Hi dmb,
> dmb said: > I don't know how to make it any clearer, Steve. Pragmatism IS the method of > testing. It is a method for settling disputes between rival metaphysical > visions. It is a method for separating real debates from mere verbal disputes. > > Steve replied: > You are missing the point. The point is that to whatever extent pragmatism is > a method of testing, it is not something ruled out as "non-conversational > constraints on inquiry." It is just a description of some of the usual ways > we go about inquiring. > > dmb says: > ...If you could only put some fresh eyes on the matter, you'd see that your > "point" is completely implausible. Just look at what you are saying... > > James's pragmatism says ideas are made true (or not) in experience, which > means there are empirical constraints. > Rorty's pragmatism says conversation is the only constraint on inquiry, which > means there are no such empirical constraints. Steve: I don't think you have any idea what Rorty is talking about as "conversational constraints." As I tried to show you by quoting his explanation of his use of the term, what he is doing is excluding certain sorts of ways of justifying beliefs which amount to essences and skyhooks and such--things that you also rule out. You seem to think that he has also rued out additional things that should be left in which fall under the heading "empirical constraints." I've asked you this before. What exactly do you think he is ruling out that should be left in? And don't give me something so general as to be entirely unhelpful like "experience." Be specific. What sorts of arguments do you think that you can make by claiming empiricism that Rorty has disallowed? dmb: > Therefore, > Rorty's denial of all non-conversational constraints does not deny James's > empirical, non-conversational constraints?!? Such a conclusion violates > common sense and basic logic and common sense, not to mention basic logic and > common sense. > You really don't see how bogus that is? You really can't how empirical > constraints differ from conversational constraints? Steve: I think as soon as you get past these theoretical categories and start talking about specific sorts of arguments for or against specific claims to knowledge, then no, I doubt there is a difference. Remember, pragmatism was invented to dissolve just this sort of metaphysical dispute by moving the conversation from theory to practice. That's what I have been trying to do, but you keep resisting. dmb: If the conversational constraints are the only kind, then where does that leave empirical constraints? Saying they haven't been ruled out is a violation of basic logic and common sense and basic logic. Steve: Not necessarily. That would only be true if these categories "empirical constraints" and "conversational constraints" are are different sets of constraints. Again, be specific. For what situations do these sorts of ways of talking about constraints on what counts as a justified belief give us different conclusions about which beliefs are justified? Are your constraints more constraining than his--more limiting to what can be claimed as knowledge? Then just give me some examples of beliefs that can count as justified with Rorty's supposedly more permissive "conversational constraints" that get flagged by "empirical constraints." Again, what sorts of arguments for the truth or falsity of an assertion can an empiricist make that Rory can't make? Best, Steve Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
