Hi Steve,
To reiterate, my posting was concerned with the rhetorical value of the
term
free, as applied to will and that what might be seen as a redundant term
in
SOMish vernacular, actually is meaningful when viewed through the lens of
MoQ levels.
Steve:
To summarize my conclusions from all the talk since the spring about
the relationship between free will and the MOQ, I would say that we
ought to distinguish between a (I) metaphysical and a (II)
conventional use of the term "free will."
John:
I think we are in basic agreement about the two differing ways of talking
about free will. However in a purely metaphysical sense, I see free will
as
fundamental and I don't think your explication gives that view much
credence. To my recollection, last spring, when as you say, all this
discussion started, I was concerned with a comment of Pirsig's in the
Coppleston Annotations which I thought denigrated free will and my point
was
to equate free will with Quality. But historical perspectives aside...
Steve:
I. The traditional dilemma between free will and determinism where the
debate is framed around the self as a metaphysical entity is replaced
in the MOQ with Pirsig's notion of DQ as a sort of freedom (as
expressed in Pirsig's "the extent to which one's behavior
follows..."). In this sense, both of the following seem like
reasonable conclusions to me...
a.) The MOQ denies both horns of the traditional philosophical dilemma
since it rejects the premise upon which that dilemma rests.
b.) Alternatively, one could take Pirsig as accepting the free will
horn while redefining what is meant by free will to the extent that it
is no longer what what originally asked about in the traditional
dilemma. In this new Pirsigian usage of the term as the capacity to
respond to DQ, even rocks and trees and atoms can be said to have free
will as Pirsig said in LC. Further, this capacity is not a matter of
will as a deliberate choice since DQ is said to be primary while
concepts are secondary. (See Pirsig's "hot stove" talk.)
John:
Well as you should know by now, I have troubles with the hot stove
analogy.
It takes as its basic assumption that we all react the same to hot
stoves,
but I disagree vehemently to that assumption. Each of us carries a
unique
historical context to our experience, and no two reactions to ANY
phenomenon
are exactly alike. But leaving that aside for the moment, I would say
that
it's important when applying the idea of free will to rocks, trees and
atoms, to notice the distinct differences in degree of freedom of choice
available to the differing levels. In fact, I think this is the key to
understanding the levels themselves. It is increasing freedom of
response
that defines the boundaries of the levels. Life has more freedom
available
than non-life. Societies have more decisions and freedoms than
individual
cells and intellect stands at the paramount of freedom, having the
ability
to think and decide whatever it chooses, even as to the definitions of
the
concepts it employs. Or "plays with".
Steve:
II. In a non-metaphysical conventional usage of the term, free will
can be taken to be the human capacity to deliberate over possible
courses of actions and play out scenarios of possible futures to weigh
the consequences of actions before acting rather than merely acting on
biologically determined impulses or socially conditioned responses.
Free will in this sense translates in the MOQ not as affirming the
capacity to respond to DQ but as affirming the fact that human beings
participate in intellectual patterns of value. (Such a conventional
usage is not explicitly discussed by Pirsig.)
John:
right! That's why we're doing it for him. But yes, when "free" is
coupled
with "will", I believe you have delineated the purely human activity of
intellectual analysis. Or artistic creation as well. I think art and
intellect are wedded in the 4th level, an important point I haven't been
able to convince anybody of yet. But overall, I think we are in
agreement
as to the idea that the rhetorical value of free will, is as a signifier
of
4th level patterning.
Is what I've been saying.
Steve:
Also important here is the MOQ's flat rejection of determinism in both
its metaphysical and conventional forms. The MOQ denies that
intellectual patterns are mechanistically determined by inorganic and
biological patterns. In other words, the MOQ denies greedy
reductionism where intellectual patterns are thought to be (even in
theory) exhaustively explainable in terms of inorganic patterns. (See
the stuff in Lila about a novel stored as variations in voltages on a
computer not being a property of the voltages for the best example of
Pirsig's critique on reductionism.)
Thanks Steve. Right on. I see nothing to argue over anymore. But
I'm
sure something will arise. As some famous philosopher said somewhere, If
we
can't find good ole dialogical opposition then maybe we can create some.
take care,
John
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