Hello everyone On Tue, Nov 22, 2011 at 4:16 PM, david buchanan <[email protected]> wrote: > > Dan quoted SEP: > "James made no concerted attempt to show or prove that the principle of > pragmatism was correct. In his lectures, he put it into practice, solving > problems about squirrels, telling us the meaning of truth, explaining how we > can understand propositions about human freedom or about religious matters. > But in the end, inspired by these applications, we are encouraged to adopt > the maxim and see how well things work out when we do so." > > Dan commented on the quote: > This is what I see you [Dave, but probably Matt, too] doing by sweeping away > such questions as: is there a sound when a forest with no one around and does > Don's dog dish exist when he walks out of the room. You're in effect telling > us (like James) that high quality intellectual patterns work well in the real > world so we should forget about questioning them. We should just take them > for granted. I don't like that, though. That doesn't seem like philosophy to > me... it seems more like giving in... ...I thought the quote might help shed > light on my reasoning. > > dmb says: > I don't follow your reasoning and I wonder where you got the impression that > that I'm sweeping away questions or taking answers for granted.
Dan: I got that impression on account of your insistence on that common sense reality tells us objects have a permanence and that should be the end of the inquiry. My question to Matt was: What did Robert Pirsig mean when he said the historical defense of philosophical idealism is, what tree? in You seem to be saying trees are hypothetical but dog dishes are not... that we all share a common sense notion of object permanence instilled in us since infancy and that is enough. End of inquiry. I am encouraged (by Robert Pirsig's words) to look at the presuppositions we form about reality. I don't see any difference between forming presuppositions about hypothetical trees falling in forests when no one is around and hypothetical dog dishes that exist when no one is around. The claim that Don is a friend of Matt's and that Don has a dog dish is hearsay evidence. It wouldn't hold up in a court of law. And it is certainly hypothetical that the dog dish exists when no one is around. dmb: >The quote seems to be saying that James didn't present pragmatism as any kind >of foundational philosophy. It is a method for determining truths rather than >a truth to be proven. And to be consistent about things, the best way to >determine the truth of pragmatism is to try it out. I'm not sure what this >quote has to do with what I was doing, which was talking about a dude's dog >dish in terms of the infant learning "object permanence" and the perception of >everyday objects AS OPPOSED to metaphysical objectivity or scientific >objectivity. Dan: You seem to be telling me (and others) that the best way of understanding the MOQ is to accept its framework and see how well things work out when we do so. I feel it is better to ask questions... to probe the nuances of the MOQ. Your talking about some dude's dog dish in terms of object permanence only reinforces the notion that objects exist independently of observation. And we're not talking about perception of everyday objects here... this is a metaphysical inquiry into how presuppositions inform our perception of everyday reality... we are (or at least I am) attempting to look behind the curtain, so to speak, to reveal a metaphysical impossibility that is taken for granted in the "real world." >dmb: > I was making a case for the empirical basis of ordinary objects like dog > dishes. Dan: As am I. dmb: > I was also saying that the analogues and ghost are the inventions that have > been fit enough to survive. We can't think outside the mythos and, for the > most part, the mythos works. Just as your biological structures have evolved > over billions of years so that your very body is the product of countless > upward evolutionary latches, so is the mythos and logos. I mean, even the MOQ > evolutionary hierarchy is really just a way to organize all the static stuff > that's already in the encyclopedia, you know? The box cars full of static > patterns, the one in Pirsig's analogy, is miles long. Can you imagine what > that kind of weight and speed would do if it hit a wall or derailed? James > used the analogy of a flywheel. That momentum is what keeps us from > converting back to the caves with every generation and it works on the > personal level too so that you don't have to learn how to tie your shoes > every day. Dan: I see nothing that we disagree about here. What I am asking is: What presuppositions is our mythos constructed upon? We take it for granted that we don't invent reality... that it has been here all along, way before we were born, and it will be here long after we're dead. There is a real history to the world completely apart from us. That is a high quality idea to be sure. But that idea is informed on presuppositions that are unverifiable. Of course we cannot think outside the mythos... but what is it that holds it all together? I think the MOQ would say experience holds the mythos together and outside of experience there is no way of knowing anything. The concept of object permanence is a handy tool and one we could hardly survive without but that doesn't mean it constitutes reality, neither everyday nor metaphysical. > > > Dan said to Matt and dmb: > ...I am questioning our perception of reality. It is a common-sense notion > that conceptual objects have permanency... that they're there whether we can > empirically verify them or not. You and Dave seem to be defending this notion > though of course I might be reading you both wrongly. You seem to be saying > some presuppositions are true because they are globally accepted while others > are on shaky ground on account of being specifically accepted. > My thoughts run something like this: by passing over or ignoring the question > concerning "what tree?" or "what dish?" we set up a presupposed scenario that > seems to mirror the common-sense reality we all agree upon. I'm not saying > trees and dishes do not exist. I'm questioning the validity of our belief > that those presupposed objects exist apart from the experience that informs > us they exist. > > dmb says: > Again, I don't know where you're getting these conclusions. In fact, as I > explained, it was my impression that the dog dish was actually known by an > actual person whereas the tree that falls when nobody's around is strictly > hypothetical. It's a question about a thing that is not known by any actual > person. That's why we can rightly ask, "what tree?". But if don is talking > about the dish he just saw 10 seconds ago and we ask, "what dish?", I think > we are being un-empirical and excessively skeptical. If things like dog > dishes sometimes vanished, we might have some empirical reason to be > skeptical but, as far as I know, nobody has ever experienced such a > disappearing act, except for pretend in magic shows and the like. Dan: What evidence do you have to support your hypothesis that the dog dish was actually known by an actual person? The only evidence I've seen is that Matt says so. That kind of evidence is not admissible in a court of law. It is hearsay evidence. Why should we take such evidence as proof that Don's dog dish exists? I walk in the forest quite a bit and I see many trees that have fallen. I can tell you about those trees. They are real. But my telling you isn't empirical evidence. It is hearsay. Is there any reason for you to believe those trees are more hypothetical than is Don's dog dish that Matt told you about? But all that is really beside the point... isn't it? Thank you, Dan Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
