Look at how complex this looks for Zizek, I like James, but does he resolve all these issues?
http://quod.lib.umich.edu/o/ohp/12763629.0001.001/1:6/--ontological-catastrophe-zizek-and-the-paradoxical?rgn=div1;view=fulltext David MOn 8 Dec 2014 23:30, David Morey <[email protected]> wrote: > > ---------- Forwarded message ---------- > From: David Morey <[email protected]> > Date: 8 Dec 2014 23:29 > Subject: Re: [MD] DMB on pure experience > To: david <[email protected]> > Cc: > > > Hi David B > > > > A world of pure experience? So take one of those movies where we count how > > many basketball passes are made but fail to observe the gorilla in the > > background until we watch a rerun of the video and someone suggests we look > > out for the gorilla this time. How would James describe this and would he > > avoid suggesting any epistemic gaps? > > > > David MOn 3 Dec 2014 23:55, david <[email protected]> wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > > "The first great pitfall from which such a radical standing by > > > experience will save us is an artificial conception of the relations > > > between knower and known. Throughout the history of philosophy > > > the subject and its object have been treated as absolutely discontinuous > > > entities; and thereupon the presence of the latter to the former, > > > or the 'apprehension' by the former of the latter, has assumed > > > a paradoxical character which all sorts of theories had to be > > > invented to overcome. Representative theories put a mental > > > 'representation,' > > > 'image,' or 'content' into the gap, as a sort of intermediary. > > > Common-sense theories left the gap untouched, declaring our mind > > > able to clear it by a self-transcending leap. Transcendentalist > > > theories left it impossible to traverse by finite knowers, and > > > brought an Absolute in to perform the saltatory act. All the while, > > > in the very bosom of the finite experience, every conjunction > > > required to make the relation intelligible is given in full." -- William > > > James, A World of Pure Experience. > > > > > > > > > As you can see here, James construes subject-object metaphysics as a > > > problem that's existed "throughout the history of philosophy." In other > > > words, it's a philosophical problem. It certainly CAN be described in > > > terms familiar to fans of philosophy, it should be described in those > > > terms. It should be described in terms that non-philosophers can learn by > > > simply using a dictionary or encyclopedia. Notice how James lists some of > > > the various theories that have been invented to overcome the problem > > > created by this "artificial conception of the relations > > > between knower and known"? When the subject (knower) is treated as an > > > entity that is absolutely discontinuous > > > objective entities (known) "all sorts of theories" have "to be > > > invented to overcome" the gap between them. Since this gap is between > > > knower and known, it is called an epistemic gap. These ontological > > > assumptions create a very paradoxical knowledge problem, a truth problem. > > > The various theories listed by James, please notice, are theories of > > > Truth. (Representative theories put a mental 'representation,' > > > 'image,' or 'content' into the gap, as a sort of intermediary. > > > Common-sense theories left the gap untouched, declaring our mind > > > able to clear it by a self-transcending leap. Transcendentalist > > > theories left it impossible to traverse by finite knowers, and > > > brought an Absolute in to perform the saltatory act.) That's basically > > > what all the isms are all about; crossing that epistemic gap. I believe > > > the "representative theories" are a reference to old-school sensory > > > empiricism, the common sense theories would be called naive realism (not > > > really a philosophical position), and the transcendentalists were > > > quasi-theological idealist like Hegel or maybe even Kant, who had > > > introduced the transcendental ego to fill the gap. > > > > > > But James and Pirsig will say that subjects and objects are not entities > > > at all, they are not the ontological starting points of reality or the > > > conditions that make experience and knowledge possible. They're just very > > > handy ideas. They're just thought categories into which we sort > > > experience - and so there is no epistemic gap. > > > > > > Just as Pirsig's rejection of SOM represents a Copernican revolution, > > > James's rejection is described as a revolution, as a "radical > > > reconstruction of philosophy". And of course it's hard to appreciate > > > their solution without first understanding what the problem is all about. > > > > > > > > > How's that? > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Moq_Discuss mailing list > > > Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. > > > http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org > > > Archives: > > > http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ > > > http://moq.org/md/archives.html > Moq_Discuss mailing list > Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. > http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org > Archives: > http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ > http://moq.org/md/archives.html Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
