Hi John, John: > To reiterate, my posting was concerned with the rhetorical value of the term > free, as applied to will and that what might be seen as a redundant term in > SOMish vernacular, actually is meaningful when viewed through the lens of > MoQ levels.
Steve: Yes, I realize that was agreeing with you in my last post on that point. I didn't explicitly say so because I wanted to write a summary of what I think our conclusions ought to be from the long debate even though I was torn because I felt like it was a little rude not to address your thoughts directly. I wanted to establish what I think the consensus is at this point. This idea goes back to the old MF at moq.org where the point was to have a specific question to debate and hopefully end up with a formal summary of the consensus at the end. I was also pointing out that your solution only works if we associate free will with the intellectual level and that the problem is that that is not what Pirsig did. He associated it with DQ which results in a completely different usage of the term from what is usually meant by free will. In fact, in his usage (which we are inferring rather than being one he made explicit) it doesn't even make sense to call it "will" of any sort. It isn't redundant but rather a misnomer or perhaps better, a metaphor. In place of free will which is denied in its traditional form we have "Pirsig's notion of freedom" to explicate. I tried to show that this notion is not about will if what is meant is the capacity to follow DQ. It IS about will when we look at it as the capacity to participate in intellectual patterns. If we do that (which isn't what Pirsig did), then Pirsig's notion of freedom can be thought of as including free will as just one sort of freedom. >> Steve: >> To summarize my conclusions from all the talk since the spring about >> the relationship between free will and the MOQ, I would say that we >> ought to distinguish between a (I) metaphysical and a (II) >> conventional use of the term "free will." >> > > John: > > I think we are in basic agreement about the two differing ways of talking > about free will. However in a purely metaphysical sense, I see free will as > fundamental and I don't think your explication gives that view much > credence. Steve: Keep in mind that my summary was not to give any traditional position credence but rather to explicate what Pirsig's position on the matter is based on his writings. I was not trying to say what the MOQ ought to say but just what I think it says. As for free will being metaphysically fundamental, Pirsig's rejection of the Cartesian self is a rejection of metaphysical free will being fundamental. Instead we have a new conception of freedom as DQ which replaces freedom as a faculty possessed by the Cartesian self. It includes free will as a non-metaphysical notion (intellectual patterns) but replaces free will as a fundamental metaphysical entity with a new way of thinking about freedom. John: >To my recollection, last spring, when as you say, all this > discussion started, I was concerned with a comment of Pirsig's in the > Coppleston Annotations which I thought denigrated free will and my point was > to equate free will with Quality. But historical perspectives aside... Steve: I don't have the Coppleston annotations. Can you provide the text that deals with free will? > Steve: > >> >> I. The traditional dilemma between free will and determinism where the >> debate is framed around the self as a metaphysical entity is replaced >> in the MOQ with Pirsig's notion of DQ as a sort of freedom (as >> expressed in Pirsig's "the extent to which one's behavior >> follows..."). In this sense, both of the following seem like >> reasonable conclusions to me... >> a.) The MOQ denies both horns of the traditional philosophical dilemma >> since it rejects the premise upon which that dilemma rests. >> b.) Alternatively, one could take Pirsig as accepting the free will >> horn while redefining what is meant by free will to the extent that it >> is no longer what what originally asked about in the traditional >> dilemma. In this new Pirsigian usage of the term as the capacity to >> respond to DQ, even rocks and trees and atoms can be said to have free >> will as Pirsig said in LC. Further, this capacity is not a matter of >> will as a deliberate choice since DQ is said to be primary while >> concepts are secondary. (See Pirsig's "hot stove" talk.) >> > > > John: > > Well as you should know by now, I have troubles with the hot stove analogy. > It takes as its basic assumption that we all react the same to hot stoves, > but I disagree vehemently to that assumption. Each of us carries a unique > historical context to our experience, and no two reactions to ANY phenomenon > are exactly alike. Steve: I sympathize with your objections to the hot stove stuff, but again, I was not setting out to say what Pirsig should have said but rather to draw conclusions from what he did say. John: But leaving that aside for the moment, I would say that > it's important when applying the idea of free will to rocks, trees and > atoms, to notice the distinct differences in degree of freedom of choice > available to the differing levels. In fact, I think this is the key to > understanding the levels themselves. It is increasing freedom of response > that defines the boundaries of the levels. Life has more freedom available > than non-life. Societies have more decisions and freedoms than individual > cells and intellect stands at the paramount of freedom, having the ability > to think and decide whatever it chooses, even as to the definitions of the > concepts it employs. Or "plays with". Steve: Yes, "freedom" in some sense (DQ), but not "free _will_" since rocks, trees, and atoms don't exercise will. They have and act on preferences but not rationally deliberated choices. Now in LC Pirsig implies this usage of free will as applying to atoms, but again, I think that has to be regarded as a metaphor. > > Steve: >> II. In a non-metaphysical conventional usage of the term, free will >> can be taken to be the human capacity to deliberate over possible >> courses of actions and play out scenarios of possible futures to weigh >> the consequences of actions before acting rather than merely acting on >> biologically determined impulses or socially conditioned responses. >> Free will in this sense translates in the MOQ not as affirming the >> capacity to respond to DQ but as affirming the fact that human beings >> participate in intellectual patterns of value. (Such a conventional >> usage is not explicitly discussed by Pirsig.) >> >> > John: > > right! That's why we're doing it for him. But yes, when "free" is coupled > with "will", I believe you have delineated the purely human activity of > intellectual analysis. Or artistic creation as well. I think art and > intellect are wedded in the 4th level, an important point I haven't been > able to convince anybody of yet. But overall, I think we are in agreement > as to the idea that the rhetorical value of free will, is as a signifier of > 4th level patterning. Steve: I think you may be making a too common mistake (in my book) in taking the code of art stuff to be a higher level of some sort. The code of art is about dynamic-static tension in general. DQ permeates the picture at all levels. Art is not something that rides above intellect. Art in the "code of art" sense is just undefined goodness that is in play at all times and at all levels. > Steve: >> Also important here is the MOQ's flat rejection of determinism in both >> its metaphysical and conventional forms. The MOQ denies that >> intellectual patterns are mechanistically determined by inorganic and >> biological patterns. In other words, the MOQ denies greedy >> reductionism where intellectual patterns are thought to be (even in >> theory) exhaustively explainable in terms of inorganic patterns. (See >> the stuff in Lila about a novel stored as variations in voltages on a >> computer not being a property of the voltages for the best example of >> Pirsig's critique on reductionism.) >> John: > Thanks Steve. Right on. I see nothing to argue over anymore. But I'm > sure something will arise. As some famous philosopher said somewhere, If we > can't find good ole dialogical opposition then maybe we can create some. Steve: Bring it. Best, Steve Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
