Hi Ron,
> Steve: > What I have been suggesting is a distinction between the (I.) > metaphysical question about free will (do we REALLY have free will? Is > free will or determinism the one correct description of The Way Things > Really Are?) from (II.) non-metaphysical pragmatic versions of the > terms "free will" and "determinism." > > Ron: > As said before I do not think at any time in this long discussion that anyone > defended any of these points of views. Steve: I think you misunderstood. These are the three positions that I myself am defending as the SOM perspective, the MOQ perspective, and the pragmatic perspective, respectively. Ron: You had defended the position that these terms carried too much SOM bagage to be able to be effectivly used in any other BUT from an SOM perspective. You had argued that they were then rendered meaningless and moot from a MoQ(compatabilist) point of view. > 1. You asserted that the terms were allways used and concieved and only hold > their meaning as a diametriclly opposed either/or proposition. Steve: I only ever talked about how the terms are _typically_ used. Ron: > 2.I said "not so" Compatabilism has used them effectivly (enter SEP). Which > states > that they really hold no defintate meaning to begin with and the terms Free > will and > determinism are broad general terms for a wide range of meaning one of them > being > Compatabilism. Steve: I agree. I have been arguing this point against dmb's claim that free will and determinism are always defined as mutually exclusive opposites. For example, you may recall that he kept insisting that it is completely nonsensical to defend moral responsibility and determinism simultaneously, but that is the position that the SEP defines as compatiblism. Ron: > Pirsig quotes confirming MoQ is a form of compatabilism are posted. Steve: I think you _can_ look at it as a compatiblism. Where dmb and I differ with respect to compatiblism and the MOQ is that dmb sees free will beginning where determinism ends (with his insistence that free will and determinism can only be understood as mutually exclusive opposites) whereas I follow the SEP definition of compatiblism which says that free will and determinism can be held as simultaneously true. (Saying that free will begins where determinism ends is not compatiblism according to the SEP. It is just the belief consistent with the traditional SOM notion of free will. No SOMer who asserts free will thinks that free will means we can just will ourselves to fly. Constraints on the circumstances where free will is in play is always assumed in the notion of free will rather than being a compatiblism between free will and determinism. Compatiblism says that even though determinism is true, we nevertheless have free will.) Ron: > Yet you still frame the problem around the SOM bagage, the one that holds > to a particular objective interpretation of the terms. Steve: That's not true. What I did was offer you my exploration of this complex issue by defining the two terms (free will and determinism) in three different ways. We have the mutually exclusive opposites of SOM, the MOQ compatiblism in terms of Big Self and small self, and the pragmatic compatiblistic "baggage free" versions. > Steve: > I. On the metaphysical side of the issue, we have to further > distinguish between SOM and the MOQ. In SOM, the traditional free > will/determinism question is one about the Cartesian self and the > extent to which it can have any control in an otherwise deterministic > world governed by that set of mechanistic causal laws mentioned > earlier. The MOQ of course says, "mu" to that version of the free > will/determinism question since it does not accept the S-O premises on > which it is based. But it has its own metaphysical version of the > question of freedom which is not articulated in terms of "will" as a > capacity of the Cartesian self. It replaces that sort of self with > small self, i.e. a collection of static patterns of all four types, > and Big Self, i.e. DQ. Big Self is free. Small self is determined, > i.e, controlled by static patterns. The question thus gets dissolved. > Free will and determinism are both true and both false depending on > which "self" you are talking about. They are compatible when thought > of as referring to different notions of selfhood. They are > incompatible notions where only one can correctly apply when referring > to just one of these notions of selfhood. (My complaint here has been > that in talking about Pirsig's reformulation of the question of > freedom is that "will" seems like the wrong word. And note that in > Lila, Pirsig did not explicitly call his notion of freedom as the > extent to which one follows dynamic quality "free will." I think it > would be best not to use the term "free will" since it is likely to > only lead to confusion while we have plenty of other Pirsigian ways of > talking about freedom without it.) > > Ron: > Which is what this really all about, YOU being stuck-on the metaphysical > baggage. You dislike the term "will".. or "self" but what other terms > simply, plainspoken pragmatically be more accurate? what else is more > useful to predicate the act of disinguishing between two types of selfhood > or explain the act of following or choosing each in experience? > Do we really want to go the route of esoteria? is it an effective rhetorical > tool? Steve: My concern is to do justice to the MOQ's conception of self which is not the sort of thing about which we ask such questions as "do we HAVE free will." There is certainly freedom in the MOQ construction of things, but as DQ it is no one's possession. See RMP Annotation 29 "The MOQ, as I understand it, denies any existence of a “self” that is independent of inorganic, biological, social, or intellectual patterns. There is no “self” that contains these patterns. These patterns contain the self. This denial agrees with both religious mysticism and scientific knowledge. In Zen there is reference to “big self” and “small self” Small self is the patterns. Big self is Dynamic Quality." > Steve: > II. On the pragmatic side of the issue, if we are going to take an > innocuous non-metaphysical view of free will, it only seems fair that > we ought to be willing to do the same for determinism, and when we do > that we find that free will and determinism are compatible concepts. > Instead of free will being the faculty of a Cartesian self to function > as an internal ultimate cause which can occasionally violate the > external laws of causality, it is merely the fact that we make > choices, act on our desires and intentions, and could have acted > differently if we had wanted to. Likewise, instead of taking > determinism to insist on causality as the one true way of thinking > about all of reality, it is simply the human hope for increasing our > power to predict and control things by making explanations of things > in terms of causality (the non-metaphysical kind of causality), with > the recognition that there is much more to life that predicting and > controlling things. On this pragmatic account, I see no reason why > becoming better at predicting could be held as mutually exclusive with > the ability to act responsibly. In fact, the more determinism there > is, the more meaningful our free will is since our actions have > predictable consequences. If the importance of free will is thought to > be moral responsibility, then clearly being held responsible only > makes sense if our actions have predictable results. On this view > (from Dennett), moral responsibility is not only compatible with > determinism but is predicated on it. Note that if someone says, "how > can we be held morally responsible if everything we do is controlled > by forces beyond our control?," this person has clearly slipped back > into an SOM metaphysical version of the free will/determinism which > says that one or the other--either free will or mechanistic causal > determinism--is the way things REALLY are and our choices are perhaps > mere illusions. A pragmatist doesn't ask which description (causality > or choice?) is what is REALLY going on. Both are intellectual > descriptions made by human beings because human beings have the > desires they have (descriptions which are forever entangled with those > human values) rather than because a particular account free of human > values was simply handed to us by the universe. > > Ron: > In that Pragmatic vein, The Pragmatist does not ask which one is true > BUT a Pragmatist DOES ask which one is better in a given circumstance. Steve: Agreed. To wonder about whether free will and determinism oppose one another is to ask for circumstances where one belief could get in the way of the other. If determinism is about predicting and controlling things and free will is about moral responsibility and neither is about saying what is really going on in the world beyond delusions to the contrary, it isn't clear to me that these ideas are in any necessary or logical opposition. Ron: > A Pragmatist MIGHT even ask which one is moraly superior in a metaphysical > explanation.ex." DQ is morally superior to SQ. " Thus big self is morally > superior > to small self, freedom is superior to determinism. Steve: Talking about the issue in terms of metaphysical concepts like Big Self and small self is something a pragmatist is unlikely to do, but I see nothing wrong with unpacking the issue in those terms as far as the MOQ is concerned. In fact, I'm pretty sure this was my idea. I am the one who is suggesting that we do so. This is how I think Pirsig should have unpacked the free will/determinism issue rather than using the "extent to which..." phrasing. Ron: > You really dont like this idea do you? > > You keep trying to reframe it as an SOM explanation Steve: No, I _do_ like it. That's why I recommended it. I think it helps us _avoid_ conflating the terms with the traditional SOM construction of the problem of human freedom. Best, Steve Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
