to understanding the levels themselves. It is increasing freedom of response that defines the boundaries of the levels. Life has more freedom available than non-life. Societies have more decisions and freedoms than individual cells and intellect stands at the paramount of freedom, having the ability to think and decide whatever it chooses, even as to the definitions of the concepts it employs. Or "plays with". Steve: > > II. In a non-metaphysical conventional usage of the term, free will > can be taken to be the human capacity to deliberate over possible > courses of actions and play out scenarios of possible futures to weigh > the consequences of actions before acting rather than merely acting on > biologically determined impulses or socially conditioned responses. > Free will in this sense translates in the MOQ not as affirming the > capacity to respond to DQ but as affirming the fact that human beings > participate in intellectual patterns of value. (Such a conventional > usage is not explicitly discussed by Pirsig.) > > John: right! That's why we're doing it for him. But yes, when "free" is coupled with "will", I believe you have delineated the purely human activity of intellectual analysis. Or artistic creation as well. I think art and intellect are wedded in the 4th level, an important point I haven't been able to convince anybody of yet. But overall, I think we are in agreement as to the idea that the rhetorical value of free will, is as a signifier of 4th level patterning. Is what I've been saying. Steve: > Also important here is the MOQ's flat rejection of determinism in both > its metaphysical and conventional forms. The MOQ denies that > intellectual patterns are mechanistically determined by inorganic and > biological patterns. In other words, the MOQ denies greedy > reductionism where intellectual patterns are thought to be (even in > theory) exhaustively explainable in terms of inorganic patterns. (See > the stuff in Lila about a novel stored as variations in voltages on a > computer not being a property of the voltages for the best example of > Pirsig's critique on reductionism.) > > Thanks Steve. Right on. I see nothing to argue over anymore. But I'm sure something will arise. As some famous philosopher said somewhere, If we can't find good ole dialogical opposition then maybe we can create some. take care, John Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
