Hello everyone

On Wed, Aug 31, 2011 at 12:54 AM, Ham Priday <[email protected]> wrote:
>
> Steve, Dan, DMB, and All --
>
> On Tuesday, 8/30/11 at  9:04 PM, "david buchanan" <[email protected]>
> wrote:
>
>> Steve said to Dan:
>> ...Correct me if I am wrong, but I understood that you disagree
>> with dmb's claim that Pirsig's conception of freedom is about the
>> capacity of a rational agent to freely choose among a set of options.
>>
>> Dan replied:
>> ... Did dmb say that a rational agent does the choosing?
>> That sounds a lot like Ham.
>
> Yep, it sure does!  It's interesting how this truth keeps popping up in the
> discussion, only to be drowned out by the dogma of the MoQ.  A while back
> Steve complained that "Pirsig does not talk about empathy, compassion, and
> love to explain morality."  This led to Matt's recounting of his wedding
> vows.
>
> It isn't easy to explain human values, emotions, and desires when you reject
> the self that experiences them.  If all we are is a set of static patterns
> with no core libido, who or what is it that possesses these feelings?  Who
> is the Knower of Freedom, Quality, or compassion?   And where is Steve's
> "rational agent that does the choosing"?
>
> David emphatically denies that he conceded anything like a free agent to
> Steve.  But here is what he did say:
>
> [dmb to Dan]:
>>
>> If Pirsig can reject the Cartesian self or SOM's self and STILL say
>> that one's behavior is free to some extent, then why can't we?
>> I mean, don't the Pirsig quotes prove that the question of free will
>> can be answered without committing yourself to the metaphysical
>> framework we've already rejected? The question of freedom is still
>> a question about you and your life, don't you think?
>
> Doesn't "one's behavior" imply an agent or self?  And if the "question of
> freedom is about you and your life," how is that life identified other than
> as a proprietary 'self', 'subject', or 'free agent'?
>
> Sooner or later the patterned illusion that Pirsig refers to as one's
> "perception" or "experience" must give way to the autonomous 'I' that knows
> itself, its values, and the reality it experiences.  Only by acknowledging
> the free self can the MoQ survive as a viable and comprehensible philosophy.
>
> This is only my opinion, of course, and it will no doubt incite an effort to
> prove me wrong.  But I sense that others in this community are coming to the
> same conclusion.
>
> Thanks for the opportunity to express an alternative view.
>
> On behalf of individual freedom and personal responsibility,
> Ham

Hi Ham

Thank you for writing. The problem with an autonomous self is the same
problem in seeing certain truth in a story, as I was discussing with
Matt in another thread. The self is no more autonomous than an object
of perception is independent of that self. Reality smears onto the
self and neither subject or object can be taken as independent of the
other. Tat Tvam Asi roughly corresponds with the MOQ notion that self
is a collection of patterns and not existing as a true individual. Yet
the ideas of individual freedom and personal responsibilities are high
quality ideas to be sure.

Thank you

Dan
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