"When Messrs. Schiller and Dewey now explain what people mean by truth, they are accused of denying ITS existence. These pragmatists destroy all objective standards, critics say, and put foolishness and wisdom on one level. A favorite formula for describing Mr. Schiller’s doctrines and mine is that we are persons who think that by saying whatever you find it pleasant to say and calling it truth you fulfil every pragmatistic requirement.I leave it to you to judge whether this be not an impudent slander. Pent in, as the pragmatist more than anyone else sees himself to be, between the whole body of funded truths squeezed from the past and the coercions of the world of sense about him, who so well as he feels the immense pressure of objective control under which our minds perform their operations? If anyone imagines that this law is lax, let him keep its commandment one day, says Emerson. We have heard much of late of the uses of the imagination in science. It is high time to urge the use of a little imagination in philosophy. The unwillingness of some of our critics to read any but the silliest of possible meanings into our statements is as discreditable to their imaginations as anything I know in recent philosophic history. Schiller says the true is that which ’works.’ Thereupon he is treated as one who limits verification to the lowest material utilities. Dewey says truth is what gives ’satisfaction.’ He is treated as one who believes in calling everything true which, if it were true, would be pleasant." -- William James, Pragmatism
"Yet in the choice of these man-made formulas we cannot be capricious with impunity any more than we can be capricious on the common-sense practical level. We must find a theory that will WORK; and that means something extremely difficult; for our theory must mediate between all previous truths and certain new experiences. It must derange common sense and previous belief as little as possible, and it must lead to some sensible terminus or other that can be verified exactly. To ’work’ means both these things; and the squeeze is so tight that there is little loose play for any hypothesis. Our theories are wedged and controlled as nothing else is. Yet sometimes alternative theoretic formulas are equally compatible with all the truths we know, and then we choose between them for subjective reasons. We choose the kind of theory to which we are already partial; we follow ’elegance’ or ’economy.’ Clerk Maxwell somewhere says it would be “poor scientific taste” to choose the more complicated of two equally well-evidenced conceptions; and you will all agree with him. Truth in science is what gives us the maximum possible sum of satisfactions, taste included, but consistency both with previous truth and with novel fact is always the most imperious claimant." -- William James, Pragmatism "In the past our common universe of reason has been in the process of escaping, rejecting the romantic, irrational world of prehistoric man. It's been necessary since before the time of Socrates to reject the passions, the emotions, in order to free the rational mind for an understanding of nature's order which was as yet unknown. Now it's time to further an understanding of nature's order by re-assimilating those passions which were originally fled from. The passions, the emotions, the affective domain of man's consciousness, are a part of nature's order too. The central part." -- Robert Pirsig, ZAMM "Their persistence in telling me that feeling has nothing to do with the question, that it is a pure matter of absolute reason, keeps me for ever out of the pale. Still seeing a that in things which Logic does not expel, the most I can do is to aspire to the expulsion. At present I do not even aspire. Aspiration is a feeling. What can kindle feeling but the example of feeling? And if the Hegelians will refuse to set an example, what can they expect the rest of us to do? To speak more seriously, the one fundamental quarrel Empiricism has with Absolutism is over this repudiation by Absolutism of the personal and aesthetic factor in the construction of philosophy. That we all of us have feelings, Empiricism feels quite sure. That they may be as prophetic and anticipatory of truth as anything else we have, and some of them more so than others, can not possibly be denied. But what hope is there of squaring and settling opinions unless Absolutism will hold parley on this common ground; and will admit that all philosophies are hypotheses, to which all our faculties, emotional as well as logical, help us, and the truest of which will at the final integration of things be found in possession of the men whose faculties on the whole had the best divining power?" -- William James, Absolutism and Empricism > ------------------------------------------------------------ > > On Sep 21, 2012, at 12:02 PM, david buchanan wrote: > > “. . . the Metaphysics of Quality does not insist on a single exclusive > truth. If subjects and objects are held to be the ultimate reality then we're > permitted only one construction of things - that which corresponds to the > 'objective' world - and all other constructions are unreal. [This is widely > known as the correspondence theory of truth - anyone can look it up.] But if > Quality or excellence is seen as the ultimate reality then it becomes > possible for more than one set of truths to exist. Then one doesn't seek the > absolute Truth.' One seeks instead the highest quality intellectual > explanation of things with the knowledge that if the past is any guide to the > future this explanation must be taken provisionally; as useful until > something better comes along." > > "The difference between a good mechanic and bad one, like the difference > between a good mathematician and a bad one, is precisely this ability to > SELECT the good facts from the bad ones on the basis of quality. He has to > CARE! This is an ability about which formal traditional scientific method has > nothing to say. It's long past time to take a closer look at the qualitative > preselection of facts which has seemed so scrupulously ignored by those who > make so much the these facts after they are 'observed'. I think that it will > be found that a formal acknowledgment of the role of Quality in the > scientific process doesn't destroy the empirical vision at all. It expands > it, strengthens it and brings it far closer to actual scientific practice." > (ZAMM 281-2, emphasis is Pirsig's) > > "It is this identity that is the basis of craftsmanship in all the technical > arts. And it is this identity that modern, dualistically conceived technology > lacks. The creator of it feels no particular sense of identity with it. The > owner of it feels no particular sense of identity with it, The user feels no > particular sense of identity with it. Hence, by Phaedrus' definition, it has > no Quality." (ZAMM 290-291) > > "The way to solve the conflict between human values and technological needs > is not to run away from technology. That's impossible. The way to resolve the > conflict is to break down the barriers of dualistic thought that prevent a > real understanding of what technology is - not an exploitation of nature, but > a fusion of nature and the human spirit into a new kind of creation that > transcends both. (like the first airplane flight or the first steps on the > moon.) ...But this transcendence should also occur at the individual level, > on a personal basis, in one's own life, in a less dramatic way." (ZAMM 291) > > Moq_Discuss mailing list > Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. > http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org > Archives: > http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ > http://moq.org/md/archives.html Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
