Hi Andre, It sounds to me like we are in agreement about how the old free will-determinism issue gets dissolved in the MOQ. Or is there something about my position you see yourself as disagreeing with?
Best, Steve On Tue, Sep 13, 2011 at 2:12 PM, Andre Broersen <[email protected]> wrote: > Steve: > Nice job digging up those quotes and tying them together. > > dmb: > Thanks, Andre. Nice work, as usual. > > Andre: > Thank you Steve and dmb for your kind words in response to my last post. I > had hoped however that it would clarify some issues and perhaps (one could > only hope) that it would 'settle' the seemingly months long debate between > you two but...it seems not. Excuse my own intellectual shortcomings but I am > confused. > > At some stage in the debate, very early on, I had thrown in the idea that > Lila is after something: > "Biologically she's fine, socially she's pretty far down the scale, > intellectually [as an intellectual] she is nowhere. But Dynamically...Ah! > That's the one to watch. There is something ferociously Dynamic going on > with her. All that aggression, that tough talk, those strange bewildered > eyes." > > The way I interpret this (and correct me if I'm wrong) is that Lila, from > the biological point of view struggles to follow Dynamic Quality. She knows > she's 'over the hill'. She wants some sort of social recognition/security. > In this way she is acting morally, what I would term responsibly. > > Place this in the context of the evolutionary value continuum, the struggle > between preference and probability (Lila's stay with Phaedrus but eventual > return to Rigel)"As such, it's apparent that this 'value' continuum (of > freedom) stretches between largely determined sub-atomic particles to > complete artistic freedom. This is important (metaphysically) as this > continuum facilitates, in a largely deterministic physical world, a notion > of moral responsibility and a considerable intellectual freedom for an > individual regarding aesthetic decisions."( Anthony's PhD, P 137). > > So what is a morally responsible action then? > > Given Pirsig's moral framework as the static levels being the fundamental > grounding of moral organization, moral action (i.e. to act morally > responsible) is simply 'one where a higher level takes precedence over the > lower one (e.g. where the social takes precedence over the inorganic [ or in > Lila's case where her social patterns take over from her biological/organic > patterns] while an immoral action is one where a lower evolutionary level of > reality takes precedence over a higher one (e.g. where the biological level > takes precedence over the intellectual)." (ibid pp 93-4) > > Lila's patterns act morally because she wants to 'become part of' a higher > level of quality, the social level. But why did she blow it, in Pirsig's way > of thinking, given the surname he's given her? > > I think this is so because the MOQ posits that the evolutionary process is a > process where all static patterns of value are moving towards Dynamic > Quality. "Lila, individually, herself, is in an evolutionary battle against > the static patterns of her own life"(LILA, p 367) > > Can we still speak of determinism or free will here? > > Of course I argue No. Preferences and probabilities. Will Lila go all the > way towards DQ? No. That is why she blew it. "She wasn't ready to emerge > from her static patterns. She was still locked into them"( AHP tape 4). And > from within that level her patterns would be socially 'determined' or rather > 'dominated'. > > Was Lila's action somehow 'caused'. Are preferences 'caused'? Could she have > acted differently? Yes and no. Thing is that from Lila's point of view this > was probably the best (!) she could manage. Is her social path therefore > 'determined? Yes and no. That depends on what happens. The answer to this is > left open, but we can guess...as Phaedrus does. > > Lila was free to the extent that she followed DQ. She attemps to 'migrate' > from the biologically 'determined' level to higher up: the socially > 'determined' level. > > My confusion comes in when the debate still involves 'causation' and > 'determinism' because somehow Lila 'could have acted differently'. > > Let me use a different example which may sound silly but I hope it gets my > confusion across. The would be sage following DQ. He is after > 'enlightenment. She is after DQ. Could s/he have acted differently? The > sage would say, to make my pursuit successful I HAVE TO weaken/reject my > links with the biological, social and intellectual static levels. I MUST > reject them because I WANT to follow DQ. > > Is the life of the would be sage, the person who seeks DQ/ Enlightenment > predetermined by expressing this preference? Are these values caught in > spiral of causation/determinism? I somehow get the feeling that this is > still playing in the debate. > > Am I wrong or is my confusion unfounded? Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
