Hi Ron,
> Ron: > Not so. Because you based your whole case on the use of the word "us". > "Us" certainly does have metaphysical status because it has practical meaning > in experience. Steve: The point is that it doesn't have some _primary_ metaphysical status, so it doesn't _really_ exist. My concern here is not for the word "us," which is easy to describe without unnecessary baggage, but with the word "REALLY" which calls up all that metaphysical baggage--appearance versus reality crap. Steve: ...Instead it ays "mu" to the free will determinism debate about > whether choices or causal laws are what is REALLY real and > reformulates the issue of freedom to a point where we stop wondering > whether "free will" or "causal laws" are more real. BOTH are real in > the exact same way. Both are intellectual patterns of value. NEITHER > free will nor causality > can claim the the metaphysical high ground--the more primary > metaphysical status. > > Ron: > Dynamic Quality certainly claims the moral high ground in Pirsigs formulation, > it's the good, it is what his entire explanation of morality is based apon > the entire > explanation of evolution is based on. Steve: Dynamic Quality is not equivalent to free will. Free will is an intellectual pattern of value. DQ is the groundstuff of reality. > > Steve: > The metaphysical status that "freedom" has as > Dynamic Quality is not a capacity of will and is in no way threatened > by the fact that humans can often successfully predict experience in > terms of causal laws. > > Ron: > The whole point is that it most certainly is a capacity of will in his > explanation... Steve: Even dmb has denied this. will 1 (wl) n. 1. a. The mental faculty by which one deliberately chooses or decides upon a course of action Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
