Hi Craig, > [Derek Parfit] > "For some act > of ours to be wrong, because we ought to have acted differently, it > must be true that we could have acted differently. But the relevant > sense of ‘could’ is the hypothetical, motivational sense. And this > sense of ‘could’ is compatible with determinism. Even if our acts are > causally determined, we could have the kind of freedom morality > requires." To clarify, "...for it to be relevantly true that we could > have acted differently, it need only be true that we would have acted > differently if we had wanted to, and had chosen to do so. We can call > this the hypothetical, motivational sense of ‘could’. This sense of > ‘could’ is compatible with determinism. You could have helped the > blind man cross the street in the sense that you would have done so if > you had chosen to do so. It is irrelevant whether, given your actual > desires and other mental states, it was causally inevitable that you > did not choose to act in this way."
Craig: > Parfit's argument shows only that a "causally inevitable" act can be > morally wrong, not that the actor is morally responsible for the act. Steve: What does "morally responsible" mean to you? Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
