Hi All, dmb presents a well written opinion below. I would like to expand on what he wrote and perhaps make the sentiment more universal. It appears to me that a false division is created between the first two and last two levels. By blending the levels under a Quality paradigm, one can begin to grasp where MoQ is leading.
More below: On 8/12/12, david buchanan <[email protected]> wrote: > > John McConnell said: > ...If you view the relationship of DQ to SQ in this way, and if you view > cosmic evolution as the history of the advance of Dynamic Quality, the > levels of MOQ emerge naturally as sort of the critical points at which phase > changes have occurred. The only place where the levels don't seem > completely natural and obvious to me in this view is the social level and > then the intellectual level. To me the obvious phase change is from the > biological level to a "mental" level which subsumes both the social and the > intellectual levels of MOQ. Social evolution and intellectual evolution > both seem to me to be ways in which DQ continues to push forward and develop > stable patterns of SQ, with intellectual being the more promising and > fruitful avenue of advance. > > > > dmb says: > I think it's pretty clear that Pirsig's four levels are all part of an > evolutionary picture and the first two levels are going to map onto physics > (Big Bang) and biology (Darwinism) quite neatly. This part is easier > understand than the social and intellectual levels but the third and fourth > levels are far more interesting and important. That's where all the action > is, so to speak. Pirsig's aim is a root expansion of rationality and his > main enemy in this respect is "value-free science" and the attitudes of > objectivity that it engenders. The whole value system of the culture is > effected by this scientific objectivity, wherein morals and values are JUST > subjective, just mental, and therefore not quite real. And so we see in the > subtitles of his books that the quest is all about morals and values and > where our forms of thinking have gone wrong with respect to morals and > values. >From the view point of Value, or its qualifier Morality, the mapping of levels becomes consistent throughout. Since I practice the art of science, I feel I can speak towards the first two levels from a different perspective than laymen such as dmb and Pirsig. The idea of a "value free science" is a romantic view of science. It suggests that science is devoted to an amoral description of reality. >From the perspective of Quality, such "romanticism" finds no ground. The descriptions coming from science are based on Value and include morality. I operate within the realm of value when I experiment. I create (or perpetuate) a moral view of existence. Let us take what dmb terms "Darwinism". This biological perspective is a moral view of existence. From this we are taught that a primary goal of existence is survival. From such a goal, everything else stems. I am not religious, but I can understand that some would consider "Darwinism" to be immoral. They would indeed be correct in attributing a perspective of morality onto this form of view. By doing so, they are fully consistent with the idea of a moral universe. There are, of course, alternatives to the Darwinist morality, and each of us chooses that which best describes our relationship with Quality. Personally I do not find "evolution" to be a very good descriptor. Been there, done that. Science provides constructs from which we can create meaning in our existence. Each time science creates a word for something it is providing such a thing Value which can be exchanged. Words are the currency of Value. They are what we exchange to share personal creations of Value. An equation in physics is a presentation of Value, and is shorthand for a phrase, paragraph, or even the Valuistic thesis. The importance of words in creating our perception of existence has been known for thousands of years. The Old Testament describes this and is reiterated by John in Genesis (John 1:1) "In the beginning..." The Semites got their beliefs from the Egyptians who believed that the creation of a word imparted ownership and power over that thing. We are no different now except that words have often replaced that which they label. The Egyptians got their beliefs from the Sumerians, where the idea of a single principle (call it God or Quality or whatever one wants) was proclaimed. We have strayed a long way from that. I suppose one could label that as “wrong” since that is a moral judgement. “You have to have men who are moral... and at the same time who are able to utilize their primordial instincts to kill without feeling... without passion... without judgment... without judgment! Because it's judgment that defeats us.” -Kurtz from Apocalypse Now. > > As David Granger puts it, in his book about John Dewey and Robert Pirsig, > "their respective metaphysics function as instruments of cultural > criticism". (p.70) Granger says "their metaphysics can do things for us and > can be 'put to work' where values are concerned". (p.70) In both cases, > their metaphysics also function as a direct attack on the fact/value > distinction, an attack on subject-object metaphysics. > > "Value-free science has got to go," Pirsig says. Or, in the words of his > eccentric friend Dusenberry,... > > "There's this pseudo-science myth that when you're 'objective' you just > disappear from the face of the earth and see everything undistorted, as it > really is, like God from heaven. But that's rubbish. When a person's > objective his attitude is remote. He gets a sort of stony, distant look on > his face. The Indians see that. They see it better than we do. And when > they see it they don't like it." (p.32 of Lila) Yes, this is Pirsig's perspective of Science. He creates a demon which he feels he needs to battle against. However, any scientist will tell you that he is interpreting reality in a subjective manner. Science is provisional and it is constantly changing depending on the morals of the day. Science is a metaphysics which operates through the principles of measurement. Measurements are man-made methods for construction of a meaningful universe. Meaning is an expression of Value. However, the admonitions of Pirsig are entirely appropriate given the credence which Science is given in today's world. The two dimensional "understandings" of science have replaced that which science is describing. The layman needs to understand that science is simply a presentation of reality. It's strength is in its usefulness. Since man is highly adept at influencing that which lies around him, any construct which enables this is considered to be of value (this can be a negative value as well). Science is an expression of Value. > > "Dewey's main point," Granger says, "is that the common belief in the > separation of the domains of science and value is ultimately parasitic on a > false separation of our cognitive and affective lives, the 'objective' and > 'subjective' modes of our relations with the world." (p.77) This "common belief" is a projection of both Dewey and Granger in order for them to express their own sense of value. These beliefs exist in their imaginations and they seek to dispel them. All metaphysics is personal, and these men cannot objectively claim that a separation exists. However, what they say is relevant towards their own personal sense of Value, and can help others to see things in a different way. We need to comprehend that using an objective premise to analyze the objective is logic feeding on itself. This is the Church of reason. > > The critique of our attitudes and assumptions is one of the main themes in > their attack on objectivity but it also includes a rejection of what Pirsig > calls "the metaphysics of substance" or what we might call ontological > realism, scientific naturalism or simply physicalism. Despite the fact that > the first two static levels of the MOQ fit neatly with the scientific > explanations for the physical and the biological, the MOQ is built upon a > radically different metaphysical premise wherein everything begins with > experience, not physical phenomena. In ZAMM, when Pirsig says that "Quality > is the source and substance of everything", he's talking about Quality as > the continuing stimulus which causes us to create reality as we understand > it, as the stimulus which causes us to create analogy upon analogy. "Man is > a participant in the creation of all things", he says. In Lila, we get the > same idea in slightly different terms and we see how it functions as a > direct assault on subject-object metaphysics. Along with William James, > Pirsig says... > > "[S]ubjects and objects are not the starting points of experience. Subjects > and objects are secondary. They are concepts derived from something more > fundamental which he [James] described as 'the immediate flux of life which > furnishes the material to our later reflection with its conceptual > categories'." (p.364-5) As I presented in my earlier paragraph, this "attack on objectivity" provides a conundrum. To fully incorporate what dmb presents, one must consider this to be a "subjective attack on objectivity". However, the sense provided is that there is an "objective attack on objectivity", which is of course self-defeating. "Subject-Object Metaphysics" is created into an object in order for it to be attacked. This is a classic case of a paradox. But, such a thing is necessary. One must step away from the idea that such a thing as "subject-object" metaphysics even exists to become aware of what lies outside of it. By realizing the paradox, one can step outside in an intuitive manner and see in a different way. James has created a false dichotomy with his "flux of life" as distinct from the "our" he distinguishes it from. We are the flux of life; it is not something outside of us. This is the meaning of a Value centered universe. The conceptual categories are the flux itself; they are an expression that is flux. There is merit is what James presents as "the result of experience". However, experience is something we create and is part of the flux of life. In this sense we could say that experience is secondary, but of course it is not. Pure experience is an objectification of that which we create. According to James, this form of experience is that which does not contain an intellectual component. We must also realize, however, that the intellectual component is also experience and it is difficult to deny it from being "pure experience". Existence is dynamic regardless. This is Zen teaching. One must simply look at it in that way. A continual creation; we are the big bang. > > In both books DQ is not anything like the physical ground of reality. All > the various ways of referring to DQ will indicate that we're talking about > experience itself rather than the underlying causes and conditions of > experience. On top of James's terms for it (pure experience, the immediate > flux of life), there is Northrop's "undifferentiated aesthetic experience", > Pirsig's "primary empirical reality", "direct everyday experience", > "continuing stimulus", "cutting edge of experience" and many others. In a > nutshell, all these concepts say the same thing, reality is experience and > all concepts are derived from that, including the idea that physical reality > comes first and concepts have arrived on the evolutionary stage only > recently. There is DQ which we use to converse with, and there is DQ. Once we objectify it through conversation we must deal with it as such. Such "dealing" is simply conveying a subjective experience. The term DQ results in the creation of all sorts of experiences in each one of us. These experiences are only "correct" in that they bring us meaning. Meaning itself is provisional and continually fluxing. Of course there are other phrases as dmb points out, but each one is simply intended to communicate a personal credo. That reality is experience is certainly one belief system. John Locke believed such. The idea of a tabula raza provides this as well. This would indicate that the experience we create is all that there is in terms of reality. However, the imagination provides alternatives to this singular point of view. As analogy, one could view experience as water filling a cup. The amount of water in the cup denotes the sum total of experience. However, the shape of the water (confined to the cup) is due to "forces which lie outside of experience”. This is just common sense. > > This can seem like a very perplexing paradox and it's where the metaphysical > shift from SOM to the MOQ can just end up with a lot of gear-grinding noise. > Pirsig wants to frame the whole thing in terms of evolutionary growth of > static patterns with DQ as the generative force behind that evolution but > it's very important, I think, to make sure we don't simply posit DQ as some > kind of ontological substance or God-like intelligence. DQ is not some > mysterious and invisible stuff behind the scenes; it's only unknowable in > the verbal, conceptual, intellectual sense. DQ is just experience that's so > simple, immediate and direct that it's what you know even before you have a > chance to think about it or reflect on it or otherwise sort it into > conceptual categories. That's what makes it dynamic rather that static; it's > pure experience rather than the conceptualized or verbalized abstractions we > add to experience. DQ is a creation which is meant to impart meaning. It is part of the Church of Reason. It becomes that which our minds project. In my opinion, DQ is not just experience for that is an injustice. SQ is also experience, so there is no way to distinguish the two. Perhaps a better way to project DQ (and stay consistent with MoQ) is to say that DQ is the "creative power". It is that from which experience results. DQ only exists in the present tense and is an act of creation. One can consider it as a "crack" through which experience flows. To say that DQ is experience is misdirecting one into the world of subject object metaphysics. We cannot create something and then turn around and say that it creates us. > > This evolutionary picture is used to paint each of us as "a cohesion of > changing static patterns of this Quality". "The words Lila uses, the > thoughts she things, the values she holds, are the end product of three and > a half billion years of the history of the entire world. She's a kind of > jungle of evolutionary patterns of value. She doesn't know how they all got > there any more than any jungle knows how it came to be". (Lila p.138) Yes, and to extend this analogy, Pirsig is no different to such Jungle. One cannot claim to be on the outside looking in. What one does is relate experience. Pirsig is relating his own as a narrative wherein he creates the protagonist Lila. While some kind of hierarchy to existence is meaningful, much of it is based on pride. Any “knowing” is a creative process, for there is nothing to know. If such creation includes the analogy of changing static patterns, that is fine. It does not mean such a thing is true or that it is the best way to know. It works for Pirsig, just like God being a “father” worked for Jesus. But it is all representational. It stems from something behind the depictions. The questions here would be “Why does Pirsig use the metaphor or patterns? What is he trying to say? Is there another way of saying it?” > > It might be tempting to simply plug this claim into the standard scientific > worldview or otherwise assume Pirisg is only saying that people evolved on > earth over time. But actually he's already challenging the subject/object > distinction in a very big way. As other philosophers have said, Pirsig is > painting a picture wherein the subjective self is NOT ontologically distinct > from objective reality but rather we are always embodied and already > culturally situated by the time we can ever begin to think about "reality". > Yes, of course. One can also see that such statements are self-defeating. One is creating an object out of "we". We create experience, such experience includes both the objective reality and the subjective reality (both objective depictions). That we are culturally situated is an experience that Pirsig is creating and imparting to us. This does not make such a statement true, but is simply meant to stimulate our imaginations and progress with self-inquiry. The question would be: "Why is the idea of cultural situation important for understanding Quality?" > > "In traditional, substance-centered metaphysics, life isn't evolving toward > anything. Life's just an extension of the properties of atoms, nothing more. > It has to be that because atoms and varying forms of energy are all there > is. But in the MOQ what is evolving isn't patterns of atoms. What's evolving > is static patterns of value, and while that doesn't change the data of > evolution it completely up-ends the interpretation that can be given to > evolution." (Lila p. 139) Me thinks that Pirsig relies a bit too heavily on Science here to make his point. The Energy construct being one such reliance. What is energy? Pirsig uses the concept of evolution to up-end the concept of evolution. This is again food for thought and not a statement of truth. > > Please notice that Pirsig is not trying to outdo the cosmologists by > developing a better version of the big bang theory and he's not trying to be > the biggest, strongest evolutionary biologist either. He's using these > evolutionary perspectives to frame a moral hierarchy for actual living > people in the present. He uses Lila (the character) as a kind of test case > by which we can examine and explore this moral hierarchy. Through this > framework we learn along the way how and why "she does and does not have > quality" at the same time. If she only had inorganic quality, she'd be dead. > Biologically speaking, she's past her prime but hell yea, baby, she had lots > of hot, slippery quality - and she had it all night long. Especially if > you're wearing those beer-goggles. But socially she's pretty far down the > scale, quite contemptible in fact, and intellectually she is nowhere. Zip, > zero, nada. Well, I don't quite agree with this paragraph, but so be it. Pirsig creates the concept of Lila for a little more than that. However, that is a good start. > > The rivalry between social level Rigel and the intellectual author helps to > show the difference between social and intellectual values, but the > historical and political examples (especially in chapters 22 and 24 of Lila) > are much more helpful and detailed. And it also helps that this explanation > is not just illustrated by way of fictional characters but rather based on > knowable, checkable and public realities. This is not just a way to explain > the levels, however, because, as I pointed out at the very start, for both > Pirsig and Dewey, "their respective metaphysics function as instruments of > cultural criticism". Using cultural norms to criticize cultural norms… Yes, the levels are an analogy. They are not necessary to present Quality in metaphysical terms. As dmb says the levels are instruments for exposition. There are many other ways to do the same thing and have been done throughout the ages. Let us not get too stuck on the levels for they will block an awareness of Quality. Let us ask what they are meant to impart in terms of Quality Cheers, Mark > > > > > > > > > > > > Moq_Discuss mailing list > Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. > http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org > Archives: > http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ > http://moq.org/md/archives.html > Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
