Steve, DMB, I see you two are still going at it.
Most people these days would surely include the freedoms of statistical chance events as part of the "determinism" half of this debate ? (determinism with probabilities) And the "could do / have done different" and "being responsible" moral angle of choice on the "free-will" side in human affairs. Of course Pirsig give's us a moral metaphor for all events right down to the fundamental physical processes, but that doesn't stop us distinguishing between these two kinds of "morality". I'm left with "What's your point?" Steve. Ian On Tue, Sep 20, 2011 at 6:17 PM, david buchanan <[email protected]>wrote: > > Steve said to dmb: > So when James says," make no mistake, indeterminism means chance!" what he > really means isn't randomness but "free will"???? I think that would > constitute "improper use." ...If the options are determinism versus > indeterminism, indeterminism if true cannot support free will since it is > just chance. > > > dmb says: > > Again, you have totally mischaracterized James's essay AND you have totally > ignored the James scholars I've quoted on this topic, scholars who are NOT > relying on a single early essay which was written long before his pragmatism > and radical empiricism were developed. Look, I fully expect you to miss the > point no matter how many times I make it but AGAIN James's is using the > terms "chance" and "indeterminism" to talk about freedom. He is refusing to > use the word "freedom" because people like you have ruined that word with > your confused evasions. But that is what he's talking about. "Chance" is > just another word for freedom. He is absolutely NOT talking about merely > random events, nor quantum mechanics. > > > "I thus disclaim openly on the threshold all pretension to prove to you > that the FREEDOM of the WILL is true. The most I hope is to induce some of > you to follow my own example in assuming it TRUE, and acting as if it were > TRUE. If it be TRUE, it seems to me that this is involved in the STRICT > LOGIC of the case. Its truth ought not to be forced willy-nilly down our > indifferent throats. It ought to be freely espoused by men who can equally > well turn their backs upon it. In other words, our first act of FREEDOM, if > we are FREE, ought in all inward propriety to be to affirm that we are FREE. > This should exclude, it seems to me, from the freewill side of the question > all hope of a coercive demonstrations,-- a demonstration which I, for one, > am perfectly contented to go without." (James, The Dilemma of Determinism) > "...But there are two words which usually encumber these classical > arguments, and which we must immediately dispose of if we are to make any > progress. One is the eulogistic word FREEDOM, and the other is the > opprobrious word CHANCE. The word "chance" I wish to keep, but I wish to get > rid of the word "freedom." Its eulogistic associations have so far > overshadowed all the rest of its meaning that both parties claim the sole > right to use it, and determinists today insist that they alone are freedom's > champions. Old-fashioned determinism was what we may call hard determinism. > It did not shrink from such words as fatality, bondage of the will, > necessitation, and the like. Nowadays, we have a soft determinism which > abhors harsh words, and, repudiating fatality, necessity, and even > predetermination, says that its real name is freedom; for FREEDOM is only > NECESSITY understood, and BONDAGE to the highest is identical with true > freedom. Even a writer as little used to making capital ou > t of soft words as Mr. Hodgson hesitates not to call himself a "free-will > determinist." > Now, all this is a QUAGMIRE OF EVASION under which the real issue of FACT > has been entirely SMOTHERED. Freedom in all these senses presents simply NO > PROBLEM at all. No matter what the soft determinist MEANS by it,--whether he > means the acting without external constraint; whether he means the acting > rightly, or whether he means the acquiescing in the law of the whole,--who > cannot answer him that sometimes we ARE FREE and sometimes we ARE NOT? But > there is a problem, an issue of FACT and not of words, an issue of the most > momentous importance, which is often decided without discussion in one > sentence,--nay, in one clause of a sentence,--by those very writers who spin > out whole chapters in their efforts to show what "true" freedom is; and that > is the question of DETERMINISM, about which we are to talk tonight. > Fortunately, NO AMBIGUITIES hang about this word [DETERMINISM] or about its > OPPOSITE, indeterminism. Both designate an outward way in which things may > happen, and their cold and mathematical sound has no sentimental > associations that can bribe our partiality either way in advance. Now, > evidence of an external kind to decide between determinism and indeterminism > is, as I intimated a while back, strictly impossible to find. Let us look at > the difference between them and see for ourselves. What does determinism > profess? > It professes that those parts of the universe already laid down ABSOLUTELY > appoint and decree what the other parts shall be. The future has NO > AMBIGUOUS POSSIBILITIES bidden in its womb; the part we call the present is > compatible with only one totality. Any other future complement than the one > FIXED FROM ETERNITY is impossible. The whole is in each and every part, and > WELDS IT with the rest into an ABSOLUTE unity, an IRON BLOCK, in which there > can be NO EQUIVOCATION or shadow of turning. > Indeterminism, on the CONTRARY, says that the parts have a certain amount > of loose play on one another, so that the laying down of one of them does > not necessarily determine what the others shall be. It admits that > POSSIBILITIES may be in excess of actualities, and that things not yet > revealed to our knowledge may really in themselves be ambiguous. Of two > alternative futures which we conceive, both may now be really POSSIBLE; and > the one becomes impossible only at the very moment when the other excludes > it by becoming real itself. Indeterminism thus DENIES the world to be one > unbending unit of fact. It says there is a certain ultimate pluralism in it; > and, so saying, it corroborates our ordinary unsophisticated view of things. > To that view, actualities seem to float in a wider sea of POSSIBILITIES from > out of which they are CHOSEN; and, SOMEWHERE, indeterminism says, such > possibilities exist, and form a part of truth. > Determinism, on the CONTRARY, says they exist NOWHERE, and that necessity > on the one hand and impossibility on the other are the sole categories of > the real. Possibilities that fail to get realized are, for determinism, PURE > ILLUSIONS: they never were possibilities at all. There is nothing inchoate, > it says, about this universe of ours, all that was or is or shall be actual > in it having been from eternity virtually there. The cloud of alternatives > our minds escort this mass of actuality withal is a cloud of SHEER > DECEPTIONS, to which "impossibilities" is the only name that rightfully > belongs. > The issue, it will be seen, is a PERFECTLY SHARP one, which no eulogistic > terminology can smear over or wipe out. The TRUTH must lie with ONE side OR > the other, and its LYING WITH ONE SIDE MAKES THE OTHER FALSE." > > > dmb says: > Clearly, James is saying that determinism and indeterminism are unambiguous > terms and the are unambiguously opposed to each other. The former says there > is no possibility to choose because the universe is fixed for eternity and > the latter that's not true. James is saying that they can't both be true, > that taking one position entails a denial of the other. The difference is > "perfectly sharp", as sharp as the difference between "nowhere" and > "somewhere". If you disagree, then I think you're just a very bad reader. > James is clear, precise and beautifully convincing too. Peterson, on the > other hand, is muddy, sloppy and grossly distorting. > > > > > > > > Moq_Discuss mailing list > Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. > http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org > Archives: > http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ > http://moq.org/md/archives.html > Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
