Steve said to dmb:The problem with this definition is that the MOQ agrees that
"our actions are not REALLY chosen by us" since "us" doesn't have any
REALmetaphysical status. Lila doesn't REALLY have the patterns, the patterns
have Lila. So this definition doesn't work to show how theMOQ disagrees with
determinism.
Ron commented:
Not so. Because you based your whole case on the use of the word "us".
Steve replied:
The point is that it doesn't have some _primary_ metaphysical status, so it
doesn't _really_ exist.
dmb says:
By your reasoning, Steve, Pirsig's reformulation doesn't work in the MOQ either
because the "one" whose behavior is both free and controlled to some extent
doesn't REALLY exist. By that reasoning, everyone who ever used a pronoun is
wrong about the MOQ. Clearly, this is one of those meaningless, catch-all
criticisms. In fact, it's downright stupid.
Steve continued:
My concern here is not for the word "us," which is easy to describe without
unnecessary baggage, but with the word "REALLY" which calls up all that
metaphysical baggage--appearance versus reality crap.
dmb says:
Leaving aside the fact that you're done the old Platteral shift here (moving
your objection from the nature of the self to the appearance-reality
distinction), you just committed that error yourself in the previous lines,
telling us what Lila REALLY is. On top of that, the definition of determinism
includes, by implication if not explicitly, a denial of free will. It entails a
claim that what appears to be our volitional action is actually an illusion.
But of course the MOQ is not asserting determinism and I am not making any such
claim either. But determinism, by definition, does make that claim - and so do
you.
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