[Eddo] In other words, MOQ = written Pirsig experience = MOQ . Am I right? This makes MOQ more a personal Brand than a philosophical framework.
[Arlo] I think what you're pointing to is along the lines of saying "pragamtism" and "Peirce", or "idealism" and "Hegel". The general umbrella metaphysical framework versus the specific writings of one individual. I think one reason this distinction remains problematic is that there have been few (if any) articulated metaphysical philosophies that would be divergent enough from Pirsig to warrant their own consideration and yet similar enough to be grouped in the same metaphysical umbrella. But, yes, I think its far more clear if you think of "the MOQ" as the metaphysical ideas proposed by Pirsig. While there is no agreed upon umbrella term (maybe Qualityism?) for divergent but similar ideas, I think the best thing to do is just present disagreement/agreement where it emerges. Sayings like "while Pirsig held SQ and DQ to be metaphysically distinct categories, I think it might be better to consider them 'morphing'". That's a clear and articulate statement that bypasses the morass of 'interpretation'. Instead many on this list seem more intent on legitimizing their 'interpretation' than anything else. Or, worse, on legitimizing the notion that any interpretation is just as valid as any other; Pirsig means whatever you personally want him to mean. Try this, instead of typing "the MOQ" type "Pirsig's ideas". Then make the same point you were going to make. If you do this, you won't really need to worry about a general metaphysical umbrella, and you'll find it much easier to identify when you agree and when you disagree with the author. [Eddo] If a differentiation of the exact written interpretation of Pirsig's experience is suggested and this suggested differentiation fits the contours of the framework. Is this suggested differentiation than considered to be, or not to be, a part of MOQ? [Arlo] Well, I think again there must be (and will be) historical variations that appear. Just like there are several philosophers who would be grouped together as "empiricists" or "idealists". So, sure, there is a common 'contour' that would keep one under an umbrella with Pirsig even with certain disagreements. I don't think its possible to pre-articulate that 'contour', seems to be a job for the historians, but I'd say (1) DQ/sq as primary metaphysical split, and (2) the evolutionary nature of the four levels is probably a good start. Back to my disagreement with Pirsig over human-only social and intellectual levels, no, I do not consider my ideas "part of the MOQ". I do, however, consider my ideas as being built from the same framework. In my head I simply say "Arlo's Metaphysics of Quality". There is a notion here, and I think it stems from a lack of historical understanding, that 'there is ONE MOQ' and we're all here to jockey and lobby for what 'that ONE MOQ' becomes. That's never been the way philosophy works, its always been a running dialogue of agreement and disagreement. Labels and umbrella categories seem to (mostly) appear later. There is not 'ONE pragmatism' that all the pragmatists were arguing over. They were presenting divergent ideas, expressing agreement and disagreement with other authors. All together, the umbrella emerged, but the abstract umbrella isn't really all that meaningful. Think about any other philosophical category you might find interesting. Do you agree with ever author in that category? Do they all agree with each other? [Eddo] Is it only possible to formulate and articulate agreement/disagreement by being very clear about what Pirsig (or anyone) has said? If you are discussing a system isn't it just enough to formulate and articulate agreement/disagreement on logical grounds? [Arlo] I'm not sure how you formulate a 'logical' disagreement (or agreement) if you weren't clear about you were agreeing or disagreeing WITH. The old Emily Litella skits from Saturday Night Live come to mind. (Emily: "I think we need MORE violins on television!" Moderator: "That's VIOLENCE on television." Emily: "Oh, nevermind.") [Eddo] Makes me wonder what Derridah would have to say about this but thats beside the point now. [Arlo] I have sympathies for deconstructionist ideas. Not that I am fully versed in Derrida's arguments, I appreciate the attention he pays to the semiotic meaning of the text-as-whole, and the roles it plays in normalizing/legitimizing power (in the Foucaultian sense). Largely, I think Pirsig's comment in ZMM, "The trouble is that essays always have to sound like God talking for eternity, and that isn't the way it ever is. People should see that it's never anything other than just one person talking from one place in time and space and circumstance. It's never been anything else, ever, but you can't get that across in an essay.", is a recognition of Heideggar's concerns over 'presence' (or at least an acknowledgement of the implied semiotic meaning such a 'god essay' carries). Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
