Davids,
Auxier, in his book, Time, Will and Purpose, contrasts the philosophy of Royce and Peirce with that of James and Dewey in a way that illuminates both: "While Peirce and Royce see *philosophy* as a fairly restricted kind of reflection upon certain kinds of problems that are *already* conceptual in character, Dewey and James want to include the process of conceptualizing the problem as once of the practical problems of philosophy itself. Royce and Peirce will insist that the philosophical problem already comes in conceptual terms, and that philosophy can assist us in re-conceptualizing it, and that this work is as much a priori as empirical. James and Dewey are leery of this move. Effectively, Dewey and James wonder whether *genuine* doubt can be inspired by a problem that is primarily (or even purely) intellectual. Dewey's approach essentially says "let's just pretend the object of experience just is (i.e., exists as) the thing it seems to be" and he goes along his merry way for another three decades. The denotative method of Experience and Nature reworks this postulate into a simplistic theory of reference, but it remains simply an ad hoc device for avoiding tough questions. No wonder people dismissed pragmatism for so long, if that is all there is to pragmatism. Fortunately Dewey got better in the 1930s. And as damning as Dewey's sins are, they seem venal compared to those of James. Peirce complained about James's kidnapping of pragmatism very loudly, and with justice. Neither James nor Dewey is left with any serious, reflective tool for addressing the issue of immediate experience -- just a handful of ungrounded postulates or denotative references. And what is worse, each of them has, in his way, created a stumbling block to the development of solid phenomenology, by psychologizing or naturalizing (or both) the concept of experience." Page 116-117 On Mon, Dec 8, 2014 at 3:30 PM, David Morey <[email protected]> wrote: > ---------- Forwarded message ---------- > From: David Morey <[email protected]> > Date: 8 Dec 2014 23:29 > Subject: Re: [MD] DMB on pure experience > To: david <[email protected]> > Cc: > > > Hi David B > > > > A world of pure experience? So take one of those movies where we count > how many basketball passes are made but fail to observe the gorilla in the > background until we watch a rerun of the video and someone suggests we look > out for the gorilla this time. How would James describe this and would he > avoid suggesting any epistemic gaps? > > > > David MOn 3 Dec 2014 23:55, david <[email protected]> wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > > "The first great pitfall from which such a radical standing by > > > experience will save us is an artificial conception of the relations > > > between knower and known. Throughout the history of philosophy > > > the subject and its object have been treated as absolutely > discontinuous > > > entities; and thereupon the presence of the latter to the former, > > > or the 'apprehension' by the former of the latter, has assumed > > > a paradoxical character which all sorts of theories had to be > > > invented to overcome. Representative theories put a mental > 'representation,' > > > 'image,' or 'content' into the gap, as a sort of intermediary. > > > Common-sense theories left the gap untouched, declaring our mind > > > able to clear it by a self-transcending leap. Transcendentalist > > > theories left it impossible to traverse by finite knowers, and > > > brought an Absolute in to perform the saltatory act. All the while, > > > in the very bosom of the finite experience, every conjunction > > > required to make the relation intelligible is given in full." -- > William James, A World of Pure Experience. > > > > > > > > > As you can see here, James construes subject-object metaphysics as a > problem that's existed "throughout the history of philosophy." In other > words, it's a philosophical problem. It certainly CAN be described in terms > familiar to fans of philosophy, it should be described in those terms. It > should be described in terms that non-philosophers can learn by simply > using a dictionary or encyclopedia. Notice how James lists some of the > various theories that have been invented to overcome the problem created by > this "artificial conception of the relations > > > between knower and known"? When the subject (knower) is treated as an > entity that is absolutely discontinuous > > > objective entities (known) "all sorts of theories" have "to be > > > invented to overcome" the gap between them. Since this gap is between > knower and known, it is called an epistemic gap. These ontological > assumptions create a very paradoxical knowledge problem, a truth problem. > The various theories listed by James, please notice, are theories of Truth. > (Representative theories put a mental 'representation,' > > > 'image,' or 'content' into the gap, as a sort of intermediary. > > > Common-sense theories left the gap untouched, declaring our mind > > > able to clear it by a self-transcending leap. Transcendentalist > > > theories left it impossible to traverse by finite knowers, and > > > brought an Absolute in to perform the saltatory act.) That's basically > what all the isms are all about; crossing that epistemic gap. I believe the > "representative theories" are a reference to old-school sensory empiricism, > the common sense theories would be called naive realism (not really a > philosophical position), and the transcendentalists were quasi-theological > idealist like Hegel or maybe even Kant, who had introduced the > transcendental ego to fill the gap. > > > > > > But James and Pirsig will say that subjects and objects are not > entities at all, they are not the ontological starting points of reality or > the conditions that make experience and knowledge possible. They're just > very handy ideas. They're just thought categories into which we sort > experience - and so there is no epistemic gap. > > > > > > Just as Pirsig's rejection of SOM represents a Copernican revolution, > James's rejection is described as a revolution, as a "radical > reconstruction of philosophy". And of course it's hard to appreciate their > solution without first understanding what the problem is all about. > > > > > > > > > How's that? > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Moq_Discuss mailing list > > > Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. > > > http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org > > > Archives: > > > http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ > > > http://moq.org/md/archives.html > Moq_Discuss mailing list > Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. > http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org > Archives: > http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ > http://moq.org/md/archives.html > -- "finite players play within boundaries. Infinite players play *with* boundaries." Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org/md/archives.html
