dmb disagreed with Steve:
The difference between Rortyism and the MOQ is very much like the difference
between no empiricism and radical empiricism, between zero empiricism and total
empiricism. I've been trying to explain this to you and Matt for several years
and so there are lots and lots of arguments. You can claim to remain
unpersuaded but you can't claim there are no arguments.
Steve replied:
...The point is just that the term "relativism" gets you nowhere in saying what
the difference is between the thoughts of these two thinkers since neither is
an SOMer who could buy into the SOM premise of absolutism/relativism. Neither
has any knockdown arguments to convince Nazis not to be Nazis, and neither is
immune from having their thoughts co-opted by Nazis. When you accuse others of
being relativists, you seem to be claiming to have something that we don't
have. What is it? What sort of foundation for your claims to ethical or
epistemic truth do you think you have that others (Matt?, Marsha?, Rorty?, me?)
can't also claim to have?
dmb says:
Are you saying that you do not see how empiricism makes a difference? That is
exactly what the MOQ has, whereas Rorty doesn't. Pragmatism is an empirical
theory of truth but Rorty replaces truth with intersubjective agreement.
Radical empiricism is a very empirical epistemology, whereas Rorty thinks we
ought not be doing epistemology. Pirsig says morals and values are as real as
rocks and trees, whereas Rorty finds himself adopting a kind of philosophical
ethno-centrism. These are the differences that lead to relativism or not.
Empiricism is what Rortyists like you and Matt do not have.
And I'll remind you that within this kind of radical empiricism, Quality is the
primary empirical reality. And that makes all the difference in the world.
What's odd about this is that I gave the answer (empiricism) and then you asked
the question. What sort of misunderstanding does that represent? How can you
not see that empiricism is going to have a major impact on the question of
relativism? You do realize that empiricism is a set of standards about what is
and is not true, don't you? You do understand that classical pragmatism is a
theory of truth, a method for determining the truth, don't you? And you can see
that intersubjective agreement isn't necessarily empirical at all, don't you?
If memory serves, Rorty admits that he's got no way to deal with "Nazis".
Pirsig, on the other hand, thinks we can prevent that kind of debasement of
pragmatism by making sure that pragmatism does NOT just mean doing what's
"practical". The "MOQ avoided this attack by making it clear that the good to
which truth is subordinate is intellectual and Dynamic Quality, not
practicality." What James actually meant by "practical" was NOT social or
biological goods, but an intellectual and conceptual species of the good that
is good when it is put into actual practice. Intellectual truths are practical
in the sense that they are put to work in experience, put to work in practice,
as opposed to remaining aloft among abstractions, as opposed to purely
theoretical truths. It's not that James was confused about this so much as his
critics were. Pirsig describes the view of these critics as a
"misunderstanding" and a "misinterpretation" of James.
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