[Arlo previously]
The basis for social patterns is, IMHO, "activity" (in the Russian sense; 
purposeful, agenic, semiotic, mediated). And the root, the carbon atom, for 
activity is shared attention.

[Craig]
IMHO the root of social activity is shared INtention, rather than shared 
ATtention.  Two people aware of each other watching a bird are not necessarily 
engaged in a social activity, but merely a biological activity. It only becomes 
a ritual if there is shared intention.

[Arlo]
I agree, Craig. I mentioned the definition caveat for "activity" to 
specifically include "purposeful" (which to me is "intentional"). And, I would 
think Tomasello (who's idea on "shared attention" I am using) would agree with 
you too. His description of shared attention includes "mutually recognizing the 
intentionality of the conspecific"; an academic way of saying that shared 
attention depends on recognizing that, like you, the 'other' is acting with 
intention. He uses the term "shared attention" as his ideas derive from 
mediated action, that "intention" requires something to be "acted upon", 
whereas he might say "shared intention" doesn't necessarily convey acting in 
the world. In any event (I can't speak for him, obviously), I would agree with 
your point here, and its a good one to make.

But, I think he would say that two people watching a bird would be social if 
(1) as mentioned both recognize each other in that moment as intentional agents 
in the world, and (2) both recognize that they are sharing a social-semiotic 
reaction to the attentional 'object'. That they DON'T act together in that 
moment is overshadowed by that they COULD act in that moment. Like I said, I 
don't think we are in disagreement in substance, maybe just in terminology.





Moq_Discuss mailing list
Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc.
http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org
Archives:
http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/
http://moq.org/md/archives.html

Reply via email to