Hi dmb,
> dmb said to Steve: > You're asking the question in response to my answer to the question. Wouldn't > it make a lot more sense to ask about the answer rather than ask the same > question again? Is there something unclear about the answer I already gave or > do you love it so much that you want another serving? Anyway, to repeat the > answer already given, the criticism is "about the consequences of thinking > that conversation is the only constraint on truth. That's what his critics > balk at...". > > > Steve replied: > You've told me that you and others balk at a particular statement, but that > doesn't answer my question. You haven't defined what relativism is. If you > define relativism to mean saying the words "there are no non-conversational > constraints on inquiry" then no doubt Rorty is a relativist by your lights. > But I suspect you must have something more general in mind for what a > relativist is. Please make that definition explicit so we can see how Rorty > fits the bill of a dangerous relativist while James doesn't. > > dmb says: > Oh, dude. You're doing it again. I answered this already. I supplied the > answer directly to you, in detail, in this same thread, connecting my use of > "relativism" with Pirsig's use of the term. This was all asked and answered > about a week ago. It seems pretty clear to me and I was trying to be careful. Steve: So you keep saying, but I wouldn't keep asking if I could find your answer. What is your definition of relativism? All I know is that you think someone who says "there are no non-conversational constraints on inquiry" is a relativist by your definition, but I don't know what your definition is. > Steve: > Is it _Rorty_ or you who is exhibiting the all or nothingism? It seems to me > that it is Rorty who is saying what we can't have (a metaphysical foundation) > and it is you who is insisting that we are therefore left with nothing. > > > dmb says: > Oh, dude. You are so frustrating. If I'm saying pragmatism is a theory of > truth that rejects prevents one from being a relativist, then how in the > world can you conclude that I'm insisting on nothing? Steve: You are insisting that Rorty leaves us with nothing. I think that we still have everything we ever had that got us this far. dmb: I'm complaining about relativism and in the same breath comparing the pragmatic theory of truth with the fact that Rorty has given up on truth theories. It should also be obvious that the all-or-nothingism complaints are about exactly that. It is this view that foundational, Platonic truth (all) is the only possible kind and since we can't have that, Rorty thinks, we can't have any (nothing) theory of truth. Steve: Wrong. Rorty thinks we can have true beliefs. He agrees with Davidson that based on the success we have in life most of our beliefs must be true. He hasn't given up on truth. He;s given up on the ability of philosophy to add anything to our knowledge of truth--the basic knowledge we surely have if we can wield the word "true" in sentences. dmb: And every time I say we can have something, namely the pragmatic theory, you assume it must be Platonism and you start equating pure experience with objective reality. And then we're right back at the beginning again. And here you've shown me that you thought I was advocating the very thing I was complaining about. How could possibly be any more mistaken? Steve: When did I ever say that you can't have the pragmatic theory of truth. Have it all you want. My point is just that it doesn't do what you are claiming it does in geting something over on Rorty. You can't do anything that he can't do without claiming that theory. dmb: > To top it off, you persist with this direct inversion even though you just > acknowledged it's backwardness, saying "to you [dmb] and your > all-or-nothing-ism that means we have nothing. To him [Rorty] that just means > we'll keep on muddling through as we always have." But this muddling through > is exactly what I mean by Rorty's nothingism. I'm saying there is an option > between those extremes. Steve: Again, it is you who is saying that "muddling through" (Dewey's phrase and a favorite of Rorty) is just nothing. You are the one seeing a choice between all or nothing here in what Rorty is saying. > Steve said: > The conversational sort is the only sort of constraint ON INQUIRY. And what > is inquiry? ...inquiry is concerned with assuaging doubts and doubts are > things that are held and raised by human beings who need to justify beliefs > to themselves and others in their communities. ..What is absent from this > picture that concerns the sort of people who like to accuse others of > relativism is "the world" as a term that are beliefs are to be true _of_. But > that is presumably not your concern. Instead, what you find missing is > "experience." Beliefs are not thought of as true _of_ experience where a > proper correspondence would be in question, but tested in the course of our > daily activities nevertheless. But still, unless you can make something of > how testing functions, you haven't specified anything of the "I have > something that you don't have" nature that Rorty is missing. > > > dmb says: > I don't know how to make it any clearer, Steve. Pragmatism IS the method of > testing. It is a method for settling disputes between rival metaphysical > visions. It is a method for separating real debates from mere verbal disputes. Steve: You are missing the point. The point is that to whatever extent pragmatism is a method of testing, it is not something ruled out as "non-conversational constraints on inquiry." It is just a description of some of the usual ways we go about inquiring. Best, Steve Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
